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ASBTRACT
This dissertation interrogates the assertion in postcolonial scholarship, especially
from the work of Homi Bhabha that the construction and performance of hybrid identities
act as a form of resistance for marginalized communities against structures of oppression.
While this study supports this assertion, it also critiques how hybridity fails to address
issues of unequal power relations. This has led to an uncritical use of hybridity that
reproduces the very idea of static identity which its proponents claim to transcend.
Through qualitative study of Chinese members of a Pentecostal church in
Malaysia, this study argues that church members engage in “unequal belonging” where
they privilege certain elements of their identities over others. In concert with Pierre
Bourdieu’s conceptions of habitus, field, and capital, unequal belonging highlights how
hybridity fails to capture the intersecting and competing loyalties, strategies, and
complexities of identity formation on a contextual level. Unequal belonging challenges
postcolonial scholars to locate the subtle workings of power and privilege that manifest
even among marginalized communities.
The study first situates the Chinese through an analysis of the historical legacy of
British colonialism that has structured the country’s current socio-political configuration
along bounded categories of identification. The habitus constrains church members to
accept certain Chinese ethnic markers as “givens.” Although they face continuous
marginalization, interviewee data demonstrates that church members negotiate their
ii

Chineseness and construct a “Modern Chinese” ethnic identity as a strategic move away
from Chinese stereotypes. Moreover, conversion to Christianity affords church members
access to cultural capital. Yet, it is limited and unequal capital. In particular, the “Chinese
Chinese,” who church members have demarcated as backward and traditional, are unable
to gain access to this capital because they lack fluency in English and knowledge in
modern, westernized worldviews.
Unequal belonging nuances monolithic conceptions of hybridity. It demonstrates
how church members’ privilege of Christianity over Chineseness exposes the complex
processes of power and privilege that makes westernized-English-speaking Chinese
Christians culturally “higher” than non-English-speaking, non-Christian, Chinese. This
study provides significant contribution to the complex aspect of hybridity where it is both
a site of resistance and oppression.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: POSTCOLONIALISM AND HYBRIDITY
(IN)ACTION

My grandfather had a deadbeat father. When he was six, his father collapsed and
died after playing mahjong and consuming alcohol for two consecutive days. My great
grandmother had enough. The Chinese gods were of no use to her; they offered no
assistance for her troubles. Now a widow, she decided to “switch sides,” embraced
Christianity, and started attending the local Chinese Methodist church. A devoted
Christian, she never missed Sunday worship despite engaging in excessive games of
mahjong six days a week. A heavy smoker, she ultimately contracted mouth cancer and
passed away at the age of 63. She was buried in a Christian cemetery in her hometown,
far away from her deceased husband who was interred in a Chinese cemetery. Already,
my grandfather was exposed to two different sets of identities and worldviews.
My grandfather attended high school operated by Methodist missionaries. A
Chinese pastor, who was also his school teacher, befriended him. The pastor shared with
him the Gospel and evangelized him. His efforts appeared fruitful as my grandfather
agreed to be baptized as a Christian. However, on the morning of his baptism, he was
nowhere to be found. Baffled by this, his teacher confronted him and asked why he shied
away from taking the step of obedience to follow Jesus Christ. My grandfather explained
that by becoming a Christian, he would be dishonoring his late father who was
1

Buddhist/ practitioner of Chinese religious traditions. Who would take care of his grave
once he becomes a Christian? Who would observe Qing Ming and honor his ancestors
once he embraced Christianity?
After that incident, my grandfather would describe himself as a “free thinker”
throughout his adult life. He had some conception of a divine being, but had not given it
much thought. It was not until late in his life that he finally converted to Christianity at
his son’s urging. This time, another pastor convinced him that one should honor the
ancestors while they are still alive and that ancestor veneration was pointless because
they are already dead. They are long gone and no longer around in this world. Satisfied
with this explanation, my grandfather was finally baptized and converted to Christianity.
I still recall those days when I visited my grandfather after his conversion to
Christianity. While he would periodically attend church services and pray to Jesus, he
still made frequent visits to his father and mother’s graves annually during Qing Ming.
He died a few years later and had a Christian funeral. Today, the church where he
attended in the last years of his life conducts yearly memorial services for its deceased
parishioners, and his name is called out and recognized.

What are we to make of this narrative? Perhaps we can speculate that my
grandfather simply wanted to satisfy his son’s wishes. Conversion from one religious
tradition to another cannot be as simple as a story of a stubborn old man finally seeing the
light and turning to the “true” faith. Nor can we describe this as my grandfather’s strategy
to “cover the bases” and have “insurance” for the afterlife. Certainly, these are interesting
discussion topics in their own way, but I am more interested in the story of a man
2

struggling to come to terms with his own identity before finally settling down to what
appears to be a hybridized Chinese Christian identity. Conversion to another religious
tradition entails a conscious shift in one’s sense of grounding to another different
grounding.
Yet, my grandfather’s story shows that conversion does not necessitate a complete
jettisoning of one identity in favor of another. These are complicated and important
questions that require thoughtful examination and analysis beyond the rhetoric of “what’s
in” and “what’s out.” My grandfather’s day to day life showed that he was
simultaneously Chinese and Christian by being not quite one or the other. While his life
story is not the sole impulse of this project, my interests in religion, identity, and
postcoloniality converge together to pursue this research interest.

The Future is Hybrid? Locating the Dissertation
This dissertation focuses on how Chinese Christians in Malaysia construct their
identities, how they express their identities in their daily lives, and how they connect
them to the broader socio-economic, political and cultural context. What goes through a
person’s thought process when they adopt and privilege one worldview over the other?
How do multiple identities affect the way people conceive themselves as both Chinese
and Christian as they negotiate and reinterpret their ethnic, cultural, and religious
traditions? Why is one religious and/or cultural system privileged over the other? How do
these communities stand to benefit by adopting such identity formations? More
importantly, do these hybrid identities serve as a site of power and/or resistance?

3

From its early biological association with notions of impurity to a positive
reclamation in the humanities, the concept of hybridity is associated with the mixing of
identities in instances of cultural contacts and exchanges. In addition, hybridity captures
the ambiguous state of the globalized world with the fracturing and constant shifting of
identities in an increasingly multicultural and intertwined world. No longer seen as a
stable category, identities are negotiated, multiple, and in a constant state of flux that is
dependent on social contexts. In postcolonial studies, hybridity functions as a strategy for
disrupting exclusionist and oppression-based essentialist notions of a pure identity. A
“camouflage” which complicates and muddles essentialist constructions of identity, it is a
“third space” inhabited by the marginalized to expose and disrupt the ambivalence of
colonial rule.1 The presence of the hybrid interrupts and destabilizes the violence inherent
in dominant discourses and structures of oppression. In other words, hybridity, when
performed, acts as a site of resistance.
I want to interrogate the claim that hybridity acts as a resistance strategy in
disrupting essentialist and oppressive power structures among marginalized and minority
communities. While I fundamentally support the assertion that hybrid identities are fluid,
1

Homi Bhabha is the biggest proponent of this idea, especially in postcolonial studies. Since the
publication of, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1995), hybridity has taken off and is widely
discussed in various academic disciplines. Of course, Bhabha is also picking up hybridity from earlier
works and gave a positive treatment of it. For some examples of works from other scholars and novelists
writing on (and critiqued) hybridity, see V.S. Naipaul, The Mimic Men (New York: Macmillan, 1967);
Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race (New York: Routledge, 1997); Ien
Ang, On Not Speaking Chinese: Living Between Asia and the West (New York: Routledge, 1997); Avtar
Brah and Annie Coombes, eds., Hybridity and its Discontents: Politics, Science, Culture (New York:
Routledge, 2000); Anjali Prabhu, Hybridity: Limits, Transformations, Prospects (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2007); Joel Kuortti, and Jopi Nyman, eds., Reconstructing Hybridity: Post-Colonial
Studies in Transition (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007); Keri Iyall Smith, and Patricia Leavy, eds., Hybrid
Identities: Theoretical and Empirical Examinations (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Sten Putz Moslund, Migration
Literature and Hybridity: The Different Speeds of Transcultural Change (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010); and Amar Acheraiou, Questioning Hybridity, Postcolonialism and Globalization
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). I will engage Bhabha and his conception of hybridity later in this
work.

4

negotiated, and constructed, these “qualifiers” have become so familiar and almost a
given that Rogers Brubaker call them “clichéd constructivism… lea[ving] us with a term
so infinitely elastic as to be incapable of performing serious analytical work.”2
Brubaker’s observation highlights how identity discourse is valorized along two poles –
either identity is static and stable or it is constructed and fluid.3 The study of hybrid
identities is also notorious for its heavy and abstract theorizing especially within
postcolonial scholarship. Further, very few postcolonial scholars have analyzed how
hybridized identities manifest on the ground.
Given these shortcomings, I argue in this dissertation that hybridity fails to
highlight and address issues of unequal power relations. I further contend that hybrid
identities, as a strategy for resistance, is not mono-directional (always emerging from the
bottom-up), nor is it clearly liberative. Through an examination of a Chinese-majority
Pentecostal Church in Malaysia, I argue that they engage in what I call “unequal
belonging” where they privilege certain elements of their identities over others.4 In this
case, it is their Christian identities that take precedence over their ethnic Chinese
identities. Through this unequal belonging, I demonstrate how dominance covertly (or
2

Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 38.

3

In addition to the aforementioned Brubaker text, some examples of works addressing the
pervasiveness of binary thinking within identity studies include Veret Amid, and Nigel Rapport, eds., The
Trouble with Community: Anthropological Reflections on Movement, Identity and Collectivity (London:
Pluto Press, 2002); Mervyn F. Bendle, “The Crisis of Identity in High Modernity,” in The British Journal
of Sociology 53, no.1 (2003): 1-18; and Nina Glick Schiller, “Situating Identities: Towards an Identities
Studies Without Binaries of Difference,” in Identities: Global Studies in Popular Culture and Power 19,
no.4 (2012): 520-532.
4

Although this concept has its similarities with “hierarchy,” my use of unequal belonging is
intentional and more complex. While “hierarchy” alludes to simplistic a “top-down” relationship, usually
between the oppressor and the oppressed, unequal belonging addresses the non-vertical relationship within
marginalized groups. This concept points toward a more layered and horizontal working of privilege and
power that are inherent within marginalized groups.
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overtly) masks itself through fluid and dynamic constructions of hybrid identities. My
project hopes to challenge scholars to locate some of the more subtle workings of power
and hegemony entrenched even among marginalized communities. Hybridity’s failure to
address issues of unequal power relations often lead us to uncritically celebrate hybridity
as sites of resistance, thus reproducing the very idea of pure and static identities which
hybridity claims to transcend. Hybridity has become a monolithic “one size fits all”
category and affords little purchase in our analysis of identity formation.
As the material grounding for my study, Chinese Pentecostal Christians in
Malaysia presents a compelling social context in examining hybridity’s claims and adds
an important dimension to the larger issue of identity formation within the comparative
context of postcoloniality and religion.5 A former British colonial territory, Malaysia is a
developing nation with a diverse population consisting of various ethnic and religious
groups. However, ethnic and class tensions between dominant Malays and ethnic
minority groups undergird the nation’s population. The Chinese minority lives in a
precarious environment where dominant Malays constantly stigmatize them as members
of the kaum pendatang (or pendatang), a pejorative term literally translated as
“immigrant group.”
In addition, Christianity, in particular Pentecostal Christianity, is a rapidly
growing religious sect in Malaysia, bolstered by many urban Chinese converts. Yet,
conversion to Christianity usually means that they face double discrimination. The
dominant Malay Muslims distrust Christians because of the proselytizing nature of the

5

Throughout this dissertation, I will be using the terms “identity formation” and “identity
construction” interchangeably.

6

religion. Chinese Christians in Malaysia face very real political, ethnic, cultural, and
religious discrimination.6 Despite this, they remain economically viable and successful,
often “outperforming” the Malays and other ethnic groups.
The Chinese Malaysian context provides a rich resource for my project in
examining the resistive potential of hybridity. I show that the Chinese Malaysian context
highlights the danger of uncritically associating the word “hybridity” with subversion and
resistance. As I shall also demonstrate in this dissertation, Chinese Malaysians are
simultaneously oppressed and privileged. To borrow Brubaker’s term again, such
“clichéd constructivism” fails to see the complexities of unequal power relationships that
manifests within the interstitial spaces and hybrid identities.
This dissertation employs an interdisciplinary approach, bringing together diverse
fields in order to explore the lives of Malaysian Pentecostal Chinese. I locate my research
at the intersections of postcolonial studies, ethnic studies, and religious studies since there
are multiple dynamics that are present in the lives of Malaysian Pentecostal Chinese as
they negotiate their ethnic and religious identities. Given this context, I delineate the
complex workings of race and ethnicity, social standing, and religion, and show how the
Chinese are simultaneously resisting as well as perpetuating the dominant structures in

6

To be sure, there are many other minority groups in Malaysia. However, it is generally
recognized among Malaysians that Indians (from Southern India) and Chinese are the primary minority
groups in the country. The dominant group, the Malays view themselves as the “indigenous” and “original”
people in the country and received the designation of bumiputra (translated as “sons of the soil”) by the
ruling government. See for example, Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002); and Tan Tai Yong, Creating “Greater Malaysia:”
Decolonization and the Politics of Merger (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008). For
other works that critique the monolithic construction of the Malay “race,” see Joel Kahn, Other Malays:
Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Malay World (Singapore: Singapore University Press,
2006); and David C.L. Lim, ed., Overcoming Passion for Race in Malaysia Cultural Studies (Leiden: Brill,
2008).
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Malaysia. I take Chandra Mohanty’s words seriously as she comments on the issue of
pluralism and difference in ethnic and identity construction:
The challenge of race resides in a fundamental reconceptualization of our
categories of analysis so that differences can be historically specified and
understood as part of larger political processes and systems. The central issue,
then, is not one of merely acknowledging difference; rather, the more difficult
question concerns the kind of difference that is acknowledged and engaged.
Difference seen as benign variation (diversity), for instance, rather than as
conflict, struggle, or the threat of disruption, bypasses power as well as history to
suggest a harmonious, empty pluralism.7
Adhering to Mohanty’s words, my dissertation intends to not only be a straightforward
descriptive project on identity construction, but also a rigorous analysis on the utility of
the identities constructed by Malaysian Pentecostal Chinese.
Many scholarly writings on Christianity in Malaysia focus primarily on issues of
theology, church history, and missiology. This dissertation hopes to provide a fresh
perspective on a topic that is hardly addressed in Malaysia. I am engaging in a project
that addresses identity formation as it locates itself in postcolonial discourse, and takes
into account the content of Christian beliefs and doctrine as an important element in the
sociopolitical formation Chinese Malaysian identities.

The Field of Postcolonial Studies and the Question of Hybrid Identities
Because hybridity is such an important category in postcolonial studies, I am
locating the majority of my work within the confines of this discipline. Since its early
emergence in the 1950s, postcolonial studies have expanded from writings concerning
anti-colonial struggles (although this is still one of its main objectives), to categories
7

Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “On Race and Voice: Challenges for Liberal Education in the
1990s,” in Cultural Critique 14 (1989): 181.
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involving issues of representation, states of being, gender relations, reading strategies,
and identity construction.
A common observation of postcolonial studies is that it lacks coherence in terms
of methodology and a point of origin due to its inter-disciplinary nature. Far from being a
unified discipline, postcolonial studies is associated with various established disciplines
such as history, anthropology, English, and literary studies. As a consequence, there is a
vast corpus of work emerged within the rubric of postcolonialism in the humanities. The
diffused nature of postcolonial studies also coincides with the conditions of an
increasingly globalized, postmodern, and fractured world where issues of origins, power,
hegemony, and agency are highly scrutinized in all areas of human society. Therefore, it
is necessary to highlight some of the developments and divergences which have occurred
in the development of the discipline. I should mention however, that I do not intend to
conduct a thorough historical review of the entire field of postcolonial studies. Rather, I
want to review the relevant literature that directly pertains to identity construction to lay
the grounding and context of my own research context.
At its core, postcolonial studies is dedicated to interrogating and destabilizing
colonial structures and categories. It is also an attempt to recover voices from the margins
of dominant discourse. According to Leela Gandhi, postcolonial studies provides a
“theoretical resistance to the mystifying amnesia of the colonial aftermath… devoted
to… revisiting, remembering, and, crucially, interrogating the colonial past.”8 Though
Gandhi alludes to a colonial “past” or aftermath (hence, the prefix “post”), however,

8

Leela Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1998), 4.
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colonialism is still alive and well, albeit in a different manifestation. Stuart Hall’s essay,
“When was the ‘Post-colonial?’ Thinking at the Limit,” attempts to interrogate this
ambiguous term. Amidst the politics of inclusion, that is, who gets to be “in” the
postcolonial group, and questions of origin and the utility of the prefix “post,” Hall insists
that it at least provides us with certain guidelines, if not some utilitarian value.9
Like Gandhi, Hall agrees that the prefix “post” should not denote an end of
colonialism. Rather, we must remain suspicious of such claims. There is nothing
celebratory about the postcolonial condition at all. While it may be true that the colonial
powers have packed their belongings and returned to their respective home countries, the
structures and ways of thinking that were put in place are still very much intact in the
formerly colonized and newly independent nations. Thus, we must be skeptical of claims
9

Stuart Hall, “When was ‘the Post-Colonial’? Thinking at the Limit,” in The Post-Colonial
Question, edited by Iain Chambers, and Lidia Curti (New York: Routledge, 1996), 246. As I have
mentioned earlier, there is no single unified field in postcolonial studies. Therefore, to provide a
universalized definition of the “who,” “when” and “what” of postcolonialism would be difficult. However,
we can agree on the similarities regarding its genesis, theoretical orientation, and purpose. For a historical
overview of the field, see, in addition to Gandhi’s superb Postcolonial Theory, Bart Moore-Gilbert,
Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics (London: Verso, 1997); Robert Young, Postcolonialism:
An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001); Peter Childs, and Patrick Williams, An
Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory (London: Prentice Hall, 1997); and Michael Syrotinski,
Deconstruction and the Postcolonial: At the Limits of Theory (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press,
2007). There are also many published readers and anthologies mapping the emergence, thematic concerns,
and selections of essential readings from prominent postcolonial scholars. See for example, Patrick
Williams, and Laura Chrisman, eds., Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994); Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, The Post-Colonial
Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 1995); and Gaurav Desai, and Supriya Nair, eds., Postcolonialisms:
An Anthology of Cultural Theory and Criticism (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005). Finally,
various scholars have recently put together an enormous 20-volume book ongoing series on
postcolonialism and its various theoretical concerns. Aptly titled Postcolonial Studies and published by
Peter Lang Press, this book series examines various facets of the colonial legacy, nationalism, issues of
representation and resistance, diaspora, displacement and migratory identities, and cultural hybridity across
geographical regions and disciplinary approaches. I should also mention that recent trends in postcolonial
scholarship involve moving beyond the boundary of Anglophone and Francophone literature, and toward a
more comparative approach by investigating links between a range of Anglophone, Francophone,
Caribbean, Latin American and Dutch contexts. See for example, Michelle Keown, David Murphy and
James Procter, eds., Comparing Postcolonial Diasporas (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); and
Michael Niblett, and Kerstin Oloff, eds., Perspectives on the ‘Other America’: Comparative Approaches to
Caribbean and Latin American Culture (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009).

10

made by those who proclaim that the period of freedom has finally come for the
colonized, and perhaps more insidiously, the proclamation that there is one single
solution to resist colonial domination.
Hall also contends that the term “postcolonial” can help us characterize the shift
in global relations which marks the uneven transition from the age of empires to the postindependent/post-decolonization era. Postcolonialism as an academic discipline helps us
identify the new relations and dispositions of power with the emergence of new global
relations and order.10 Thus, Hall succinctly states that the “post” in post-colonialism
denotes going beyond colonialism.11 This shift in global relations is what postcolonial
scholars are attempting to examine as they continue to struggle in constructing new
strategies in resisting this new form of colonialism.
Given the globalized characteristic of the world, identities are becoming more
complex. The shift in global relations has also produced a hybridization of cultures and
identities through a reflexive relationship between local and global. These constructed
identities are neither assimilated nor altered. Instead, they are a fusion of interactions and
elements of both the local and global to create a new hybrid identity.12 The hybrid, once a
derogatory word used to signify impurity and contamination, has found new life in
postcolonial studies. Hybridized identities are common in postcolonial communities, and
10

Ibid., 256-257. Euro-Western thought and cultural norms continue to permeate across
postcolonial nations and communities even after the era of physical imperialism is long gone. In response,
postcolonial scholars charged that far from being the disseminator of knowledge, law and order, and
culture, Europe should be considered simply as one of many cultural regions. In effect, it is an attempt
towards “provincializing” and delinking Euro-West thought as the operative norm across the globe. See
Dipesh Chakrabarthy, Pronvicialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000).
11

Ibid., 254.

12

Keri E. Iyall Smith, “Hybrid Identities: Theoretical Examinations,” in Hybrid Identities, 3.
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many postcolonial scholars have explored this concept extensively. Hybridity becomes an
asset because of its creative ability to traverse across boundaries and understanding both
the local and global. It creates an advantageous space for cultural creativity and
imagination.13 Yet, we must not stop at the descriptive and prescriptive aspect of
hybridity, but rather analyze how hybridity is or is not useful for different communities. I
must also note that as one of the most colonized regions of the world, Southeast Asia
does not figure significantly in the ever expanding corpus of postcolonial literature.14 For
this reason, Malaysia provides an excellent case study against hybridity’s purported
claims.
Homi Bhabha, the main theorist on hybridity, is most famous for articulating and
demonstrating resistance strategies that marginalized communities employ within the
interstices of a structure that provides little to no room for such possibilities. In order to
examine Bhabha’s claims of hybridity, I will first provide a brief genealogy of hybridity
within the field of postcolonial studies.15 I begin by exploring the “anti-colonial” writings
of Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire as they were interested in the question of pan-African
black identity. More importantly, they begin to articulate the fracturing of identities
13

See for example, Ming-Cheng Lo, Doctors Within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and
Modernity in Colonial Taiwan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Lo’s analysis of Taiwanese
doctors during the Japanese Occupation challenges the colonizer/colonized dichotomy and demonstrates
how the doctors negotiate their “in-betweness” and create spaces to critique Japanese domination.
14

A close examination of various postcolonial texts reveals a dearth of postcolonial analysis in the
Southeast Asian region. “Classic” postcolonial studies texts are predominantly produced from the Middle
Eastern, African, and sub-Indian continents. Even Europe and Australia have received more treatment than
Southeast Asia. So, even as postcolonial scholarship is heading more towards a comparative model,
Southeast Asia continues to be neglected for various reasons such as ambivalence towards colonialism as
an “oppressive force,” and the rise of multi-national capitalist economics. See Chua Beng Huat, “Southeast
Asia in Postcolonial Studies: An Introduction,” in Postcolonial Studies 11, no.3 (2008): 231-240.
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Again, this is not a comprehensive literature review of the field itself. As I have already
suggested some texts for a good comprehensive review of the field, at this juncture, I will touch on some
key theorists that I have identified as hybridity’s academic predecessors.
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where the colonized person is trapped in between two worlds. I then explain hybridity’s
ascension to the forefront of postcolonial studies which owes its start with the
“professionalization” of the discipline, represented by Edward Said. How one claims to
be who they are, and if one possesses the agency to deploy such hybrid identities are
important questions to consider. To address the issues of representation and agency, I
shall also explore the works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Analyzing Homi Bhabha’s
works, I draw attention to the issue of identity, and how constructions of identity have
functioned as a way of resistance and political mobilization. Finally, I highlight the
innovations, critiques, and tensions that exist within the discipline.

The Anti-colonials
The ensuing instability following the end of World War II in Europe propelled a
way for its colonies to assert their autonomy against their masters. The politics of
revolution became the main characteristic among postcolonial writing in 1950s as
scholars and activists from Northern Africa and the Caribbean called for a break from
Euro-Western ways of being. Two scholar/activists, Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon, are
the best representatives of this “anti-colonial” phase of postcolonialism.16 They have
conceptualized colonialism as a totalizing force of violence and brutality. Only an
instance of total revolution could eradicate it. In this case, a negative force (colonialism)
can only be countered by a positive one (revolution). Amidst the rhetoric of total
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Not to be forgotten are other prominent anti-colonial figures such as Chinua Achebe, Leopold
Senghor, Albert Memmi, and Ngugi wa Thiong’o. For the sake of brevity, I will not be exploring their
works and contributions to the anti-colonial cause.
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revolution, early postcolonial scholars are interested in understanding what it means to
straddle a colonized mentality with an emerging “postcolonial” identity.
Aimé Césaire, a Martinique scholar, poet, and political activist, wrote his seminal
work, Discourse on Colonialism in which he explores the hypocrisy implicit in western
civilizations along with the bankrupt notions of “progress” and “civilization.”17 Written at
the height of the anti-colonial fervor in the 1950s, Discourse captures the spirit of
revolution in a post-World War II environment where European imperialism was on the
decline. Césaire argues that colonization and civilization are, by definition,
incommensurable. Highly influenced by Marxist theory, Césaire attempts to move
beyond the narrative of class struggle between bourgeois and proletariats to the one
between colonizer and colonized. He insists that the anti-colonial struggle supersedes the
proletarian revolution as the fundamental historical movement of the period.18 This
means that the coming revolution will not be defined in terms of capitalism versus
socialism but by the complete overthrow of the bourgeois and racist colonial systems that
redraw new boundaries for a new world.
For Césaire, colonialism is “neither evangelization, nor a philanthropic enterprise,
nor a desire to push back the frontiers of ignorance, disease, and tyranny, nor a project
17

Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York, NY: Monthly Press
Review, 2000), 32.
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We should not be too quick to condemn Césaire for “bastardizing” Marxist theory to serve his
anti-colonial fervor. On the contrary, he was a longstanding member of the French Communist Party, and
looked toward the Soviet Union as a model for a utopian society. But his relationship with Marxism and
communism was not without any conflict. When the Soviet Union suppressed the Hungarian uprising in
1956, he grew disillusioned with the communist movement and ultimately resigned from the Party. Unlike
his white Marxist counterparts, Césaire could not separate the issue of class from the problem of race. He
argues in Discourse, that the communists “acted like abstract Communists” in their failure to address the
“Negro problem.” (Discourse, 85) On the other hand, the colonized, in their concrete experience of racism,
are unable to overlook the race question. Césaire believes that there needs to be an ongoing effort to reform
and “complete” Marxist theory.
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undertaken for the greater glory of God, nor an attempt to extend the rule of law.”19
Rather, “the decisive actors here are the adventurer and the pirate, the wholesale grocer
and the ship owner, the gold digger and the merchant, appetite and force.”20 This is not
surprising since Europe, having experienced the horrors of two world wars and Nazism in
the early twentieth century, would only perpetuate a similar modality in its colonies. The
difference however, is while Nazism was condemned, colonialism was tolerated because
it was directed towards non-Europeans. Césaire points out that both colonialism and
Nazism stem from the same ideology that privileges one race over the other. He equates
the process of colonization as “thingification.”21
Additionally, Césaire states that colonialism is toxic to both the colonized and the
colonizer, which he calls the “boomerang effect.” The colonized individual is
dehumanized and reduced to an instrument of production to serve the purpose of the
colonizer. As a result of colonialism, indigenous peoples also lost their culture. In
addition, colonialism works to “decivilize” the colonizer. Colonization, states Césaire:
dehumanizes even the most civilized man; that colonial activity, colonial
enterprise, colonial conquest, which is based on contempt for the native and
justified by that contempt, inevitably tends to change him [sic] who undertakes it;
that the colonizer, who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing
the other man as an animal, accustoms himself to treating him [sic] like an animal,
and tends objectively to transform himself [sic] into an animal.22
As a way out of this entrapment, Césaire calls on colonized peoples to overthrow the
colonizer’s ideology of progress that is built on violence, destruction, and genocide.
19
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Further, it is equally necessary to decolonize one’s minds as well as society. Failure to do
so would condemn both Europe and its colonies.
Césaire belongs to a group of literary and intellectual figures that advocate the
idea of Négritude. From its early development in the 1930s, Négritude rejects French
colonialism in favor of a common black identity and the self-affirmation of the black
individual.23 They believed that the shared cultural heritage among blacks around the
globe would create an effective tool in fighting against the French. By the time Césaire
became active in the anti-colonial movement, Négritude as a political movement had
come full circle. Césaire’s view of Négritude is not only concerned with the political
liberation of blacks, but also with the creation of a positive black social identity.24
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Here, I must mention another important figure among the African anti-colonial movement,
Leopold Senghor. A close friend of Césaire, Senghor is a big proponent of Negritude. He believes that at
the heart of every black person lies an essence and shared African attribute. Senghor argues that the
Négritude mentality is diametrically opposed to Euro-Western ways of thought. Whereas Euro-Western
thought is objective and is based on separation conflict, Négritude is based on unity and balance. We may
think that this is simplistic and essentialistic by today’s standards. However, we must remember that the
figure of the “primitive” black person is a construction of European colonialism. In effect, European
colonialism had systematically and effectively wiped out all traces of African historical and intellectual
achievements. This provided the rationale for Euro-Western colonial projects around the world. Négritude
rejects the idea that black identity is inferior to the “white man” and strives to alter the negative values
attached to African and the black individual. Thus, for Senghor, Négritude acts as an effective countermyth or counter-reading of traditional European stereotypes with aims of valorizing and celebrating the
African identity. For more information, see Leopold Senghor, “Negritude: A Humanism of the Twentieth
Century,” in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, 27-35; Abiola Irele, The African Experience in
Literature and Ideology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); and Cedric Robinson, Black
Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2000).
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To be sure, there are many expressions of Négritude, and I must acknowledge the movement’s
plurality. Beginning with the 1930s, Négritude can be interpreted along its thematic orientations. For
example, one could conceptualize Négritude as an aesthetic movement or an epistemological orientation.
Similar to Césaire’s view, here I am referring to Négritude as a political/revolutionary movement. For more
information on the various conceptions of Négritude, and Césaire’s interpretation of it, see A. James
Arnold, Modernism and Négritude: The Poetry and Poetics of Aimé Césaire (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1981); Janis Pallister, Aimé Césaire (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1991); Gregson
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Another seminal figure and fellow Martiniquean, Frantz Fanon, echoed Césaire’s
critique of European civilization and colonial racism in Discourse. With the publication
of Black Skin, White Masks and coupled by the full force of the Négritude movement,
Fanon’s work examines colonialism’s psychic, cultural and social damages toward the
colonized. A psychiatrist by training, Fanon employs psychoanalytic modes of analysis
and asserts that colonialism is based on racist worldviews. In addition, the concept of
whiteness relies on the negation of the black subject. Neither one can exist without the
other. So, if the white colonizer is progressive, rational and civilized, the black subject is
backward, irrational and uncivilized. The structure of colonialism privileges whites and
generates harmful psychological constructs that blind the black person to his subjection to
a universalized/idealized white norm, and thus alienating his own consciousness.25
Due to the negative and inferior stigmatization of the black subject, colonized
blacks desperately try to escape this predicament. For example, they would attempt to
marry a white person in order to be more “white,” or they would reject their inherent
inferiority and embrace white culture. The black person dons a white “mask” in order to
be more like their white masters. Yet, because the structure of colonialism only privileges
the white colonizer, they can never truly fit in to white society. Further, by donning the
white mask, the black person is rejecting his own self-identity and ultimately alienating
himself, with disastrous results. Black Skin represents Fanon’s theorizing of radical anti25

My use of the male gender pronoun is intentional. I am simply reporting and stating the gist of
Fanon’s arguments about the psychic imprisonment of the black mind, more specifically, the black man’s
mind. A product of his time, Fanon did not address the colonial experience of women of color, which was
of course vastly different from men. Feminist scholars have critiqued Fanon’s omission and inattention to
women of color. For more information, see Rey Chow, “The Politics of Admittance: Female Sexual
Agency, Miscegenation, and the Formation of Community in Frantz Fanon,” in Frantz Fanon: Critical
Perspectives, edited by Anthony Alessandrini (New York: Routledge, 1999), 35-58; and T. Denean
Sharpley-Whiting, Frantz Fanon: Conflicts and Feminisms (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
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colonial and anti-racist humanism that rejects the assimilationist model of white
supremacy. While Fanon’s analysis of the black psyche takes many cues from
psychoanalysis, he also moves beyond the confines of psychology. He articulates how
colonized peoples can recuperate a sense of identity and cultural affiliation independent
of the racist project of an imperializing dominant culture. He states that the “effective
disalienation of the black man [sic] entails a recognition of social and economic
realities.”26 Examinations on individual neurosis may be beneficial, but this is no
substitute for an analysis of social situations. He articulates this sentiment further in his
next book.
In his follow-up book, The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon incorporates what he has
written in Black Skin and produces a revolutionary manifesto similar to Discourse on
Colonialism. For Fanon, the devastation of the black mind due to their perceived
inferiority and the destruction of colonized societies (in this case, French-occupied
Algeria) can only be countered through the use of violence. For Fanon, violence is
inherent in the act of decolonization and liberation movements. He contends that colonial
society is structured in a Manichean fashion where good is pitted against evil; black
against white; rich against poor; and colonizer against colonized. Since colonialism came
about through violence, violence is the only language that colonialism understands and
capable of responding back. He writes, “Colonialism is not a machine capable of
thinking, a body endowed with reason. It is naked violence and only gives in when
confronted with greater violence.”27 It is a purifying force that wipes the slate clean of
26

Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 10-11.

27

Ibid., 23.

18

any colonial past. Decolonization thus cleaves away this dichotomous structure that
would usher a complete overhaul of the socio-political system. By starting things over
from the ground up, Fanon believes that every aspect of society, from the lowest to the
highest, would benefit from a new system that is free from European influence.
Fanon blames the failings of nationalism on the “intellectual laziness of the
middle class.”28 These nationalist elites came into power only insofar as they seek to
replicate the structures set in place by the outgoing colonizers. They only wish to gain
access to the wealth and social status that had previously been commandeered by the
colonists. 29 Fanon faults the national elites for their unwillingness to alter the old colonial
system and improve the situation that would benefit all aspects of colonial society.
Further, reformist ideals have no place in Fanon’s schema. Acts of negotiation and
peaceful handovers from colonial to independent governments are nothing but facades
that serve to perpetuate the colonial structures that are already put in place. Indeed, the
native elites are in power only insofar as it seeks to replicate the bourgeois structures of
the “mother country” that sustains colonial rule. Fanon believes that the opportunistic
native elites are surveying and controlling the colonized masses to the same extent as the
colonials that they have displaced.
To this end, Fanon believes that peasants and the most disenfranchised (i.e. the
wretched of the earth) constitute the most revolutionary group and are the only ones
qualified to lead the charge against colonialism. This is because they are suspicious of the
elite native nationalists’ promises of independence and reforms. Fanon’s answer to the
28
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problem of colonialism is the complete overthrow of European presence from Africa.
This includes not only expelling European presence from the colonies, but eradicating all
forms of European political and social structures and ways of being. The European
conception of humanity and universality should make way for a new way of being, one
that taps into a localized context and tradition as a resource. Only then will the colonized
be truly free from European domination.
From this brief exploration of the anti-colonials, we now have a clearer sense of
postcolonialism’s beginnings.30 Early postcolonial theorists are concerned with the ill
effects that colonialism have on colonized peoples and they theorized that colonialism
needs to be eradicated in its entirety. Anti-colonials support embracing localized
traditions as a way to create a more just order. While they are interested and engaged in
political and economic liberation, they are also aware of the psychological trauma that
colonialism inflicts on identity formation among colonized peoples. Thus, they are
dedicated to rescuing the “black subject” from destitute and self-hate, and toward
creating a counter-narrative against accepted colonial norms.
By the end of the 1960s, the enthusiastic hope of revolution and decolonization
had waned. Fanon and Césaire’s call to remake an alternative and inclusive political
solidarity had failed. But we need not dismiss their contributions as wrong, outdated or
unsophisticated for what Fanon and Césaire bring to postcolonial scholarship has been
30

This is still a contested assertion. As we recall from Stuart Hall’s article, the term “post” in
postcolonialism remains unclear and elusive to define. Meanwhile, Native American scholars would argue
that the “post” in colonialism has not arrived yet, and that anticolonial sentiments have been around since
Columbus set foot on the North American continent. For more information, see Arnold Krupat,
“Postcolonialism, Ideology and Native American Literature,” in Postcolonial Theory and the United States:
Race, Ethnicity, and Literature, edited by Amritjit Singh, and Peter Schmidt (Jackson: University Press of
Mississippi, 2000), 73-94; and George “Tink” Tinker, Spirit and Resistance: Political Theology and
American Indian Liberation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004).
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invaluable, and there is still much utility in their scholarship even as the state of global
relations has changed since the 1950s.31 While the era of physical colonization may be
(more or less) over, colonial structures continue to perpetuate with the shift in global
relations and new complex re-alignment of power dispositions in the world. This calls for
new ways of theorizing postcolonialism. Here, we see an expansion of Fanon and
Césaire’s anti-colonial writings into more complex theorizing on cultural discourses
dealing primarily with issues of identity, gender, language, power relations, and
difference.32 The anti-colonials’ observations on the fracturing psyche of the colonized
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David Scott’s Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment observes that
“anticolonialism has been a classic instance of modern longing for total revolution.” (Conscripts, 6) In
addition, he associates anticolonialism as “traditional” dreams of utopia and political emancipation that are
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person have become a launching point in examining how people who live within and inbetween the (post)colonial world construct their identities.
Even though Fanon and Césaire may seem passé by today’s standards, there is
still much utility in their theoretical analyses, especially as related to the
disenfranchisement of marginalized communities within newly independent nations. In
my research context, Malaysians are especially proud of the fact that they did not have to
engage in a bloody war against their colonial masters to achieve independence. Our
history books unequivocally celebrate the skillful maneuvering of a select few elite men
in negotiating a peaceful transition from British rule to self-governance. Yet, as Fanon
and Césaire have shown us, peaceful transitions do not weed out the structures of
colonialism. If anything, these structures continue to perpetuate under a new regime now
led by nationalist elites. Specifically, postcolonial Malaysia continues to be haunted by
the “divide and rule” policy. The current ruling government, having absorbed and
internalized the racist stereotypes from the British long after they have left, continues to
deploy these essentialized identities as a way to consolidate their power. In a society
where ethnic prejudice thrives in politics, communities, institutions and popular culture, it
is imperative to first understand how oppression is internalized and reproduced before
analyzing the resistance strategies forged among marginalized communities in Malaysia.

Location of Culture dedicated to the work of Fanon and identity. See “Chapter 2: Interrogating Identity:
Frantz Fanon and the Postcolonial Prerogative,” in Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 57-93.
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The “Professionalization” of Postcolonial Studies: Said, Bhabha, and Spivak
Locating agency among the oppressed can be a difficult task. With the collapse of
the anti-colonial movement and the consolidation and restructuring of neo-colonial
structures around the globe, advocating total revolution ala Fanon or Césaire may not be
a viable option. Instead, contemporary postcolonial studies is interested in examining and
locating of the gaps and fault lines in colonial structures in order to locate avenues and
spaces where the marginalized could utilize as a site of resistance.
In 1979, Palestinian cultural critic Edward Said published his book Orientalism,
heralding the beginning of “postcolonial studies” as an academic field of study. Drawing
on Foucauldian theories of power and knowledge, Said sought to uncover the creation
and control of the “Oriental” figure by western scholars throughout the modern era. From
the time Napoleon stepped foot in Egypt in the late 1700s, Said argues that the West has
actively engaged in writing, collecting and representing the Orient (the Middle East) and
constructing the “Other.”33 Subsequent academic writings from England, France, and
most recently, the United States have produced studies that effectively distorted the
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To be sure, Orientalism is not the first work to make this connection. The critique of western
representation of the Orient stretches back as far as the 18th century with chronicler Abd-al-Rahman alJabarti’s observation that Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 was as much an epistemological as a
military conquest. For more information, see Abd-al-Rahman Jabarati, Napoleon in Egypt: Al-Jabarti’s
Chronicle of the French Occupation, 1798, trans. Shmuel Moreh (Princeton: M.Wiener Publishers, 1993).
See also Anwar Abdel Malek, “Orientalism in Crisis,” Diogenes 44 (1963): 102-140; and Bernard Cohn’s
originally published essays on India in the 1960s and 70s, collected under the title An Anthropologist
among Historians and Other Essays (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990). My point here is not to
diminish Said’s significant contribution to postcolonial studies. I am simply pointing out that Said’s book
had created such a galvanizing firestorm that had some detractors reacting against the book with
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dismantling the West’s epistemic control over the “Other.”
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Orient and the Oriental person. In studying and knowing the Orient, Said argues that the
West comes to own and control the Orient.34
Similar to Fanon’s description of the black colonized subject, Said claims that the
West held the Oriental person as a negative mirror image of the white, Euro-Westerner.
So, while Euro-Westerners are rational, masculine, and progressive, Orientals are exotic,
feminine and backward. Given these constructed and imposed identities, Said shows how
the West came to legitimize colonialism through the control of the Oriental image.35 The
United States continues to perpetuate this Oriental imagery today as evidenced by their
involvement in the Middle East and the prevalent stereotyping of Arabs as backward and
violent people who practice an irrational Islamic religion.36 This creates the impetus for
the United States to legitimize its imperialist agenda similar to the British and French in
previous centuries.
However, in mapping the operation of Orientalistism, Said falls into the type of
colonizer/colonized binary thinking that he first sets out to critique. In addition, he paints
the Oriental figure as a defeated person and unable to fight back. More importantly, Said
fails to account for the voices of the colonized and their potential for resistance. His
follow-up work, Culture and Imperialism, attempts to address these limitations. While
34
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Orientalism focuses on Europe’s invention of the Orient and its imposition on the
“Other” through academic discourse, Culture and Imperialism argues that culture acts as
another avenue where Europe legitimizes its colonial attitudes. Said insists on the
inherent political nature embedded within European literary and cultural studies, and
argues that the West effectively imposed and legitimized its superiority over others
through its literary culture. In Said’s eyes, these seemingly “neutral” works of European
literature in actuality denigrate indigenous and traditional cultures of the colonies.37
Said believes that the experience of colonialism creates an intricate and
intertwined relationship between the colonizer and colonized. Thus, one cannot simply
compartmentalize them into separate entities and distinct identities. Said is interested in
uncovering voices of resistance hidden beneath colonial rhetoric. Whenever there is
colonialism, there will always be a hidden resistant voice that goes against the grain.
Thus, Said suggests a strategy of “contrapuntal reading” where a colonial text is read
simultaneously with an anti-colonial text in order to locate fissures and hidden resistant
voices.38
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Said finds evidence of this through the exploration of famous English novelists such as Jane
Austen, Joseph Conrad and Rudyard Kipling. For example, Austen’s famous novel Mansfield Park
describes the plantation owner’s wealth. However, Austen did not bother to take into account where the
wealth came from, something which Said describes as an “aesthetic silence.” This was legitimated by the
plantation owner’s exploits overseas, that is, in the colonies. Said exposes the notion that a seemingly
neutral and beloved novel by Jane Austen does indeed legitimized colonialism as the colonial subject exists
in the background of the novel, exploited by their white masters. This is succinctly argued in the section,
“Jane Austen and Empire.” See Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994),
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Equally important for Said is his suggestion that the (former) colonized world
must move beyond the “rhetoric of blame and defensiveness,” that is, blaming the
colonizer for all of their current problems.39 Because of the complex and shifting world
we inhabit today, Said recognizes that things cannot simply be reduced to “black and
white” scenarios: colonizer/dominant center = bad; colonized/marginalized = good. In
Culture and Imperialism, we see Said’s attempt to locate agency among the marginalized.
He suggests that the most effective tactic of resistance is by engaging the dominant
culture through a variety of hybrid cultural works. This counters dominant culture
without simplistically rejecting it.40 Said acknowledges that all cultures are essentially
hybrid, and any effective analysis on culture, identity, and resistance has to reflect on this
reality.
Said’s theorizing of Orientalism and the impossibility of delinking colonizer and
colonized cultures provide an important analytical lens for my project. So much about the
way Malays portray Chinese Malaysians is through an Orientalist lens. Since the Malays
are in power, they are actively rewriting Malaysia’s historical narrative that privileges
Malay voices. In doing so, they have also reconstructed the Chinese as “ungrateful
foreigners” and “greedy” money grubbers. In other words, the Chinese are “Othered” by
the Malays. Moreover, these imageries trap the Chinese along essentialized categories of
identity. By utilizing Said’s suggestion of reading against the grain of Malaysian history,
a different story and image of the Chinese begin to emerge. Rather than a bounded group,
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Chinese Malaysians are a heterogeneous community with different cultural, social, and
religious backgrounds.
I now turn my attention to the work of Homi Bhabha, who is an important figure
in theorizing hybridity’s potential for resistance. Central to Bhabha’s analysis is that
identities are fluid. Any statements on identities as fixed are at best, illusory. In the
introductory pages of The Location of Culture, Bhabha argues that:
The move away from the singularities of “class” or “gender” as primary
conceptual and organizational categories, has resulted in an awareness of the
subject positions – of race, gender, generation, institutional location, geopolitical
locale, sexual orientation – that inhabit any claim to identity in the modern world.
What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the need to think
beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those
moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences.
These “in-between” spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of
selfhood – singular or communal – that initiate new signs of identity, and
innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea
of society itself.41
For Bhabha, the structure of colonialism is based on ambivalence, not fixity. It is because
of this ambivalence, located in the “in-between spaces” of culture that the colonized and
marginalized possess agency for resistance and subversion.42 These spaces are areas for
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To be sure, Bhabha does not equate agency with the modernistic ethos of individual and/or
cultural sovereignty that is a central tenet of liberal individualism. Rather, Bhabha’s idea of postcolonial
agency derives from a colonial context that does not grant sovereignty to the colonized, arguing instead for
an impersonal and involuntary agency. (The Location of Culture, 205) See Homi Bhabha and John
Comaroff, “Speaking of Postcoloniality in the Continuous Present: A Conversation,” in Relocating
Postcolonialism, edited by David Theo Golderg and Ato Quayson (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2002),
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Young’s Colonial Desire; and Brett Nicholls, “Disrupting Time: Post-Colonial Politics in Homi Bhabha’s
The Location of Culture,” in Southern Review 30, no.1 (1997), 4-25 for critiques of Bhabha’s conception of
postcolonial agency.
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the creation of “new signs of identity.” 43 They are the hybrid product of opposing
cultures, and Bhabha argues that these conditions are the greatest source for creativity.
Nevertheless, the project of overcoming oppression becomes impossible because
of the irretrievably fractured and blurred conditions of the postcolonial self.44 I have
mentioned earlier that Fanon had influenced Bhabha a great deal. While greatly
acknowledging Fanon’s ideas on the black psyche and identity formation, Bhabha also
critiques the dualistic notions implicit in Fanon’s writings. In his essay, “What Does the
Black Man Want?,” Bhabha reinterprets Fanon and moves away from the binaries
between the colonizer and colonized, or rather of the Self and the Other.45 Such binaries,
argues Bhabha, “function in a kind of narcissistic reflection of the One in the Other which
is confronted in the language of desire by the psychoanalytic process of identification.”46
The colonial subject is not caught being the Self or the Other, but rather suspended in the
gap between the Self and Other. This is the liminal space of identity. Bhabha’s

43

Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 2.

44

Sankaran Krishna, Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twentyfirst Century (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 93-94.
45

Bhabha’s analysis of colonialism and identity construction heavily employs Lacanian
psychoanalysis. As such, Bhabha believes that many scholars had misinterpreted Fanon. According to
Bhabha, Fanon’s interpretation of Lacan’s mirror stage had led him to conclude that the black collective
unconscious self has taken over negated archetypes, that is, archetypes belonging to White Europeans.
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46

Homi Bhabha, “What Does the Black Man Want?” in New Formations no.1 (1987): 120.

28

observation contends that identity is never a finished product, which marks the site of
ambivalence.
Utilizing a multitude of disciplines such as psychoanalysis, cultural analysis, and
literary criticism, Bhabha locates these interstitial spaces and fissures in cultural
production in order to locate the spaces of resistance for marginalized communities. He
argues that Fanon’s “psychoanalytic framework illuminates the ‘madness’ of racism, the
pleasure of pain, [and] the agonistic fantasy of political power.”47 Bhabha argues for a
“third space” of negotiation that bridges the violent and traumatic encounter between the
colonizer and the colonized. This space allows for the productive and aesthetic space of a
new cultural formation, thus creating an identity that is “neither the one thing nor the
other” – hybrid.
Similar to Said, Bhabha blurs the categories of “colonizer” and “colonized” and
argues that these two groups cannot be viewed as separate entities that define themselves
independently. In Bhabha’s view, new hybridized identities emerge due to the experience
of colonialism where continual exchange and interactions between the colonizer and
colonized occur. This hybrid identity is ambivalent and in turn challenges the validity and
authenticity of essentialized and static identities derived from the colonizer. For, while
destabilizing the colonial narrative, hybridity’s ambivalence also empowers the colonized
to resist and interrupt it: “The ambivalence at the source of traditional discourses on
authority enables a form of subversion, founded on the undecidability that turns the
discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds of intervention.”48
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Closely interrelated with Bhabha’s hybridity is the concept of mimicry. Mimicry
is the strategy employed by the colonized to create ambivalence in order to subvert
colonial dominance. Because the colonial structure needs to be understood as superior
than its native counterpart, this creates an occasion for the native, in their “sly civility,” to
destabilize authority. Through the native’s acts of mimicry, they rupture the dominant
discourse and transform it into “an uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject as a
partial presence.”49 These acts of mimicry are at once “a resemblance and menace;” it is
the “not quite” of the colonized that disrupts colonial dominance.50
Bhabha presents an instance of agency and resistance in British India. Following
the colonial policy to reform the administrative and education system, the British colonial
government in India had hoped to produce well-mannered Indian subjects in order to
“civilize” the population. Because the British required intimate knowledge from the
natives for the colonial machinery to run smoothly, the British also had to train local
Indian bureaucrats to help run the affairs of the colony. Yet, the local bureaucrats cannot
be fully trained in western ways because of the fear that they might learn the meaning of
liberty, independence, and freedom. Thus, the attempt to mimic the “civilized
Englishmen” results in what Bhabha calls “a mode of representation that marginalizes the
monumentality of history [and] mocks [colonial] power to be a model… which
supposedly makes it imitable.”51 Ultimately, Bhabha argues that colonialism is a selfdefeating enterprise because it is “the effect of an ambivalence produced within the rules
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of recognition of dominating discourses as they articulate the signs of cultural difference
and re-implicate them within the deferential relations of colonial power.”52
Bhabha’s theory of hybridity shies away from any talks of revolutionary politics
since the “naïve” and romantic narrative of a totalizing revolution ala Fanon and Césaire
is no longer tenable. Instead, he opts for a performative tactic of everyday survival,
mechanisms that subvert and undercut the system. Bhabha’s ideas of mimicry,
ambivalence and hybridity present the postcolonial person with gaps and spaces to
engage in creative resistance. It is also important to point out that Bhabha’s work has
duly impinged upon us that the exercise of recovering some type of primordial precolonial identity is impossible and unattainable. Identities have always been hybrid.
If Bhabha is interested in recovering agency and voices for the marginalized,
Bengali scholar Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak inquires if this is even possible at all. Unlike
Bhabha, Spivak’s concern centers on the issue of representation. A self-professed
“eclectic” scholar, Spivak is concerned with the voice of the subaltern (such as women,
the currently and formerly colonized and economically disadvantaged), even as she
questions the very notions of these categorical constructs.53 In particular, she is
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Antonio Gramsci first employed the term “subaltern” in his Prison Notebooks to refer to the
lowermost classes of people either due to their race, class, gender, religion, and/or sexual orientation. More
importantly however, I want to point out a major school of thought in India that gained popularity in 1980s.
Led by Ranajit Guha and calling themselves the Subaltern Collective, these scholars (mostly historians)
sought to move away from elitist colonial and bourgeois nationalist interpretations of Indian history.
Instead, they are dedicated to recovering and writing the history of the non-elites – the subalterns – and
recasting them as the agents of political and social change. In the process of recovering the subaltern, Guha
rephrases “subaltern” to refer to the “demographic difference between the total Indian population and all
those whom we have described as the elite.” See Ranajit Guha, “On Some Aspects of the Historiography of
Colonial India,” in Selected Subaltern Studies, edited by Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakoravorty Spivak
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 35. I should also mention that Spivak was once an active
member of the Collective before setting her sights to more “eclectic” forms of scholarship and academic
inquiry. For more an excellent primer on the Subaltern Studies Collective and their contributions to
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apprehensive of the misappropriation of the term “subaltern” by those who claim to be
disenfranchised by the dominant system but are not.54
Spivak earned some degree of notoriety with the publication of her famous essay,
“Can the Subaltern Speak?” in 1985.55 She is suspicious of the self-congratulatory
scholarship that speaks of recovering and reinserting of subaltern voices. Using the
example of a young Bengali woman’s suicide in a sati ritual in colonial India (her
representation of the subaltern), she describes how this story gets reappropriated both by
British “humanitarian” discourse calling for the abolishment of the ritual and native
Hindu policy encouraging women to perform their religious duties. Given these two
polarities, Spivak argues that women’s voices are lost in the process even while these two
groups are attempting to provide them with one. If women were once caught and silenced
in the relay between colonialism and national liberation struggles in the past, the
subaltern history, see David Ludden, ed., Reading Subaltern Studies: Critical History, Contested Meaning
and the Globalization of South Asia (London: Anthem, 2002). Also see Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects
of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983); Gyan Prakash, Bonded
Histories: Genealogies of Labor Servitude in Colonial India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990); Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993); Vinayak Chaturvedi, ed., Mapping Subaltern Studies and the
Postcolonial (London: Verso, 2000); Neil Lazarus, Nationalism and Cultural Practice in the Postcolonial
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) especially “Chapter 2: Disavowing Decolonization:
Nationalism, Intellectuals, and the Question of Representation in Postcolonial Theory,” 68-143; and El
Habib Louai, “Retracing the Concept of the Subaltern from Gramsci to Spivak: Historical Developments
and New Applications,” in African Journal of History and Culture 4, no.1 (2012): 4-8.
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subaltern disappears in the “violent shuttling” between multinational capital and
culturalism today.56 It is in the appropriation of the subaltern voice that s/he is silenced.
Given the subaltern’s marginalization and the postcolonial elite’s inability to
relate to their plight, Spivak concludes that the subaltern could NOT speak.57 For Spivak,
there is confusion among scholars that assume a symmetrical relation between the
speaker and listener which leads to the conclusion that the subaltern can act resistively
and have full knowledge to speak on their own. Because speaking is a transaction
between the speaker and listener, the subaltern could not achieve that dialogical level
even if they do speak. These voices do not necessarily transfer out to the Center, and the
Center may not understand or support it. If these voices do transfer to the Center, they are
not subaltern voices anymore for they will have gained access to power.58
Spivak maintains that one must differentiate between the subaltern and the
postcolonial. She suggests that postcolonials are the group of decolonized peoples who
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have benefited from cultural imperialism, and imbued with power through the colonial
situation by continuous contact and conversation with colonial ideologies. It is important
to mention that for Spivak, the postcolonials (including scholars) are unable to escape
from their own privileged position. She is concerned with the fact that postcolonial
studies may ironically reinscribe and co-opt neo-colonial imperatives of political
domination, economic exploitation, and cultural erasure. In other words, the postcolonial
critic may unknowingly be complicit in perpetuating imperialism even as they recognize
their inherent oppressed state within the dominant system: “This impossible ‘no’ to a
structure, which one critiques, yet inhabits intimately, is the deconstructive philosophical
position and the everyday here and now named ‘post-coloniality’ is a case of it.”59
While the postcolonial is comprised of colonized intelligentsia who possess the
ability to converse with the culture that was built through the experience of colonialism,
the subaltern is rendered invisible because they do not possess such a privilege.60 For
Spivak, the subaltern belongs outside the culture of imperialism. They represent those
who are completely left out of the narrative and rendered invisible from society. Hence,
they could not speak. Spivak’s interrogation on the status of the postcolonial and the
subaltern subjects forces scholars to consider issues that are taken for granted in

59

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993),

60.
60

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the
Vanishing Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 225.

34

postcolonial studies. She duly points out that our task as postcolonial scholars is to create
and open up spaces for the subaltern to speak.61
At first glance, this exploration of Spivak may not have any connection with the
overall discourse on identity formation. On the contrary, I believe that Spivak’s take on
subaltern agency provides a useful tool for this dissertation. What she offers to my
project is not just an awareness of the contradictions and silences inherent in dominant
discourses, but also in postcolonial discourses as well, “showing the absences around
which they cohere, without claiming a transcendent position from which one can escape
one’s own complicity in structures of domination.”62 To reiterate, even though Spivak
centers her critique on Euro-Western flaws in critical theory, she is also attempting to
exemplify a broader problem found among postcolonial intellectuals and scholars who
are interested in addressing the plight of marginalized communities – the issue of
representation and agency. Spivak reminds me that I must be attentive to the voices of my
research participants and not hastily jump to tried and true “postcolonial” explanations.
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To this end, Spivak advocates for a kind of strategic essentialism that serves as a counter to the
problem of speaking for the subaltern. This should not be mistaken as universal truth. Rather, it is a
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What this means is that at some point during my research, I have to acknowledge the
incongruent or mystifying stories from my research participants that may be at odds with
how I might traditionally view identity, agency, and resistance.

Putting it All Together
I have tried to show the major trends and tensions that exist in postcolonial studies
as it pertains to my research topic.63 By way of summary, there is an underlining tension
between those who advocate for a politics of revolution, and those who are invested in a
politics of subversion. There is also a divide between materialist and discursive ways of
inquiry. While recent contributions to postcolonial studies are illuminating and creative,
they lack certain pragmatic political usefulness. Moreover, postcolonial studies falls into
the clichéd devices and explanations that are comfortable and familiar. With the
excessive emphases on textual deconstruction and abstract theorizing, contemporary
postcolonial discourse runs the risk of losing an engagement with the real world.64
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Perhaps due to the fact that postcolonial studies continue to be attached around English and
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Not that there is anything wrong with this theoretical move. In fact, it is rather
necessary. But a gap now exists between abstract sophisticated theorizing prevalent in
literary and cultural circles and the ethnographic fieldwork that takes into account the
social and political implications of “everyday” people’s constructed identities. What I am
stressing here is postcolonial studies is too caught up in linguistic exercises, paying only
lip service to material examples on the ground, while ignoring the present lived situations
of everyday people. As Benita Parry summarizes:
In the realm of postcolonial studies… discussion of the internal structures of texts,
enunciations, and sign-systems became detached from a concurrent examination
of social and experiential contexts, simulations, and circumstances. A theoretical
position wholly neglectful of political economy has had the effect of disengaging
colonialism from historical capitalism and re-presenting it for study as a cultural
event… the effect of [postcolonial] scholars’ one-sided concern with the
constitution of “otherness”/alterity/difference… has been to cause matters of
discourse undeniably to take precedence over the material and social conditions
prevailing during colonialism and the post-independence era. The postcolonial
shift away from historical processes has meant that discursive or “epistemic”
violence has tended to take precedence in analysis over institutional practices of
the violent social system of colonialism.65
In the face of the global war on terror, closing of borders, increased xenophobia and
unrestricted march of global capitalism, the strategy proposed via the subversive
performance of hybrid identity may not be as effective a tactic of resistance. In this
dissertation, I hope to demonstrate that hybridity may not be the answer, although it may
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be an answer, because it flattens complex power relationships that exist within one’s own
marginalized context.
While I am certain that Bhabha is aware of his own lived experience as a
diasporic Indian postcolonial critic, he does not constructively draw on the lived contexts
around him. In other words, Bhabha’s theory of hybridity demonstrates a failure to be
culturally significant.66 To address this flaw, I am advocating for a nuanced assessment of
the way we analyze hybridity in postcolonial studies. Through a re-assessment of
hybridity by incorporating what I call unequal belonging in the construction of identity
among Pentecostal Chinese Malaysians, we can begin to rethink how one could examine
identity and agency in ways that could effectively engage hegemonic discourses
perpetrated by the dominant structure. Indeed, the process of economic and political
marginalization goes hand in hand with discursive/cultural domination. Ultimately, any
serious work of justice in the postcolonial world must move beyond descriptive projects
of reclaiming lost memories and identities and toward to an analytical project of
evaluating the utility of hybrid identities as a method of resistance.
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Here, I am thinking of Martha Nussbaum’s criticism of Judith Butler’s writings as both
incomprehensible and out of touch with the real world. As a political philosopher, Nussbaum attacks Butler
on two fronts. First, she argues that Butler is really rehashing old ideas, albeit in new technical jargon.
Nussbaum argues that because Butler’s prose is so dense and abstract, it “bullies” the reader into believing
Butler’s arguments to be significant: “the imagined reader poses few questions, requests no arguments and
no clear definitions of terms.” Second, and more importantly, Nussbaum castigates Butler for advocating a
type of feminism that encourages women to disengage from public engagement to retreat to a “sexy”
politics of subversion. Certainly, these are scathing charges against such a prominent scholar as Butler. But
they are not unprecedented. Endless theorizing coupled with a retreat from public engagement because they
are the public square is “irredeemably corrupt” can be dangerous. As scholars, we are trained to be
suspicious of universal norms for justice and liberation. Going “rogue” or “off the grid” may sound
“risqué,” but I insist, and I think Nussbaum would agree, that this cannot be the sole reason for a
disengagement from the real world as it creates a disservice and damage to workers of justice that are on
the ground fighting for equality and freedom for marginalized peoples. For more information on this
fascinating debate, see Martha Nussbaum, “The Professor of Parody,” The New Republic Online, February
2, 1999, http://www.tnr.com/archive/0299/022299/nussbaum022299.html (accessed July 5, 2012).

38

Methodology
Due to the inter-disciplinary nature of the research, my dissertation incorporates
various methodologies. While I utilize ethnographic methods in the data collection
process, specifically through participant observation and in-depth interviews, I also
incorporate the theoretical framework of Pierre Bourdieu who conducted ethnographic
work as a sociologist. The data collected from my interviews and observations will
become the primary means of gaining insights to the world of Malaysian Chinese
Christians. Their insights will serve as “conversation partners” then critique and
interrogate the scholarship on hybridity. The collected data will also converse alongside
within the larger scholarly discourse on postcolonialism and identity formation. Finally, I
conduct selective literature review and analysis areas such as the discourse on ethnic
identities and the scholarship on religious conversion.
During the first half of 2011, I conducted fieldwork at a Pentecostal church
located in the city of Subang Jaya, a suburb that is part of the greater Kuala Lumpur
metropolitan area.67 For the purpose of confidentiality, I replaced the actual name of the
church with a pseudonym – Metro Church. Metro Church is part of the Assemblies of
God denomination, one of the fastest growing Christian denominations in Malaysia.
Formed in the 1980s by break-away members of a now defunct larger Pentecostal church,
Metro Church is open to all non-Muslims and non-Malays, although the church is
composed mainly of Chinese members. For my interviews, I used a variety of languages
ranging from Cantonese, Malay, and English. I conducted Interview sessions on a one-
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on-one basis. All my participants were adults ages eighteen years and older. I chose oneon-one interviews over focus group interviews so that I could facilitate a space that is
safe for participants to freely express themselves. In addition, one-on-one interviews are
appropriate for addressing sensitive and/or controversial topics that people might be
reluctant to discuss in group settings. I assigned different names for my participants to
protect their identities and for confidentiality. With their consent, I audio taped all
interviews. I also kept notes of important words as well as my observations of the
participant’s mannerisms, behaviors and other intangible properties that could not be
captured through an audio recording device. Each interview session lasted between one to
three hours. To further facilitate a free and safe interview space, I conducted the
interviews in places that my participants found most comfortable. These included private
residences, coffee shops, public parks, and restaurants. The interviews centered on indepth discussions about my participants’ world and experiences. I considered my
interviewees to be the “experts,” while my task as the interviewer was “to listen, observe
with sensitivity, and encourage the interviewee to respond.”68
Along with one-on-one interviews, I engaged in participant observations in
various locales, per the consent of my participants. The most obvious setting for my
observations was Sunday worship services. However, I also observed various nonSunday church-sanctioned activities. These included prayer meetings, held every
Wednesday night at the church sanctuary, and Friday night “CARE Groups.” These
groups function as small devotional/cell groups to help each other grow deeper in their
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faith. These observations gave me an opportunity to observe the lives of my participants
outside the Sunday service. I identified my degree of participant involvement to that of a
participant-as-observer. As a participant-as-observer, I entered the field with the full
acknowledgment of my own investigative purposes. Even though I have established a
relationship with the church in the past, I did not approach them as “one of my own
people,” nor did I claim to have any sort of integration into the routines and lived realities
of my participants.69 Perhaps the most important realization for me as a researcher as
participant-as-observer is that this role dispels any claims to objectivity in the research;
there is a greater degree of negotiation taking place between the researcher and the
participant in terms of space and relational ethics.70
I also did not wish to limit myself to simply observing “official” church-based
activities and functions. Thus, apart from these formal settings, I observed and
participated in various non-church social activities and gatherings, that is, activities not
organized by the church, in places such as coffee shops, restaurants, parks, malls, and
private residences. These non-church activities ranged from dinner parties, mahjong
sessions, house-warming ceremonies, weddings, outdoor activities, birthdays, funerals,
and day trips. Finally, my observations included informal conversations with people.
These interactions provided me with opportunities to gather information that otherwise
would not have presented itself in a more formal interview setting.
The last component of the data gathering process involved a content analysis from
materials gathered from my fieldwork. This included worship bulletins, meeting agendas
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and minutes, church pamphlets, and various literatures available at the church foyer. In
addition to printed materials, I made note of the various material artifacts around the
church and in people’s homes. These included posters, pictures, books, newspapers,
figurines, home decorations, and memorabilia.
Along with my qualitative data, this project incorporates a historical narrative of
the Chinese in Malaysia. The historical narrative situates and locates my research
participants along a trajectory.While this is not a straight-forward historical retelling, the
inclusion of the history of Chinese migration to Malaysia highlights how the reproduction
of social and cultural practices in contemporary Chinese Malaysians are inherited
practices of the past. The practices and cultural givens of Metro Church members as
products of historical forces relates to my use of Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, fields,
and capital.71
At this juncture, I wish to point out how habitus, fields, and capital play a
significant role in my overall research design. These concepts are seminal to an
understanding of and engagement with issues of identity constructions - how they are
negotiated and maintained.72 According to Bourdieu, habitus is an individually
operationalized set of expectations and understandings based on the collection of
experiences social agents encounter that shape their sense of the “rules of the game.”
Meanwhile, the field is the arena of social positions structured internally in terms of
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power relationships between social agents. The social agents “merely need to let
themselves follow their own social ‘nature,’ that is, what history has made of them, to be
as it were, ‘naturally’ adjusted to the historical world they are up against.”73 Finally,
Bourdieu’s concept of capital goes beyond Marx’s idea of accumulated labor in its
materialized form. Rather, he expands and reintroduces capital to fully account for the
structure and functioning of the social world. Thus, depending on the field where social
actors operate, capital presents itself in other forms such as economic capital, cultural
capital, and social capital.
Bourdieu sees everyday life as consisting of not one but a conglomeration of
fields such as leisure, family patterns, consumption, work, and artistic practices. 74 These
conglomerations act as social arenas of struggle over the appropriation of capital.75 This
framework is extremely useful for the dissertation since I am observing and interacting
with people outside the confines and operation of the church. By utilizing Bourdieu’s
frameworks, I demonstrate that hybridity constructions are closely intertwined with
questions of power, and that religious practitioners operate within complex and shifting
fields of relations. I view the religious life of Chinese Pentecostals in Malaysia as a field
in the Bourdieuan sense in which diverse forms of capital are both invested and generated
in interactive processes between and among each other, and those outside the faith
community. Finally, Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts are extremely useful in the
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simultaneous examination of both individual human conduct and structures of society.
These theoretical interlocutors not only enhance my analysis on identity formation, but
also provide a more comprehensive account of the relation between agency and structure.

Limitations: Positionality, Power and Representation
Because the discipline of postcolonial studies began in literature and English
departments, ethnography has taken a backseat as a legitimate methodology within the
discipline, which privileges a more discursive and textual method. I find that discourse
analysis is useful in providing tools to analyzing culture and identity. Indeed, Ien Ang
succinctly argues that Cultural Studies often prides itself as being a discipline located in
the intersections of various discourses, and strives “on a refusal to homogenize plurality
and heterogeneity as a way to resist, subvert or evade hegemonic forms of power.”76 I
want to advocate for an ethnography that does not take part in the traditional
understanding of the term, that is, a western academic enterprise of categorizing,
collecting, and controlling “barbaric cultures.” Rather, I strive to follow what James
Clifford identifies as “tentative, dialogical but still realist, ethnographic histories.”77
Yet, words such as “anthropology” and “ethnography” evoke suspicions of
essentialism and are stereotyped as irreparably tainted by the colonial enterprise. Further,
they ignore disproportionate power relations, and in doing so end up harming the people
they study. Ethnographers and anthropologists represent, while the people studied are
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represented. Edward Said sums up the postcolonial critique on ethnography and
anthropology succinctly:
I suppose there is some (justified) fear that today’s anthropologists can no longer
go to the postcolonial field with quite the same ease as in former times. This of
course is a political challenge to ethnography on exactly the same terrain where,
in earlier times, anthropologists were relatively sovereign. Responses have varied.
Some have in a sense retreated to the politics of textuality. Others have used the
violence emanating from the field as a topic for postmodern theory.78
These are valid accusations, and we should seriously address this complexity.
Nevertheless, I insist that ethnographic research is still salvageable and viable as a
method in religious and postcolonial studies as it is the most viable method with regards
to my dissertation.79
Even though I identify myself as Christian, and the majority of Metro Church’s
congregation, including the pastor, knows who I am, I acknowledge that there were many
elements in the church that appeared foreign to me. I vividly recalled my visits to the
church when I was a teenager. I remembered leaving feeling uncomfortable after a typical
Sunday worship service. I was not particularly an emotionally expressive person, so I was
unsettled by the congregation’s open declaration of their love for Jesus. The frenetic and
free-flowing speaking in tongues, sermons on submission and obedience, and prophesies
of Jesus’ return also unnerved me.
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Returning to the church now as an adult armed with sophisticated theoretical
concepts and academic knowledge, I do not expect any changes from the responses and
reactions that I experienced as a teenager. I do, however, expect to gain a sense of
empathy in understanding and appreciating how people believe and do things differently
from my own life. Doing ethnographic work involves more than just sound theory and
method. I have to be self-reflexive and recognize my place within the field. This means
that I have to constantly ask myself why I am feeling uncomfortable every time the
congregation began speaking in tongues. Why am I disturbed with the resounding “Yes,
Lords,” or every time the pastor proclaims some sort of end-times prophecy? How could
well-educated and urban well-to-do Christians come to believe in this? Given my position
as a Chinese, heterosexual, able-bodied, middle class male, how am I to interpret these
phenomenon? How do these lenses influence my observation of the environment, along
with my interviews with my participants? The act of being self-reflexive responds to the
claim that there is no such thing as a neutral and objective research. I do not claim to
know what is really “out there,” readily waiting for me to uncover. I am giving a
particularly situated account, while attempting to clue my readers into the lenses that
imbue that account.
Without a doubt, there are endless possibilities for distortions in my interview
process. Participants could lie and forget key details in their narratives, or the researcher
could be blatantly biased. Further, what we write can have dire repercussions and
consequences on our participants’ lives. Thus, if this dissertation is to have any
legitimacy and honesty, I have to address the uncomfortable issues of positionality,
power, and representation inherent in ethnographic research. Taking these issues to heart,
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I insist that a careful examination of what people say and do can give us some
approximation of what is going on “on the ground,” but simultaneously know that my
observation and conclusions will always be incomplete and non-representative of all
Chinese people.
I had assumed that while I belonged more or less to the ways and practices of
Metro Church, I was an insider. Furthermore, my ethnicity as a Chinese and someone
who has interacted with the church in the past only bolstered my status as an insider. This
means that I would have easy access to my participants, the ability to read culturally
specific non-verbal cues, and perhaps more importantly, be able to present a more
authentic (re)presentation of the culture and context I am researching. However, as
Sharan Merriam, et. al., explain in their article, “Power and Positionality: Negotiating
Insider/Outsider Status Within and Across Cultures,” the issues that researchers
encounter in the field are often unanticipated, in subtle ways, and more importantly, are
more complex than a simple insider/outsider dichotomy.80 Through reflections on their
fieldwork experiences – for example, a black woman interviewing black women, and a
Korean scholar interviewing her own people “from home” – the authors argue that there
are “multiple insider/outsider positionalities and complex power dynamics as well as
factors bearing on knowledge construction and representation in the research process.”81
My past relation with the church and ethnic and religious similarities may provide me
with special insider access to the community. I may have been an insider once upon a
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time, but because of my educational background and longstanding absence from the
community, I do not think I have the privilege of being called an insider any longer. I am
both an insider and outsider. I fall more in the category of what James Banks calls an
“indigenous outsider.” According to Banks, indigenous outsiders have experienced high
levels of cultural assimilation into an outsider culture (given that I received my postsecondary education degrees in the United States) but remains connected with his/her
indigenous community.82 When I enter into the world of my participants, I take to heart
the realization that positionalities constantly shift depending on one’s context, be it
social, economic, gender, and/or ethnic.
Researchers also possess immense amounts of power, since they are tasked with
telling the story of the community they study. The question of representation comes into
play. How are we to represent them? How can we be sure that we really understand the
community we are studying? Most importantly, what effects does our writing/research
have on our participants? James Clifford and George Marcus’ edited volume, Writing
Culture, explores these questions and observes that “ethnographic truths are only partial
and incomplete.”83 The authors conclude that we cannot be sure that we are getting things
right. We cannot even assume that the researcher can fully capture a pristine picture of
his/her research subject. Rather, ethnographic researchers need to recognize the interconnectiveness and multiple layerings that affect both the researcher and the researched.
Reflecting on her fieldwork experience among GLTBQ Christian communities, Melissa
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Wilcox suggests that as “human-subject” researchers, we have the choice among
“advocacy, constructive criticism, destructive criticism, and irrelevant or rarified
analysis.”84 While all options are viable, she states that it is our responsibility to be
vigilant against misuse, abuse or exploitation occurring within the choices we make.
Realizing the nature of my research and the level of complexity of involvement
with the Chinese Christian community of Metro Church, I choose to maintain, to the
extent that it is possible, a level of neutrality throughout the duration of my field work.
As a person with immense privilege and intellectual capacity, it is complicated for me to
enter into a community and begin interpreting the real meaning behind people’s religious
lives. There is a great risk that I may end up representing their stories and lives without
acknowledging their voices. Nevertheless, the academic study of religion has always
been engaged in the enterprise of “re-reinterpretating” things, and this dissertation is no
different.85 What I am doing is offer a re-reinterpretation of identity formation and its
contribution towards the larger question of hybridity’s efficacy as a means of resistance
through an examination of Pentecostal Chinese in Malaysia. Ultimately, the only thing I
can do is to attend to the limitations of the academic practice of ethnography, and to be as
ethical and responsible as possible with my participants and my readers.
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Structuring the Argument
Chapter Two begins by introducing the historical background of the Chinese
community in Malaysia. It concentrates on how the experience of British colonialism and
its policies altered Malaysia’s ethnic and political structures. I show how these practices
have separated Malaysia’s diverse ethnic groups along racial, religious, and socioeconomic lines. The British policy of “divide and rule,” predicated by nineteenth century
European theories of racial superiority and hierarchy, effectively created a plural but
ethnically essentialized and bounded Malaysian society. This configuration was simply
adopted over by the independent Malayan government. Some of these assumptions are
even enshrined in the nation’s Constitution. Because of their status as an ethnic minority,
the Chinese in Malaysia are pigeon-holed as greedy and untrustworthy migrants who
have benefited economically at the expense of the Malays. More importantly, this chapter
demonstrates how the habitus is informed Malaysia’s historical development which then
creates cultural and social practices that are carried over to contemporary Malaysia.
The question of what defines a Chinese person is the main focus of Chapter
Three. Using my ethnographic data to drive the research, I explore how Metro Church
members construct their ethnic identities. This chapter contends that Metro Church
members construct what I call a “Modern Chinese” ethnic identity to demarcate between
Malays and the “Chinese Chinese.” Here, strategy serves as an important outlook as
Metro Church members. This identity is a strategic maneuver, structured around the
habitus to distance themselves from the imposed essentialist categories imposed by the
dominant Malays. Nevertheless, I demonstrate how the Modern Chinese identity
constitutes an instance of unequal belonging as church members continue to recapitulate
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Malay stereotypes of Chinese toward the Chinese Chinese group. This chapter also
interrogates and critiques the structure/agency divide that exists in various primordialist
and constructivist approaches to ethnic identities. I suggest instead a processual way of
examining identity construction that is more in line with Bourdieu’s theoretical
conceptions of habitus, field, and capital.
Chapter Four concentrates on the growth of Pentecostal and Charismatic
Christianity among Chinese Malaysians. After providing a brief on the history of
Pentecostalism in Malaysia, this chapter locates and examines the narratives of Metro
Church members through my ethnographic observations. In particular, I examine the
conversion narratives of Metro Church members and argue that Christianity functions as
a site for the accumulation and optimization of cultural capital. I also show that this
capital is limited and unequal because it is only available for those who have mastery of
the English language and western ways.
Through the ethnographic data collected from my fieldwork, Chapter Five makes
broader connections to the overall discourse on syncretism and hybridity. Once again, I
draw on Bourdieu’s concepts of capital, habitus, and field to examine Chinese
Pentecostals’ engagement in unequal belonging as they negotiate their identities both as
Chinese and Christian. Because a majority of Metro Church’s congregants are
disproportionately from the urban, middle to upper class sector (i.e. westernized) of the
Malaysian population, I show that these constructions of hybridity may not necessarily
act as sites of resistance as many postcolonial theorists may have suggested. In particular,
I suggest how unequal belonging points to a way of analyzing the more subtle working of
power and hegemony that is entrenched even among marginalized communities.
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The concluding chapter discusses the implications of my findings in the field of
religious studies and postcolonial discourse. I make the case any serious engagement of
culture and religion must take into account the lived reality of people on the ground. As
such, religious scholars need to hold in tension between their roles as critic and caretaker.
I also stress the importance of Orsi’s idea of “abundant events” in the religious lives of
Christians in the Global South. I also stress that these abundant events, that is, the
“presence” of divine/spiritual beings must be taken seriously and analyzed in a direction
that moves beyond tried and true modernist analytical categories.
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CHAPTER TWO: CHINESE MIGRATION TO MALAYSIA

I grew up in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur just at the outskirts of downtown.
My neighbors consisted of people from various ethnic groups in Malaysia – Malays,
Chinese, Indians, Sikhs, and Eurasians. Every year on August 31st, I sat in front of the
television to watch the National Day parade where representatives of each ethnic group
walked across the Prime Minister’s stage showing off their kaleidoscope of cultural
garbs, music, and dances.
My parents sent me to a public school, where I once more had the pleasure of
interacting with children from different ethnic groups. In history class, I learned that the
three majority ethnic groups – Malays, Chinese, and Indians – all worked together in the
struggle for Malaysian independence from the British. I was proud to be living in a multicultural environment where everyone co-existed and worked harmoniously with one
another.
One day, while class was in session, a Chinese funeral procession passed by the
school. Being curious and inquisitive children, my classmates and I peered through the
windows to watch the procession, complete with mourners in sackcloth, a funeral band,
an elaborate hearse, and a convoy of cars following. One of my Malay classmates
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sneered that “a Chinaman had perished.”86 I was shocked at this blatant display of
disrespect, not just towards the deceased, but to my own ethnic group. Was he simply
being childish? Or was he being ignorant? Or was there something deeper than that?
This first experience of racism shattered my perception of Malaysia as a peaceful and
harmonious multi-ethnic nation. Behind the façade of unity and harmony there lay deepseated ethnic and religious tensions among the dominant Malays and ethnic minorities.
We are the “pendatang.” 87 (translated as “immigrants”)

Malaysia is a plural society dominated by the Malays.88 The country’s minority
groups, such as the Chinese, live in a precarious environment. They face very real
political, ethnic, cultural, and religious discrimination.89 Malaysia’s current ruling
government, the Barisan Nasional (National Front, hereafter, BN), is a coalition of racebased parties led by the Malay-centric United Malays National Organization (UMNO).
The other two component parties, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the
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Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), are also part of the coalition to protect the interests of
their respective ethnic groups.
While this political union appears to pays equal credence to each ethnic group, in
reality, UMNO possesses most of the power and influence. The BN administration
recognized Malays as the country’s original people. This recognition gives Malays
special rights compared to other minority groups. These rights include preserving the
sovereignty of Malay rulers, recognizing Malay as the official language, and maintaining
Islam as the national religion. They also have the right to preserve the major symbols of
Malay culture and religion and incorporate them as Malaysia’s official symbols.90 Over
the course of time, these special rights and privileges have expanded to include setting
affirmative action policies for the Malays such as university admissions and discounts on
buying homes. UMNO stressed that because the Malays were lagging in economic and
social progress compared to non-Malays, they needed additional assistance to catch up
with the rest of Malaysian society. Meanwhile, the other component parties largely stood
silent as UMNO dictated policies that increasingly marginalized the minority groups, a
process which slowly increased ethnic tensions.91 There is a special mistrust of Chinese,
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who are stigmatized by Malays as immigrants who have economically benefitted at the
expense of the natives.
Before going further, let me recall Said’s theorizing of western Orientalist
discourse. As detailed in the previous chapter, Said’s book Orientalism demonstrates the
ways Europe discursively constructed the Middle East through academic writings, and
thereby wielded a great deal of power and control – both rhetorical and on the ground –
in the Middle East. For Said, culture and academic discourse are not neutral endeavors. In
justifying colonialism, Said explains that Orientalism also created false and essentialized
images of Arabs and Islam. These “essentialist” Arab identities were negative in
comparison to white European identities. Orientalism helped define Europe’s self-image
as progressive, modern, and rational, and Orientals as backward, degenerate, and
irrational.
Even though Said’s book is more than thirty years old, his arguments remain
relevant and insightful today, especially in light of the current US involvement in the
Middle East, which presents the clearest case that Orientalism is alive and well today.
The depiction of Arabs and Muslims as backward and anti-democratic people is
predicated by profound ignorance and gross essentialisms of culture and identity. This in
turn creates an inaccurate and prejudicial view about Islam and Middle Easterners, which
in turn justifies US imperial aspirations in the region. Although Orientalism situates itself
in the Middle East, Said contends that there are counterparts in “similar knowledges” in
faults the UMNO-led government’s pro-Malay policies in stroking the fires of racism. As a result of the
Malaysian government stirring “the racial and religious pot,” Malott argues that this will ultimately ruin the
country’s economy and detract businesses from investing in Malaysia. For more information, see John
Malott, “The Price of Malaysia’s Racism,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704422204576129663620557634.html (accessed January
14, 2012).
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denying, suppressing, or distorting other minority and marginalized groups’ systems of
thought.92 In other words, Said’s analysis is not limited towards examination of European
attitudes toward Islam and Arabs, but is applicable as an analytical model for any
discourse that “others” marginalized groups.93
When we apply Said’s analytical lens to the Malaysian context, we begin to see
how a long history of false images of the Chinese as “invaders” and “greedy money
grubbers” have created false and essentialized images of the Chinese community in
Malaysia. Thus, in constructing a historical narrative that privileges the dominant Malays,
the ruling government is effectively “othering” the Chinese. Failing to consider the
nuanced complexities of the Chinese in Malaysian history has further perpetuated their
marginalization. An awareness of the orientalizing attitudes toward the Other is an
important step in analyzing Malaysia’s current ethnic and social configuration.
In this chapter, I analyze how the British colonial encounter (ca.1786 – 1957)
transformed Malaysia’s socio-political, economic, and ethnic environment into plural but
segregated communities. I focus on the transformation of the Chinese and Malay
community and how British rule permanently altered Malaysia’s socio-political
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landscape into its current configuration.94 After demonstrating that British colonialism is
predicated by nineteenth century European theories of racial superiority and hierarchy, I
identify and explore how these ideologies give rise to the divide and rule policy and the
colonial census as examples of colonial practices that created a plural but ethnically
essentialized Malaysian society.
This chapter also analyzes how these colonial policies became the habitus which
translates into contemporary social practices/policies that continue to cast the Chinese
along essentialized categories in postcolonial Malaysia.95 As Bourdieu argues in The
Logic of Practice, habitus, “a product of history, produces individual and collective
practices… in accordance with the schemes generated in history.”96 Since habitus is
acquired through the long-term occupation of a position in the social world, I show how
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experience of the Indian community in Malaysia with reputable scholars such as Judith Nagata, Khoo Kay
Kim, and Chandra Muzaffar.
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the post-independent Malaysian government, having unconsciously internalized these
colonial structures, recapitulates these structures by continuing to view the Chinese along
bounded categories. More importantly, the habitus leads to enduring social patterns that
Chinese Malaysians have inherited and perceived as the cultural givens of Malaysian
society.
I should note that it is not my intention here to provide a comprehensive treatment
of Chinese history in Malaysia. Rather, I am highlighting some of British colonial
policies that contributed to the orientalizing and essentializing of the Malay and Chinese
population.97 This provides a useful framework to assess the effects of the legacy of
British colonialism on Chinese and Malay relations in Malaysia today.

Early Chinese Migration to Malaysia
The Chinese have co-existed with the Malays since the 1400s. Between 1405 and
1433, the Ming Dynasty dispatched naval expeditions throughout the known world under
the auspices of the Yongle emperor (1402-1424). The expeditions’ goals were to extend
the Ming tributary system and establish Chinese diplomatic presence in various
settlements around the globe. The Ming government offered protection to any kingdoms
or governments that would enter into a tributary relationship with them. Among the portstates that took advantage of this opportunity was the newly established Melaka Sultanate
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in Malaysia. Strategically located in the middle of the Malaysian peninsula and
overlooking the Straits of Melaka, Melaka became a significant mid-point stop for
merchants and traders journeying between India and China for much of the fifteenth
century. Led by the Ming diplomat Admiral Zheng He, Melaka entered into a suzerainty
relationship with the Ming Dynasty and became a protectorate and tributary state.98 In
return, the Malay rulers of Melaka received Chinese military aid against rival kingdoms
and piracy threats.99 Having created a diplomatic relationship with the Melaka Sultanate,
the Ming government established a small Chinese community in the port city to handle
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commercial activities and promote foreign trade with China. Through familial networks,
the small Chinese trading community effectively linked the port of Melaka with other
Asian coastal ports.100
It is important to note that this “first wave” of Chinese immigrants was part of a
diplomatic mission sanctioned by the Ming Dynasty. They were educated diplomats and
professional traders who worked alongside the Melaka Sultanate and intermingled with
the local population. Some served as cultural brokers between China and Melaka; a few
even became government officials and diplomats for their new communities. Since the
Melaka Sultanate integrated foreigners into their administration, the Malay rulers elected
leaders of the Chinese community, alongside with other people of different cultural
background, to serve as Shahbandar (translates as “port official”), overseeing the
administration of the port. The Chinese Shahbandar also functioned as liaisons to the
Sultanate in overseeing Chinese trade activities and regulating Chinese behavior.101 In
spite of wide cultural and linguistic differences, Malay rulers worked with the Chinese
for mutual gain.
Many of the early Chinese migrants acculturated and assimilated into the local
culture through the bonds of matrimony. Because early Chinese immigrants to Malaysia
were mostly men, they married local women, and in the process created hybrid
communities. Although they were ethnically Chinese, these loosely-defined communities,
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called peranakan, assimilated some Malay cultural traits of their adopted homeland.102
Some features of acculturation include speaking Malay as the common/dominant
language, wearing Malay-style attire, and adopting Malay-style cuisine and eating
habits.103 This gives evidence of the relatively loose boundaries of pre-colonial ethnic
relations. By the time the Portuguese invaded Melaka in 1511, there was already a small
resident Chinese community in the city port.104
For the next 300 years, Chinese migration to Malaysia stagnated as China became
embroiled in its own internal problems with famines, rebellions, and the changing of
102

In Melaka, these hybrid Chinese are collectively called “Straits Chinese,” or colloquially
known as Baba (for men) and Nyonya (for women).The term peranakan translates as “local-born” in
Malay. It was not until the British colonial period which where ethnic boundaries became enacted. For the
Chinese who did not assimilate to Malay culture, peranakan Chinese were not considered to be “full”
Chinese. As such, they were usually considered to be a distinct Chinese ethnic group with their own
separate agendas. Historical narratives on the Chinese in Malaysia rarely mention the peranakan
community, mainly because they occupy a hybrid space of not quite Chinese and not quite Malay. It is
worth mentioning that peranakan society is more a product of cultural synthesis than biological mixing.
The issue of peranakan Chinese in Malaysia has received much scholarly attention, and rightfully so,
warrants a fuller exploration than what is afforded here. For more information, see John Clammer, The
Ambiguity of Identity: Ethnicity Maintenance and Change among the Straits Chinese Community of
Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1979); Felix Chia, The Babas
(Singapore: Times Books International, 1980); Tan Chee-Beng, The Baba of Melaka: Culture and Identity
in a Chinese Peranakan Community (Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 1988); Lee Su Kim, “The Peranakan
Baba Nyonya Culture: Resurgence or Disappearance?” in Sari 26 (2008): 161-170; and Tan Chee-Beng,
Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004).
103

This appears to be a widespread trait in other regions. For example, in pre-Dutch Java, the
Chinese community was free to adopt Indonesian cultural practices or marry into the local society. See Leo
Suryadinata, The Culture of the Chinese Minority in Indonesia (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish
International, 2004); and Tim Lindsey, and Helen Pausacker, eds., Chinese Indonesians: Remembering,
Distorting, Forgetting (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). Also see Mary F. Somers
Heidhues, Southeast Asia’s Chinese Minorities (Hawthorn: Longman, 1974).
104

Portuguese records speak of a small enclave of Chinese residing in the southern bank of the
Melaka River even though there was no mention of a Chinese community leader. According to Anthony
Reid, it is not clear why this was the case although he speculates that the Chinese community that
emigrated to Melaka in the early 1400s had thoroughly assimilated into the local population. See Reid,
“Flows and Seepages,” in Sojourners and Settlers, 33. See also Lockard, “The Sea Common to All,” 232.
The writing of Tomé Pires also provides an excellent resource for studying life in Melaka. His work, the
Suma Oriental is one of the earliest European written records on Malaysia. Pires spent some time in
Melaka from 1512 to 1515, writing extensively about Melaka under Portuguese rule. Among the topics
covered include Portuguese dealings with the various communities in Melaka, notwithstanding the Chinese.
See Tomé Pires, The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, trans. Armando Cortesão (London: Hakluyt Society,
1944).

62

dynasties. Portuguese and Dutch colonial governments also offered few incentives to
attract new Chinese traders to Melaka.105 Even so, the Chinese community was able to
maintain their existence by allying and cooperating with the rulers of the land. They
continued trading with other city ports around the Southeast Asian region, namely in
Batavia, Manila, and Ayutthaya.106 The southern Malay kingdom of Johor, established by
descendants of the Melaka Sultanate, encouraged and welcomed Chinese settlement and
business enterprises. There was also evidence of Chinese involvement in the kingdom’s
administrative council as well with the presence Malay administrators who spoke and
wrote Chinese fluently.107
Chinese settlement in Malaysia prior to British colonial intervention is
significantly different. Chinese settlers were varied which consisted of diplomats, traders,
and artisans. Early Chinese migrants were also involved in the administrative affairs of
the Malay kingdoms. They worked alongside and cooperated with one another for mutual
benefit. The heterogeneous nature of early Chinese migration to Malaysia was absent in
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the nineteenth century as a mass influx of poor and uneducated Chinese came to Malaysia
as laborers. More importantly, there was less separation between each ethnic group
during pre-colonial times. Evidence of inter-ethnic marriages between Chinese and local
Malays and the creation of peranakan hybrid cultures indicate a less rigid conception of
ethnic boundaries. Of course, I am not naïve to believe that these communities co-existed
harmoniously and free of ethnic tensions. Although there may be instances of ethnic
tensions, it did not appear that there was universal distrust between Chinese and Malays,
nor were there indications of a creation of essentialized boundaries. 108 Ultimately, there
was less social and cultural distance/separation between Malays and Chinese during preBritish times.

The Chinese under British Rule
Racializing Discourses
The most significant shift in Malaysia’s demographic composition occurred
during the British colonial period (ca. 1786-1957). After first colonizing the island of
Penang in 1786, the British expanded and consolidated their influence in the region by
acquiring Singapore in 1819 and Melaka in 1824. The British converted these three cities,
known as the Straits Settlements, into free ports. The signing of the Pangkor Treaty in
1874 also heralded the annexation of more interior Malaysian territories as the need for
raw materials to manufacture commercial goods in Europe became increasingly vital and
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lucrative.109 Under the terms of the treaty, the British assigned Resident Advisors to assist
the Malay rulers in all matters of governance, except for issues pertaining to Islam and
the Malay culture. By the early 1900s, the British consolidated its hold across Peninsula
Malaysia. They soon began a rigorous economic program to harvest the region’s rich
resources of raw materials such as tin, tea, rubber and palm oil. Thanks to large British
capital investments, there was a great demand for manual labor to extract these materials
to meet the demands of European industrialization. This marked the creation of a plural
society in Malaysia as thousands of Chinese and Indian laborers migrated to the colony in
search of work.
Let me stress here again that I am not reconstructing a history of British rule in
Malaysia.110 Rather, I am highlighting how British colonialism altered ethnic relations
between Chinese and Malays. The British set up policies rooted in nineteenth century
European scientific theories of racial superiority. Late nineteenth century Europe
witnessed a shift in ideological thinking in terms of race. The height of Social
Darwinism, pseudo-scientific theories of the human race, and the seemingly unfettered
dominance of Europe around the globe contributed to the development of the idea of
109
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European white superiority. These “scientists” devised methodologies, such as measuring
the shapes and sizes of skulls, to determine an entire people group’s position on an
imagined racial hierarchy.111
Although Darwin himself never sought to apply his theory beyond biology, Social
Darwinism found much analytical purchase in the social sciences. This misapplication of
Darwin contends that all human races progress and evolve from primitive to civilized
cultures under the principles of “survival of the fittest.”112 Natural selection was seen as a
method of eliminating weak persons or groups. Letting nature run its course presented the
best scenario for ultimately improving the race and weeding out society’s unworthy
elements. Herbert Spencer’s “The Social Organism” (1860) compares society to a living
organism and argues that society evolves and increases in complexity through an
analogous process just as biological organisms evolve through the process of natural
selection. 113 Western technological advances placed European culture as the pinnacle of
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human socio-cultural evolution by virtue of Europe’s “natural superiority” in the struggle
for existence. According to Crawford Young, this evolutionary view of the human race
offers:
the rationale for a racially stratified view of evolution based on an ethnocentric
colonial view of the subjugated nations who, with reference to their relative lack
of western technology, were deemed more lowly. Europeans represented the
highest point of evolution, diverse Asians and Indians fell in somewhere behind,
and Africans brought up the rear.114
Social Darwinism legitimized Europe’s conquest of non-European lands.115 Because
different groups of people were perceived as less evolved, and therefore inferior,
European powers justified the use of slave and indentured labor to work in their colonies.
Since European civilization self-identified as superior to the rest of the world, it
was Europe’s duty to take up the White Man’s Burden to civilize the world for the benefit
of all humankind.116 This attitude permeated throughout the colonial enterprise.
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Colonialism inflicts damage on the colonized as it alters, exacerbates, and distorts the
pre-existing socio-economic structures, social relations, and identities of the colonies.
Armed with a sense of racial superiority, the British established their rule in Malaysia by
conducting practices and implementing policies that permanently changed the country’s
ethnic and political landscape.

The Colonial Census
One of the ways European powers controlled their colonial subjects is through
categorization and enumeration. Benedict Anderson’s seminal work, Imagined
Communities argues that nineteenth century colonial powers utilized the census, the map,
and the museum as tools to foster belonging by consolidating early ideas about the nation
and its citizens. Through the census, the state identified, enumerated, and classified
people and “profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion
– the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy
of its ancestry.”117 This in turn encouraged people to view the world as composed of
distinct groups. Let me return to Bourdieu once again to frame this analysis. As he
reminds us in Language and Symbolic Power, “by structuring the perception which social
agents have of the social world, the act of naming helps to establish the structure of the
world, and does so all the more significantly the more widely it is recognized, i.e.
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authorized.”118 Bourdieu recognizes the power to create social realities through the use of
words. These practices create habitus, a socially inscribed space that defines a person’s
sense of place in the world that is enduring and transferrable from one context to another
over time. In Malaysia’s case, the census categorized the country’s diverse ethnic groups
along rigid boundaries over time. David Goldberg similarly argues that the census is “an
exercise in social naming, in nominating into existence.”119 He further states that “the
census reflects the racializing categories of social formation that it nevertheless at once
reifies, which it reproduces as it creates and cements as it naturalizes. The process of
objectified nomination thus fixes (as least temporarily and tenuously) what are at best
racial fabrications.”120
The British solidified bounded ethnic identities among the Malays, Chinese, and
Indians – usually without any input from the colonized groups.121 More than just a
statistical exercise, the data from censuses possesses the power to construct or eliminate
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pre-existing categories by which people understand sameness and difference.122 I am not
saying that ethnic and cultural differences did not exist, nor am I suggesting that these
differences were solely the invention of the colonial powers. Certainly, pre-colonial
censuses did exist, but they lacked what Anderson argues, any “systematic
quantification.”123 Pre-colonial censuses did not exude the totalizing power that colonial
authorities possessed.124 As James Scott states, “state officials can make their categories
stick and impose their simplifications.” 125
Colonial Malaysia provides an excellent example of how the British divided
people-groups into separable racial categories and identities. In devising these categories,
census-takers used pre-existing cultural and geographical markers to categorize the
colonial subjects. Charles Hirschman suggests that colonial officials had to formulate a
set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive ethnic categories to classify the population:
“There were no precedents from earlier reports to follow… the categories of

122

See for example, Marianne Ferme, “The Violence of Numbers: Concerns, Competition and the
Negotiation of Disputes in Sierra Leone,” in Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 38, no.150-152 (1988): 555–580;
Talal Asad, “Ethnographic Representation, Statistics and Modern Power,” in Social Research 61,
no.1(1994): 55-88; and David Kertzer, and Dominique Arel, eds., Census and Identity: The Politics of
Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
123

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 168.

124

One of things that occurred with the census in the nineteenth century was a shift in its logic.
The pre-colonial census was more of an instrument of taxation before becoming an instrument of
knowledge and discipline. For examples of pre-colonial census, see Richard Saumarez Smith, “Rule-byRecords and Rule-by-Reports: Complementary Aspects of the British Imperial Rule of Law,” in
Contributions to Indian Sociology 19 (1985): 153-176. Elsewhere, Norbert Peabody suggests that colonial
authorities often used indigenous enumeration records about which the colonials were only dimly aware of.
Nevertheless, he stops short of making a direct correlation between pre-colonial and colonial forms of
knowledge. See Norbert Peabody, “Cents, Sense, Census: Human Inventories in Late Precolonial and Early
Colonial India,” in Comparative Study in Society and History 43, no.4 (2001): 819-850.
125

James Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 81.

70

classification had to be ‘invented’ from experience and common knowledge.”126 He
argues that categories such as Malay, Chinese, and Indian are much broader than they are
socially understood.127 This reflects the British colonial government’s lack of awareness
in the existence of diversity among the people living in Malaysia had in turn created
categories of simplification and division, consciously or not, as a means of control.
Echoing Hirschman’s assessment, Anderson’s analysis of the Indonesian colonial
census shows that local Indonesian natives did not recognize themselves along the labels
generated by colonial census-takers.128 This shows how colonial attempts to classify
subjective identities are void of native involvement. This is the significant difference
between European and colonial census practices. While Euro-Western enumeration
categories involving nationality and language were negotiated between the state and the
social groups, the colonial powers paid no attention to their colonized subjects.129
The colonial censuses of 1871, 1891, 1911, and 1931 show how diverse
categories of people in Malaysia became grouped together under the general headings of
“Europeans,” “Malays,” “Chinese,” and “Indians.”130 For example, the 1871 Census
incorporated people groups from as far as the Philippines (“Manilamen”) as part of the
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Malay race.131 Later in the 1911 Federated Malay States Census, the category of “Malay”
was extended to other groups such as the Javanese, Achinese, and Bugis. Strangely, all
three groups originated from the Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Java which was part
of the Dutch colony; Anderson points out that surely these groups were categorized under
a different enumeration rubric by Dutch colonial census takers.132 As for the Chinese
immigrant community in Malaysia, the 1911 Straits Settlements Census subsumed the
“Straits-born” and “China-born” under the general heading of “Chinese.”133 The census
left little room for people with belonging in multiple ethnic categories such as the
peranakan Chinese. To the eyes of the colonial census takers, either they were Malay,
Chinese, or Indian. Consequently, the relatively porous pre-colonial boundaries of ethnic
cooperation and mutual tolerance were written off by the colonial census. This is perhaps
the most damaging feature of the colonial census. In its capacity to erase the legacy of
cultural borrowing and hybrid identities in pre-colonial times, Barbara Andaya and
Leonard Andaya observe that “the British contributed to the hardening of ethnic divisions
which was to plague all subsequent governments of Malaya/Malaysia.”134
It is important to understand that undergirding the colonial census are European
perceptions of racial supremacy. Because colonialism is justified through ordering and
ranking races along a hierarchy of races, the British restructured Malaysian society
through the logic of an ethnically-based communal society that separated the various
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ethnic communities according to “higher” and “lower” races, each with different
economic functions. The Malays were seen as a primarily agrarian people who were
economically backward and therefore needed the protection of the colonial authorities.
Meanwhile, the Chinese and Indians who were brought to the colony in large numbers
were meant to serve different functions within the colonial economy. It is through these
reified categories that justified Charles Warnford-Lock, a colonial mining officer in
declaring, “by nature, the Malay is an idler, the Chinaman is a thief and the Indian is a
drunkard. Yet each, in his special class of work, is both cheap and efficient, when
properly supervised.”135 It is through this categorization of colonial Malaysia’s ethnic
groups that an uneven and racially segregated colonial economy appeared.
Malaysia presents a classic example of what John Furnivall calls a plural society.
Based on his observations of colonial Burma and Indonesia in the 1940s, he argues that
plural societies are the creation of colonial policies that fostered migration of laborers
according to economic dictates. The result of this is the creation of a society that co-exists
side by side, but is divided along racial and religious lines.136 Echoing Furnivall,

135

Charles Wanford-Lock, Mining in Malaya for Gold and Tin (London: Crowther and Goodman,
1907), 31-32.
136

John Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1956), 304. For an analysis of Malaysia’s plural society, see Maurice Freedman, “The
Growth of a Plural Society in Malaysia,” in Pacific Affairs 33, no.2 (1960): 158-168; Judith Nagata, ed.,
Pluralism in Malaysia: Myth and Reality: A Symposium on Singapore and Malaysia (Leiden: Brill, 1975);
and Robert Hefner, ed., The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001). Furnivall’s theory is criticized for
being too overdrawn. In particular, Charles Coppel argues that Furnivall’s assessment of the plural society
of colonial Indonesia is too “exaggerated” and “misleading.” He warns that one should not view the
relationship between the various ethnic groups in the colony as static. Of course, I agree that the ethnic
makeup of colonial Malaysia is more fluid than the census takers would like it to be. Even though his work
is dated, Furnivall accurately captures how ethnicity, as a reified concept, continues to play a fundamental
part in structuring postcolonial societies in Southeast Asia. For more information See Charles Coppel,
“Revisiting Furnivall’s ‘Plural Society’: Colonial Java as a Mestizo Society?” in Ethnic and Racial Studies
20, no.3 (1997): 562-579.

73

Malaysian social anthropologist Zawawi Ibrahim contends that Malaysia has always been
a plural society, even before the arrival of the British. This is especially true during the
Melaka Sultanate where there was a great deal of cultural mobility, as loose boundaries
of marriages and inter-ethnic cooperation between Chinese and Malay. But with the
arrival of British colonialism, “the subsequent elaborations by colonialism upon this
‘initial pluralism’… gave rise to the ethnicism and competing ethnicities currently
inherited by the modern Malaysian nation-state.”137 Through the infamous divide and rule
policy, these “ethnicism” and “competing ethnicities” give rise to communal and reified
identities. 138

Divide and Rule
Due to the high labor requirement to work in tin mines and rubber plantations, the
British colonial government imported Indian and Chinese laborers to the colony. From
the start, the British discouraged the Malays from participating in the economic activities
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of the colony. Robert Hefner, an anthropologist specializing in Southeast Asian Muslim
culture, contends that the price of teaching the Malays the tools of the trade was “too
high” politically, and the British would pursue an appeasement policy by not interfering
with their religion and culture.139 British policy towards the Malays was to conserve the
traditional Malay structure. In dealing with the Malays, the British knew that the Malay
rulers commanded the loyalty of the Malay population. To the Malay peasantry,
“government was the sole business of the Sultan and his chiefs… A commoner’s duty
was to carry out commands, or ‘Titah’ of the Sultan at all costs.”140 In order to keep the
Malay population in check, all they had to do was to make sure that they preserved the
relationship between the Malay aristocracy and their Malay subjects. The British
symbolically acknowledged the Malay rulers’ sovereignty over each state, whose rule
encompassed matters relating to the Malay tradition such as Malay customs and Islam.
The British provided the rulers with “bureaucratic and legal machinery to implement their
directives in a more systematic and invasive manner than ever before in Malay
history.”141
Concurrently, the British selected a small group of Malays from aristocratic
families and trained them as low-level bureaucrats to help run the colony’s administrative
affairs. B.N. Cham suggests that this pro-Malay policy was designed to emphasize
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Malays as the sole originators of the region, and not the non-Malay community.142 They
set up schools designated for elite Malay boys where they received a western
education.143 This was not a gesture of British benevolence towards the local populace.
Rather, this new class of learned Malay elites functioned as arbiters between the local
populace and colonial authorities. By creating this class, the British co-opted the Malay
traditional elites and established a hierarchy where western-educated Malay elites would
serve as the “vanguard” for the rest of the Malay populace. At the same time, the majority
of the Malay population was dependent on this vanguard group for leadership and
guidance.144
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The divide and rule policy constructed racial difference and distinctiveness within
a hierarchical ordering of superior and inferior races. This formed the ideological basis
for the maintenance of British colonial rule in Malaysia. Even though the British
recognized the status of Malays as the original people of the country, they also believed
that the Malays were lazy and docile, and thus required supervision from their superior
colonial masters. Syed Hussein Alatas’ The Myth of the Lazy Native argues that the
bountiful Malaysian environment has conditioned the Malays against a disciplined work
ethic, which gave birth to the stereotype of the “lazy” and docile Malay.145 Unlike the
shrewd Chinese, the British did not believe that the Malays possessed the capability to
participate in the economic affairs of the Empire. Writing on his adventures and
observations in Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, British naturalist Alfred Wallace
observes in The Malay Archipelago (1869) that with regards to the Malays, “the intellect
of the Malay race seems rather deficient. They are incapable of anything beyond the
simplest combination of ideas and have little taste or energy for the acquirement of
knowledge.”146 With such projections, the British ultimately kept the Malay population
away from colonial economic activity. 147 Since the Malays were not ambitious and did
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not possess the work ethic to labor in the tin mines and rubber estates, the British doubted
that the Malays could compete with the other ethnic groups. As such, they had to be taken
care of. While trying to maximize economic output from their territories, the British
simultaneously made sure that each group was kept apart from each other.148
The British segregated the ethnic communities in colonial Malaysia along
economic “trades.”149 Mines and plantations became exclusively served by Chinese and
Indian laborers. At the same time, the British discouraged the Chinese and Indian from
entering into subsistence farming for fear that this would encroach on the Malays. For
example, the British introduced the Malay Reservations Enactment in 1913 as a means to
prevent sale of Malay rural land and Malay-reserved land to non-Malays.150 The
segregated recruitment policy also means that the British could easily manipulate the
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immigrant labor community and ensured that workers were not easily assimilated or
readily accepted by the local inhabitants.151

The Chinese Immigrant Community
The practice of employing immigrant labor to work in the colonies was standard
procedure throughout the British Empire.152 For the Chinese, the majority of the new
immigrants were young men of poor and uneducated rural peasants, farmers and
craftsmen.153 The high demand for immigrant labor, coupled with worsening famine and
overpopulation in China, resulted in a resurgence of Chinese emigration to Malaysia. 154
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There were two types of Chinese migration to Malaysia: kinship-based immigration and
credit-ticket immigration. Under kinship-based immigration, the Chinese traveling to
Malaysia relied on their relationships with their blood relatives to help make the
transition to a new environment. Once they established a foothold in Malaysia, they
would in turn recruit their kin and relatives to help them with their business operations.
The other system, the credit-ticket immigration, became the primary pattern of Chinese
emigration to Malaysia.155 Under the credit-ticket system, the Chinese entered into a
contractual agreement (written or verbal) with labor agencies or junk captains. In
exchange for advance passage to Malaysia, immigrants were required to work for their
sponsors to pay off their debt upon arrival. Once they repaid their debt or fulfilled their
contractual obligations, they were free to choose their own employment.
The uneducated Chinese laborers posed little threat to the British colonial
government since they had little political purchase away from their homeland.156 They
were cheap, disposable, and easy to control; at the first sign of trouble, the British could
deport them back to China. Labor inspectorates/agencies and protectorates also ensured
that the Chinese immigrants were held in check while ensuring the free flow of Chinese
migration around the colony. According to Amarjit Kaur, these agencies functioned as
“screening bodies” to identify the “troublemakers.” Through the practice of medical
supporters of the Ming Dynasty from establishing bases overseas. The Qing Dynasty considered Chinese
emigration as an act of disloyalty. These decrees were largely ignored as the situation in China worsened in
the late 1800s. Chinese migration to Southeast Asia also coincided with Chinese influx to the United States
before the United States government banned further migrations in 1882. Eventually, the imperial Chinese
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screenings, these labor agencies would identify politically undesirable laborers and
deport them.157 The Chinese were also barred from participating in the administrative
affairs of the colony, a privilege that was only conferred to the Malays. Left to fend for
themselves, the Chinese established religious organizations, “benevolent” societies, and
secret societies to help the Chinese immigrant community. The British tolerated these
institutions, provided that they did not upset the peace and daily flow of the colonial
administration.158
These organizations assisted the Chinese in securing employment, offering
protection, and organizing social/religious events. Yet, they also functioned as a form of
control that ensured Chinese segregation from other ethnic groups. For example, in the
tin-mining industry, the Chinese were organized through the kongsi, an organizing
system based on clan associations which combined dialect, regional, and occupational
groupings.159 They simultaneously functioned as a means of social control and social
solidarity among the Chinese immigrant community.160 These kongsis have their own
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codes of conduct which demanded the loyalties of its members. These organizations also
offered a sense of security and identity for the Chinese community through clan ties and
kinship links.
The Malays, protected by the British and separated from the colonial economic
enterprise, and the Chinese, clustered around clan-based organizations, represent two
very different systems of organization during a crucial period of Malaysian history. Wang
Gungwu summarizes:
By the time the Europeans were ready to expand in the 19th century in search of
markets and raw materials and to introduce new administrative structures to help
them get what they wanted, they had molded the pluralist heritage of the region to
a shape that suited their needs. It was no longer an amorphous open pluralism, but
one that recognized priorities (for example, entrepreneurial and technical over
farming skills) and emphasizes new hierarchies that could be systematically
manipulated (for example, religious and ethnic differences, new status and wealth
differences, and ultimately class differences)...The earlier form of cultural
pluralism was now placed in a new cultural framework - a modern secular culture
based on control, efficiency, profitability, and accountability.161
This new framework created an aura of suspicion between the Malays and the Chinese as
these two ethnic groups did not interact with each other. According to William George
Maxwell, a high ranking colonial officer, the prohibition against the participation of nonMalay Asians in the colonial administration came directly from the British themselves:
From the very earliest days of British protection, the [Malay] Rulers have
welcomed Chinese communities as members of their State Councils, and have
paid the greatest deference to their opinions and advice… The policy of keeping
non-Malayans out of the administration owes its inception to British officials, not
to the Rulers.162
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The British did not recognize the Chinese immigrant labor as “citizens” of the land.163
They had assumed that they were merely sojourners who would eventually return to their
homeland once they have accumulated enough wealth. However, many chose to remain,
since there were better opportunities in Malaysia than in China. The increased presence
of women in Malaysia also contributed to the transformation of the Chinese community
from a predominantly male transient community into a more settled and permanent
society.164 The 1931 Malayan Census showed a significantly increasing proportion of
permanent immigrant population, revealing that nearly a third of the Chinese population
had been born in Malaysia.165
Although the Chinese faced exploitation and harsh working conditions in colonial
Malaysia, a large proportion of workers later managed to become self-sufficient.
Economic historian Wong Lin Ken observed that by the late 1880s, there was:
an increase in the number of [Chinese] immigrants who could pay their own
passages, either because they were helped by friends and relatives who had
already made some money from the tin mines or elsewhere, or because they were
Chinese laborers returning to the Straits to make more money.166
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British attitudes toward the Chinese were of begrudging admiration. Frank Swettenham,
an accomplished colonial officer in Malaysia, who, in spite of his interests in the customs
and people of the country, contends that:
The Chinese have, under direction, made the Protected States what they are. They
are the bees who suck honey from every profitable undertaking… It is almost
hopeless to expect to make friends with a Chinaman, and it is, for a Government
officer, an object that is not very desirable to attain. The Chinese, at least that
class of them met with in Malaya, do not understand being treated as equals; they
only realize two positions – the giving and receiving of orders; they are the easiest
people to govern in the East for a man of determination, but they must know their
master, as he must know them… Under the conditions, the Chinese are the bone
and sinew of the Malay States. They are the labourers, the miners, the principal
shopkeepers, the contractors, the capitalists, the holders of the revenue farms, the
contributors of almost the whole of the revenue: we cannot do without them.167
We should not be surprised by Swenttenham’s assessment of the Chinese. Even after
acknowledging their contributions to the colonial economy, the British continued to view
the Chinese as penurious. Similarly, Hugh Clifford, the British Resident to the Sultan of
Pahang and a contemporary of Swettenham, echoes the prevalent European view of the
Chinese. Presenting a paper at the Royal Colonial Institute on Great Britain’s work in the
Malaysian colony in 1889, Clifford observes:
The Chinese have toiled in the Peninsula for many centuries… These people, who
surely are the most thrifty and industrious of mankind, love money for money’s
sake, love a gamble, such as mining affords, and above all, love complete security
for life and property probably because the latter is a thing which they so rarely
find in their own distracted country… A constant stream of immigration has set
towards these States from the over-crowded districts of Southern China, and the
yellow portion of the inhabitants of Malaya threatens shortly to outnumber the
brown.168
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Clifford’s view of the Chinese also helps us illuminate another important point. He was
concerned that the influx of Chinese labor to Malaysia would threaten to outnumber the
local Malay population. It might only be a matter of time before the Malays would start
resenting the presence of foreigners in their country. Indeed, the question of non-Malay
presence became the single pressing issue among Malays as the Malaysia began its
decolonization process and moved towards independence.
What I have shown in this section is that the mass influx of workers coming from
India and China to Malaysia to fuel the colonial economy had significantly altered the
ethnic, economic, and social landscape of the region. This colonial plural society is based
on ethnic segregation. British colonial policies, predicated by European theories of racial
superiority, ordered and cemented the ethnic groups in Malaysia into separate “trades”
and along essentialist categories. By assigning different ethnic groups along different
trades based on the racial superiority, the British reified the distinction between the
Malays and non-Malay immigrant groups.169
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The “Historic Bargain” and Independence
The years before independence (1945-1957) were a tumultuous time for the
Chinese in Malaysia as more and more became permanent residents of their adopted
homeland.170 One of the major roadblocks to an independent Malaysia was solving the
status of the Chinese and Indian immigrant community. Where did their loyalties lie?
How will they function in an independent Malaysia? In this section, I briefly narrate the
complex maneuvering of Malaysia’s local elites in negotiating for independence from the
British. Again, this narrative will not cover the full extent of this very complicated and
complex political process. Rather, I want to show how the independence movement is
predicated by an internalized the logic of bounded ethnic differences which then
produced a communal outlook among the Chinese and Malays.
In the aftermath of World War II, the British Empire’s efforts to reform the
colony under the Malayan Union in 1946 were met with Malay protests. Under the
Malayan Union, the British streamlined the governance of their colony, abolished the old
Resident system, and transferred the Malay rulers’ powers (except for religious matters)
to the British governor who would rule directly under the British Crown. Further, the
Malayan Union would grant equal rights and citizenship to all residents of the colony
who successfully applied for it. The British had hoped that the Malayan Union would
foster unity and loyalty towards a new centralized state under British rule.171
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The British proposal to grant equal citizenship for all residents in Malaysia,
regardless of ethnicity, angered the Malay population. The United Malays National
Organization (UMNO), a party founded by Malay aristocrat Onn Jaafar, decried this act
as evidence of further weakening of Malays in Malaysia. 172 After a series of boycotts and
protests, the British relented. They abolished the Malayan Union and replaced it with the
Federation of Malaya in 1948. According to T.N. Harper, “Britain sought to break down
the divisions of a plural society, and create an integrated economic and political entity,
bound together by shared allegiance, a common culture and the obligations of an active
citizenship.”173 This failed because the Malays were not willing to accept non-Malays as
their equals.
With this act, UMNO successfully forced the British to grant citizenship for the
Malays by virtue of their special place in Malaysia. The Federation tightened non-Malay
immigration, restricted non-Malay citizenship, and recognized the special rights and
privileges of the Malays. The rights and privileges of the Malays became encapsulated
under the phrase ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy). The formation of the Federation
of Malaya was very much an initiative spearheaded by Malay elites, UMNO, and the
British Empire as non-Malay grievances and suggestions were not taken into
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consideration.174 In effect, the Federation of Malaya solidified among the Malays that
Malaysia was the “land of the Malays” and turned many Chinese in Malaysia into
stateless aliens due to an unclear and biased citizenship policy that privileged the
Malays.175 Tunku Abdul Rahman (hereafter, the Tunku), a western-educated Malay
prince who replaced Onn Jaafar as the president of UMNO, declared in 1952 that
“Malaya is for the Malays and it should not be governed by a mixture of races.”176
Curiously, Onn Jaafar left UMNO after he unsuccessfully tried to extend UMNO’s party
membership to non-Malays.
However, one of Britain’s pre-requisite for an independent Malaysia was interracial unity and co-operation among the various ethnic groups in the country. 177 The
country’s elites from various ethnic groups hatched a peculiar solution. The Malays, led
by UMNO, needed the support of the Chinese and Indians; they needed to strike a
political bargain with the non-Malays. The Tunku, who earlier sought an exclusivist
“Malay” Malaysia, needed to relax his stance if he was to persuade other groups to ally
with UMNO. They found a partner in the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). Founded
in 1949, the MCA’s primary goal was to provide a political voice for the Chinese
174
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community. The party’s president, Tan Cheng Lock, recognized that an alliance with
UMNO was the best route to safeguard Chinese interests and ensure the Chinese of a
political future in an independent Malaya.178 The MCA would appeal to both British
authorities and UMNO Malay nationalists as a “moderate” movement who were willing
to acquiesce to Malay interests in exchange for citizenship in a newly independent
Malaysia. The UMNO-MCA alliance would eventually become the prototype for the
Alliance Party, and subsequently the BN coalition, which has ruled the country
uninterrupted since 1955.
The first thing the UMNO-MCA alliance needed to do was create a united multiracial front to satisfy the British’s prerequisite for self-governance. They did this by
merging with yet another ethnically-based party, the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), in
1954. Together, the three component parties formed the Alliance Party to contest in the
country’s first local general elections in 1955. The 1955 election served as a “trial run”
for the outgoing British colonials to determine which party would form the new
independent Malaysian government, and if Malaysia was indeed ready for selfgovernance. The Alliance Party won 51 out of 52 seats and showed the British that the
colony could govern the country on its own through multi-ethnic cooperation.
Although the Alliance Party’s victory may have convinced the British that the
country’s diverse ethnic groups could work together, it is noteworthy to mention that the
structure of the Alliance Party presents a rather peculiar marriage of convenience in
Malaysian history. The UMNO-MCA-MIC model of inter-ethnic cooperation is
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communal based. The component parties that made up the Alliance did not differ in
political and ideological persuasions, but they did differ along racial, cultural, and ethnic
lines. Farish Noor observes that the political arrangement in Malaysia is akin to:
an American political landscape where there was not one democratic party but
rather several, divided and differentiated along the lines of race and culture. One
would be puzzled by such an equation, and would wonder why there needed to be
a Democratic Party for white Anglo-Saxons, another for African Americans, yet
another for Latinos, and, of course, yet another for Asian Americans.179
Noor’s assessment of this arrangement highlights how the political bargaining between
UMNO, MCA, and MIC is reminiscent of the colonial structure of segregated
communities, each with its own elected leaders and organizational structures. Political
difference is not delineated by ideological differences, but by ethnic, language, and
cultural particularities. Several scholars have explained the popularity of communal
parties in winning the support of the various ethnic groups in Malaysia. According to
R.K. Vasil, Malays were not interested in supporting or joining non-communal parties,
especially left-wing parties, because they were perceived as “non-Malay parties.” 180 As
such, non-communal parties were not safeguarding Malay supremacy and their position
as the country’s original peoples. This is a testimony to the colonial logic of bounded
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categories of race and ethnic identities where membership to a political party is not based
on political persuasions but on ethnic association.181
It is also worth mentioning that these political parties were founded by elite,
western-educated nationalists. To invoke Frantz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth,
bourgeois nationalists are not revolutionary or anti-colonial since they are simply
replicating the socio-political system that was already set up by the outgoing
colonizers.182 Fanon’s analysis reminds us that elite nationalists in Malaysia, such as the
members of UMNO, MCA, and subsequently the Alliance Party, did not alter the preexisting colonial structures that were put in place in Malaysia.183
With Alliance victory secured, the component parties needed to negotiate an
agreement that would satisfy the demands of the three ethnic groups. This negotiation,
now famously called “the historic bargain” by historians of Malaysia, granted basic
citizenship rights for non-Malay groups along with the right to preserve and practice their
language, religions, and cultural traditions of their choice. In exchange, the Alliance
181
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guaranteed the primacy of Malays as Malaysia’s original people and all the special rights
and privileges afforded thereof. These agreements were later enshrined in the Malayan
Constitution. According to the Constitution, Malay is recognized as the country’s official
language and Islam as its official religion. It also safeguards the Malay Rulers’ positions
as the head of Malay culture, specifying that each of these rulers would be elected as
Yang Di Pertuan Agong’s (King) every five years to serve as the country’s symbolic
ruler. The Constitution also confers special rights and privileges on Malays, such as
quotas in university placements, scholarships, public services, and economic access.184
Most importantly, the Constitution effectively cements Malay dominance in Malaysian
politics and culture.
Robert Hefner calls the Malaysian setup an example of an “ethnically
differentiated citizenship,” where there are clear institutional distinctions among citizens
along categories such as ethnicity, race, gender, etc.185 In an effort to secure
independence from the British, the MCA insisted that a deal with UMNO was the best
way forward even though the bargain ultimately puts other minority groups at a
disadvantage.186 Having secured a victory, Malaysia officially became an independent
nation on August 31, 1957 under the governance of the Alliance Party. This party
continues to govern the country still, now reformed under the name Barisan Nasional
184
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(BN). Malaysia’s independence signaled the coming of Malays as the primary political
player in the nation. But there were many unresolved issues between the different ethnic
groups even though they were all “represented” in the political process. The most salient
of these issues involve the uneven economic development between Chinese and Malay.

Postcolonial Malaysia: Constructing the “Other” in Chinese Identity
Wang observes that Malaysian nationalism consisted of a “nucleus of Malay
nationalism enclosed by the idea of Malay-Chinese-Indian partnership.”187 While the
Alliance Party’s formula consisted of cooperation between the three major communal
parties, UMNO, MCA, and MIC, UMNO is now the majority “shareholder” of the three,
and the Chinese community now had to content with the fact that they are always
politically marginalized and underrepresented.188 MCA’s alliance with UMNO caused
Chinese discomfort against UMNO’s pro-Malay policies while simultaneously, Malay
resentment towards Chinese economic strength continued to plague Sino-Chinese
relations. This came to a head-on collision in the aftermath of the General Elections of
1969.
In the lead-up to the election, the Chinese had lost confidence in the MCA and
chose to cast their votes on Opposition political parties, namely the Chinese-led
Democratic Action Party (DAP).189 The DAP ran under the slogan of a “Malaysian
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Malaysia.” The party pursued a campaign promising equal access to political, economic,
and cultural rights for all Malaysians regardless of race and ethnicity. Due to MCA’s
declining influence, the DAP made huge gains in the election. As a result, the Alliance
Party fared poorly in the 1969 General Elections. Although the Alliance Party was
returned to power, it lost significant seats in Parliament. The Malay community
interpreted Chinese rejection of the Alliance Party as a challenge to Malay primacy.
Fearing that they may lose their special position in Malaysia, rioting broke out in Kuala
Lumpur on May 13, 1969 where Malays targeted Chinese businesses and burned Chinese
properties. Dozens of Chinese were injured and some were killed. Today, the BN
government dissuades people from pursuing this topic since it may threaten national
harmony.190 This incident serves as an example of the damaging effects of a deep-seated
mistrust between Malays and non-Malays.
In the aftermath of the 1969 riots, the Tunku stepped down as president of UMNO
and Prime Minister of Malaysia. His successor, Abdul Razak, consolidated UMNO’s
primacy in Malaysian politics through a series of constitutional amendments in 1971.
Fearing another repeat of the 1969 riots, these amendments forbade any political debates,
publications, acts, and speeches concerning issues of Malay special privileges or issues
society. However, it is unfortunately perceived as a “Chinese party” that champions Chinese rights by
many Malays.
190
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that challenge Islam and Malay as the official religion and language. Most notable is the
implementation of the National Economic Policy (NEP) which afforded Malays easier
and more economic access. Citing Malay economic backwardness as the precursor for
this policy, the NEP attempted to “correct” the economic imbalance between the Malays
and non-Malays.191 In other words, it is a form of reverse affirmative action for the
majority ethnic group. Applications for business licenses and contracts now became
largely reserved for Malays. While its intention was to restructure the economic and
social imbalances of the ethnic groups in Malaysia, in reality, the NEP’s programs
privileged only elite UMNO members and not the Malay poor.192 Cheah argues that the
“historic bargain,” once based on compromises and accommodations made between the
three ethnically-based political parties, became “a binding and cast-iron ‘social contract’
which became sacrosanct to control or prevent communal differences.”193 The economic,
cultural, and political changes subsequent to the 1969 race riots brought about massive
changes for the Chinese. While it appears that the NEP had curbed Chinese-Malay
tensions, nevertheless the colonial structure which undergirds the current political system
remains in effect.
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Time and time again, the Malays and BN party would reproduce the colonial
trope of the lazy Malay and the shifty Chinese to explain why Malays are economically
behind the Chinese. Twelve years before becoming Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad
wrote a controversial book explaining Malay backwardness and articulating the fear that
the Malays would eventually become dispossessed against aggressive Chinese business
practices. In The Malay Dilemma, Mohamad faults Malay “inbreeding” as the reason for
Malay backwardness, compared to the dynamic Chinese community who “decreed that
marriage should not be within the same clan.”194 As such:
the Malays, whose own hereditary and environmental influence had been so
debilitating, could do nothing but retreat before the onslaught of the Chinese
immigrants. Whatever the Malays could do, the Chinese could do better and more
cheaply.195
Here is a striking example of the recapitulation of Social Darwinism in postcolonial
Malaysia. Accordingly, an aggressive foreign race such as the Chinese, who had
evolutionarily progressed with time, overwhelmed the stagnant Malays in the commercial
realm. The essentializing of Malay and Chinese ethnic identities continues to reproduce
long after the British have left Malaysia.
Mohamad also argues that the Malays need to assert themselves as true heirs of
Malaysia, since it was the Malays that first brought order to the land: “The Malays
maintain that Malaya has always been, and still is, their land. If citizenship must be
conferred on other races who have settled down and made their homes in Malaya, it is the
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Malays who must decide the form of citizenship, the privileges, and obligations.”196
Although dated and erroneous, The Malay Dilemma continues to carry much weight.
With the enshrinement of Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution which safeguards the
special rights and privileges of the Malays, no one can publicly question or challenge this
inherent inequality without risking retribution.197 To critique Malay primacy is
tantamount to sedition under the Internal Security Act (ISA), an antiquated colonial law
which allows law enforcement authorities to detain and imprison people without arrest
warrants.198 The Chinese, once sojourners seeking better lives in colonial Malaysia, now
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have to contend that they will always be looked upon as foreigners – pendatang – despite
the fact that they are loyal citizens of Malaysia. The essentializing image of the greedy
and untrustworthy Chinese constructed by dominant Malays continues to hold sway in
Malaysian society.
Today, the communal narrative remains alive and well in Malaysian politics
despite the presence of multi-ethnic opposition parties.199 The BN party continues to
enact policies that promote a pro-Malay view of history. For example, in 2011 the
Education Ministry proposed to establish a special committee consisting of “top
historians” to update the curriculum and content in Malaysian history secondary school
textbooks. The Ministry tasked the committee to make the necessary revisions in the
curriculum in an effort to inculcate nation building, foster unity, and to “nurture
patriotism and loyalty to the country among students and strengthen their identity as
Malaysians.”200 While this may sound noble and honorable, I am suspicious of the
Education Ministry’s so-called patriotic agenda as this appears to be a ploy to reinforce
racial politics by essentializing Malaysia’s ethnic identities into the country’s political
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culture, a culture where Malay rights and special privileges continue to be upheld without
any critique.201
Cheah Boon Kheng observes that there is a concentrated effort to construct
Malaysian history primarily as a history of the Malay people.202 These histories contain
“overt and overly Islamic and Malay-centric slant, factual errors, half-truths, value
judgments and politically motivated content.”203 Accordingly, the historical narrative
places the Malays, Islam, and UMNO at the center of the story. Malay Muslims serve as
the primary players in the creation of the nation of Malaysia while non-Malays play only
minor roles.204 Along with the indigenous peoples of Malaysia, the Malays claim to be
the country’s original inhabitants, thus justifying their special rights and privileges.205
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They invoke the romantic pre-colonial days of Melaka, where the Malays were in charge
before other ethnic groups came intruding into their lands.206 While this is not untrue, it is
an exaggeration to claim that Melaka was purely a Malay kingdom. As I mentioned
earlier, there was a great deal of cultural and inter-ethnic mingling during this time
period. This telling of history omits and marginalizes the narratives and voices of
Malaysia’s ethnic minorities.207 This is especially true for the Chinese who are reduced to
playing nominal roles in the annals of Malaysian history.208
In light of growing discrimination against the Chinese, some chose to leave
Malaysia in search for a better life. This “brain drain” is an alarming phenomenon of
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human capital that is on the rise in Malaysia. According to the World Bank report, the
brain drain is overwhelmingly represented by non-Malays, mostly younger Chinese
Malaysians who have earned an overseas tertiary education.209 The report further states
that “economic conditions” and “social injustice” are the main factors for the brain
drain.210 The report is a testament to the damaging effects of pro-Malay and race-based
policies in the country – an ironic product of British colonialism – now recapitulated in
the laws of postcolonial Malaysia.

Conclusion
The contemporary Malaysian political, cultural, and ethnic landscape remain
entrenched along divisive and sectarian lines, re-creating racial categories inherited by
British colonial policies. The specter of British colonialism looms large in the psyche of
many Malaysians today. Even after 56 years of independence, much of the nation’s
political, social, and economic structures are based on inherited colonial models. The
history of Malaysia is often retold through Malay eyes with Malay-centric stories.
Eugene K.B. Tan argues that in the case of Malaysia where Malays dominate the
political sphere while the Chinese control the economic sphere, this sort of arrangement
that is based on racial and ethnic divisions would only reify and essentialize the
respective ethnic identities; whenever an ethnic minority group becomes successful either
in the political, social, or economic sphere, it would quickly become the subject of envy
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and could possibly erupt in violence.211 We have already seen this in the May 1969 race
riots.
For a long time, Chinese Malaysians were told that a vote for the Opposition was
a vote for more extremist forms of government. They were also told that the BN coalition
was a party that stands up for equality for all ethnicities in Malaysia. Today, the Chinese
are no longer persuaded by this story. Although ethnic relations are more relaxed today,
the trope of the greedy and ungrateful Chinese continues to resurface whenever there are
any rumblings of protest and critiques against the ruling pro-Malay BN government.
Racial and ethnic boundaries are strictly reinforced, and any semblance of criticism is
quickly squashed under the justification of maintaining racial harmony. This has ensured
the erasure of flexible characteristics of ethnic boundaries that was once part of
Malaysian history in favor of fixed identities, enabling the enforcement and control of
boundaries. Any deviation from these boundaries will most certainly incur the wrath of
the ruling government. This is the Malaysian dilemma today: how can Malaysians learn
to co-exist peacefully without even learning who their neighbors are ethnically and
religiously and without resorting to essentialized views of ethnic identities?
In this chapter, I provided a brief historical overview of the Chinese in Malaysia. I
also showed that the Chinese community is not a homogeneous group. Rather, they come
from all walks of life and multitude geographic regions and ethnic groups with different
conceptions of who they are. Although Malaysia’s plural and multi-cultural society was
largely the byproduct of British colonialism, it also reified strict ethnic boundaries that
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contributed to the marginalization of non-Malays in Malaysia today. It is important to
show the historical narrative of Chinese migration to Malaysia because past events shape
and unconsciously reproduce the habitus of not only the Malays, but of the Chinese as
well.
Although the Chinese are a minority and marginalized group in Malaysia, I also
want to point out that they continue to preserve despite their disadvantaged status. As we
approach the second decade of the twenty-first century, an influential Chinese middle
class began to emerge, especially in urban areas such as Kuala Lumpur. Shunned by the
local universities and admission policies that privilege Malays, Chinese families sought
to provide quality education for their children without the aid of the government by
sending them overseas. While some remained overseas post-graduation, those who
returned home after their education sought out employment in the private sector, in multinational corporations, or became self employed, preferring not to have anything to do
with government-run institutions. They also became more vocal in expressing their
dissatisfaction for being treated as second-class citizens. The Chinese are constantly
remaking themselves and negotiating their identities through new cultural and social
lenses.
As this chapter has demonstrated, any “official” depiction of Chinese Malaysians
is problematic, incomplete, and contested. With such a strict maintenance of ethnic
boundaries, how does one construe and define a Chinese identity within the schema of
Malaysian society? If Chinese identities are porous and multiple, what are the markers if
any, of “Chineseness” in Malaysia? What resources do they have access to and utilize as
they navigate such complex processes as fitting in, assimilation, survival, and resistance?
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How are these identities presented, invoked, negotiated and deployed? In the next
chapter, I will attempt to answer these questions by exploring the lives of the Metro
Church members as they negotiate their ethnic Chinese identities. Their unique stories
provide a lens to analyze Chinese interactions within the larger Malaysian landscape.

104

CHAPTER THREE: WHAT MAKES CHINESE “CHINESE?”

In my grandparents’ home were two large portraits of my great-grandfather and
great-grandmother. My great-grandmother came from a well-established and wealthy
Chinese family who settled in Georgetown, a bustling city with a diverse population and
culture in the island of Penang soon after emigrating from China. She was the niece of
Dr. Wu Lien-Teh, the famous “plague doctor” of China.212 The Wu family (or Ng in
Cantonese) were financially well off and highly educated.
My great grandmother was not like any typical Chinese woman. She enjoyed
cooking “Nyonya” dishes, a blend of Chinese and Malay cuisine. She also preferred to
wear attire that was not considered to be traditional Chinese – Malay sarongs with batik
prints. She was fluent in Chinese, Malay, and English. Her multi-lingual skills must have
aided her with access to a diverse clientele in her midwifery. Later, my father confirmed
that my great-grandmother had “a little bit of Malay blood.” This apparently explains
why she did not behave like a regular Chinese person.
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I am recounting this small slice of my family’s history to show how difficult it is to
define who is a Chinese in Malaysia. While my ancestors migrated from China, spoke
Chinese, celebrated Chinese New Year, and enjoyed doing “Chinese things” such as
playing mahjong, they also spoke fluent English, wore non-traditional Chinese clothing,
and participated in activities that were not considered “Chinese.” As a fifth generation
Chinese Malaysian, I may look the part, but I certainly do not play the part. For example,
many Chinese consider language to be the benchmark in determining their Chinese
ethnic identity; I do not know how to read or write in Chinese. By that standard, I am not
truly Chinese; ethnic identity, however, goes beyond mastery of the language.

In the previous chapter, I provided an historical background of the Chinese in
Malaysia. In particular, I showed how British colonial structures, undergirded by
European theories of racial superiority, reified and essentialized Chinese identities.
Through census collecting and the divide and rule policy, the British kept Malaysia’s
distinct ethnic groups apart from each other. These policies created the habitus that later
became internalized by the ruling BN government. In inheriting this colonial legacy, each
ethnic group came to be associated with certain characteristics in a homogenous way –
lazy Malays, greedy Chinese, and drunk Indians. The Malaysian government continues to
“Other” the Chinese and Indian communities, rhetorically casting them as ungrateful
second class citizens. Yet, any “official” depiction of Chinese Malaysians is problematic,
incomplete, and contested. Chinese identities in Malaysia are complex.
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How does one define Chineseness?213 What are the markers, if any, of a
Malaysian Chinese identity? Are identities unchanging and self-bounded categories? Or
are they something that can be situationally and strategically manipulated at a collective
level? How, and to what purpose are these identities presented, invoked, negotiated and
deployed? In this chapter, I analyze the data collected from my fieldwork and interviews
with Metro Church members to explore the construction of Chinese ethnic identities in
Malaysia. This chapter contends that Metro Church members construct what I call a
“Modern Chinese” ethnic identity. This identity is an attempt to distance oneself from the
imposed essentialist categories by the dominant Malays. As such, these identities are
constructed and flexible. However, these identities also display attachments to static
concepts – a primordial identity of Chineseness. Put simply, Chinese ethnic identities are
constantly shifting and fraught with tensions. I argue also that a processual outlook is
more useful means of analysis, and can lead to a way out of the structure-versus-agency
dichotomy.214
I shall intersperse my fieldwork and interviews with relevant scholarship on
ethnicity. After discussing Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and fields, I then examine
213
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Metro Church members’ taken-for-granted ways of thinking about and acting upon the
social world – namely China as their ancestral homeland (roots), Confucian values,
Chinese language, and Chinese business savvy. However, habitus is not deterministic.
Rather, it is an open system of dispositions where social agents create, maintain, and
modify the structure to suit their needs. Social actors possess the agency to situationally
construct their ethnic identities within the constraints of the habitus. Thus, I examine the
constructed nature of Metro Church’s ethnic identity by exploring the creation of cultural
boundaries between the Chinese minority and Malay majority. I will next examine how
church members create demarcations between what call a “Modern Chinese” identity in
opposition to a “Chinese” Chinese identity. Finally, I explore some of the limitations of
postcolonial studies’ contribution to the study of identity and how Bourdieu’s analytical
framework begins to capture the complexity of identity formation on a more contextual
and processual level. Bourdieu offers a more complex analysis of the Malaysian context
with his concepts of habitus, and strategy (sometimes called practice), an analysis that
adds to and compliments much of postcolonial scholarship on identity.

Habitus and Field
Let me begin by exploring two of Bourdieu’s most important theoretical
categories: habitus and field. Habitus is an individually operationalized set of
expectations and understandings based on the collection of experiences social agents
encounter that shape their sense of the “rules of the game.” The social agents “merely
need to let themselves follow their own social ‘nature,’ that is, what history has made of
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them, to be as it were, ‘naturally’ adjusted to the historical world they are up against.”215
Here, is a system of “schemes of perception, thought and action… whose limits are set by
the historically and socially situated conditions of its productions.”216 The effect of this is
a naturalization of the social order. Power inscribes its logic into the everyday lives and
categories of these naturalized views; Bourdieu demonstrates how power is masked
through the naturalization process. Further, these “rules of the game” act as coping
mechanisms “against unforeseen and ever-changing situations.”217 Habitus implies that
the social actor’s behavior is tacit and practical while actions tend not to be consciously
reflective.
Bourdieu also understood the social world as divided by a variety of distinctive
arenas of practice called fields. As a relational term, a field is a network of social
relations and positions where agents (individuals, groups or institutions) are located.218
These locations are determined as a result of the interaction between the rules of the field,
the individual’s habitus, and the person’s capital. Each field possesses their own unique
set of rules, knowledge and forms of capital. Individuals and groups are engaged in the
struggle to maximize their positions in the current existing social order. In order to fully
understand the concept of field, it is important to pay attention to the “positions” in the
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field and its relations to one another.219 Bourdieu believes that an individual occupies
certain positions in society’s various fields. These positions are contingent on how much
capital or power that the individual possesses. Individuals are defined by their relational
position within the field’s distribution of capital. They would either form alliances with
different members/groups that would improve their lot in society or exclude other groups
that might threaten them. Similar to soccer or football games, fields are spaces where
individuals and groups occupy; they are constantly jockeying for positions and “playing”
to win. In this scheme, fields are:
networks of relations between individuals and institutions competitively engaged
in the dynamics of cultural production, pursuit, consumption, and/or
accumulation… invariably in one’s interest…Thus each of us – by second nature
because we have internalized this entire system – develop strategies to either
maintain or improve our positions in this relational network of power that is the
social world.220
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is useful in showing the historically “givens” – the
inherited cultural patterns – of Chinese Malaysians that continue to manifest themselves
in the current Malaysian context. These inherited cultural patterns continue exert
powerful influence in the daily lives of Metro Church members. In the next section, I
shall explore some “unchanging” and static markers of Chineseness that are products of a
historically learned pattern of behavior which are internalized as an innate part of Metro
Church members’ ethnic identities.

219

Terry Rey, Bourdieu on Religion: Imposing Faith and Legitimacy (London: Equinox
Publishing, 2007), 44.
220

Ibid., 45.

110

Inherited Cultural Givens
The China Mystique and Confucian Values
While having lunch at a restaurant with some church members after a Sunday
service, one of them asked me if I have ever been to China. I replied in the negative. “Oh,
that’s a shame,” he responded. “There’s a lot for you to see. You should go sometime.
Get reconnected with your roots.” I was puzzled by this talk of roots and heritage. Like
most Metro Church members, I too was born and raised in Malaysia. So, even if we are
ethnically Chinese, would it not make more sense that our roots came from Malaysia and
not China? Why do they continue to look at China as the place of their “roots?”
Even after many generations of living in Malaysia, many Chinese still genuinely
feel that they are somehow connected to China. In the previous chapter, I showed how
Chinese Malaysians became reified by the dominant Malays. More importantly, the postBritish environment also created a plural society where inter-ethnic mingling continues to
be a rarity in Malaysia. These socialized settings create habitus that predispose the
Chinese to behave in certain unconscious ways. They are constrained by their historically
trained cultural patterns. Metro Church members believe that there exist unique
“primordial” cultural patterns that make them Chinese, and consequently set them apart
from other ethnic groups in Malaysia. In particular, my interviews and observations attest
to the cultural attachments towards China, the Chinese language, and Confucian cultural
values. It appears thus, that there are certain discernible features and characteristics that
are unquestionably Chinese. These features are, using Bourdieu’s words, both structural
and structuring.

111

Metro Church members consider ancestral and geographic origins as important
markers of Chinese identity. Yet, how is this any different from, say, German
Americans? Anthony Reid argues that the issue of Chineseness differs from other
globalized identities because of China’s overwhelming presence in influencing “past and
future imaginings” of Chinese identities.221 Throughout the history of Chinese migration
to Malaysia, the Chinese saw themselves as an extension of their kin in the mainland.
With the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the subsequent turmoil in Republican China, the
diasporic Chinese sought to create an imagined “New China” which upheld traditional
Chinese values and traditions.222 This thought persisted until decolonization demanded
new local loyalties to the newly independent nation.223 Although they are now citizens of
Malaysia, this is not to say that they stopped being Chinese. Wang argues that even
though they are less bounded to China, they continue to emphasize personal connections
with their ancestral past.224 Images of Chinese history become landmarks in paradigms
that are central to their self-recognition as Chinese. Thus, this should not be seen as a
total rejection of Chineseness as Chinese Malaysians continue to display attachments to
China.225 This is also related to the way the colonial powers and later the Malaysian
government has historically treated the Chinese. Most notably, the reification and
bounded notions of Chinese ethnic identities, the emphasis on Chinese business success
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and the sense of ethnic communalism is still present in Malaysia. Applied to the Chinese
in Malaysia, the notion of ancestral heritage has generally reproduced these historical
patterns.
China’s draw presents one the strongest manifestation of primordial identity. The
idea of the existence of a primordial ethnic identity presupposes that ethnicity is sui
generis. Rooted in German Idealism, proponents of the primordial approach believe that
identities are fixed with clearly drawn boundaries, and that there are intrinsic features at
the core of one’s identity.226 Moreover, proponents of this understanding of identity point
to the importance of bloodlines, common ancestry, language, and customs as the criteria
in determining one’s ethnic identity. One of the early scholars of such an approach was
Edward Shils, who coined the term “primordialism.” Shils argues that the strength and
persistence of kinship ties is not just about “the function of interaction…it is because a
certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood.”227 The strength of group
solidarity relies not so much on interactions between members of the group, but on
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common ancestry and the equation of ethnicity and family. People are capable of
inducing selfless behavior on behalf of the group.228
Later, Clifford Geertz applied Shils’ arguments to encompass social groups on a
larger scale. In his article, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil
Politics in the New States,” Geertz argues that primordial attachments form the basis of
identity and becomes the building blocks of the nation-state. For Geertz, primordial
attachments:
stem from the ‘givens’ or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such
matters, the assumed ‘givens’ of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin
connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born
into a particular religious community, speaking a particular dialect of a language,
and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech,
custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering
coerciveness in and of themselves.229
What Geertz suggests is that primordial attachments are inherent in human beings. In this
case, these “givens,” the markers of ethnic identities such as blood, language, custom,
and religion are natural and cannot easily be renounced or disassociated. Groups either
connect or divide based on these markers Further, Geertz cautions that these attachments
are non-rational foundations of the human personality, and could potentially lead to
conflicts with other group loyalties.
Geertz and Shils agree that there is a basic human need to band together based on
natural attributes such as blood ties and common ancestry, customs and culture. As
descendents of Chinese immigrants, China’s rich traditions and culture elicits a strong
emotional response among Metro Church. But this is a China that is heavily
228
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romanticized. It is not the nation-state of China, but the China of days past. It is the
China that is identified culturally instead of politically. Metro Church members
nostalgically see China as a place of origin and a place where their traditional values and
ethics originated. This is especially true concerning Confucian values of respect, honor,
and filial piety.230
Through the ascription of Chinese values, we see the connection and
romanticization of China. We can observe the outward and physical displays of
Chineseness by the way Metro Church members decorate their homes. Whenever I
visited their homes, I saw wall scrolls with Chinese calligraphy, Chinese tea sets, ornate
red lanterns, and sometimes paintings depicting popular stories of Chinese history. I was
even treated to a traditional Chinese tea serving ceremony on one visit; I was told that
they had taken lessons to make sure that it was authentic. 231
In almost all instances, I was also informed that filial piety, the act of honoring
one’s elders and parents, is an important marker of being Chinese. Church members view
this as part of a Confucian ethic that continues to play a vital role in the psyche of their

230

Even though many of my informants would not admit that they are “following” the teachings of
Confucianism, nonetheless they would argue that Confucianism is in itself “not a religion,” but more of a
guide or philosophical treatise on establishing “right” and harmonious relationship based on respect, honor,
and filial piety. Since they equated these traits as part of the Confucian ethos, they would make the
argument that such traits are unique towards Chinese culture, and as such, becomes a marker of one’s
Chineseness.
231

The image of the dragon, a creature that is associated with power, luck, and prosperity in
Chinese mythology, is nowhere to be found. In addition, there were no family altars, charms such as the pat
kua, or any shrines and images dedicated to the Chinese pantheon of gods in their homes. For example, the
pat kua, meaning “eight symbols, is an octagon-shaped plate with a mirror that is placed over front doors of
homes. It is meant to symbolize the fundamental concepts of reality, seen as eight inter-related concepts
within Taoist cosmology. Metro Church members reject this as non-Christian trinkets, and should not be
brought and adorned in their homes. For the members of Metro Church, the source for one’s “luck” and
prosperity comes only from Jesus Christ, not trinkets. Instead of dragons and pat kuas, there were pictures
depicting familiar Christian stories such as the Last Supper, stylized cross-stitched Bible verses in English,
as well as crosses hanging on the walls.

115

daily lives.232 Moreover, they believe that this ethic is a good quality that every Chinese
person in Malaysia should cultivate and foster. Two women from different social
locations – Janet Lim and Nadine Ma – attest to the importance of cultivating Confucian
values.
Janet, a widow and recent retiree, grew up in Kuala Lumpur in what she called “a
very Chinese” background. Her father was a martial arts instructor: “Kung Fu,” she
proudly declared. She is happy that her early childhood included reading Chinese
classical texts, and she believes that filial piety is a very important value that every
Chinese family should instill in their children. Her affinity toward her Chinese heritage
affirms her values and identification as a Chinese.
Meanwhile, Nadine enthusiastically shared how China’s rich culture and history
helped her recognize the values of respect and honor. Having grown up in a small town
four hours east of Kuala Lumpur, she is thankful for her early exposure to Chinese
culture and history: “If you read the entire Chinese history… you will feel very proud
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being a Chinese because of the rich culture and how long we have a rich civilization.”As
a mother and successful corporate person, she tries to instill these filial values in her son.
These two women agree on the importance of the Confucian principle of filial
piety as a marker of Chineseness even though they come from different backgrounds.
Geertz’s explanation on the importance of natural attributes such as blood ties and
common ancestry plays an important role in solidifying ethnic belonging among the
women. These unconscious attributes continue to operate within the women’s lives.
When the Chinese have been historically reminded that they are an immigrant group, the
draw of China and Chinese cultural attributes continue to persist. These narratives show
the pervasiveness of the habitus that continues to exert a large influence in these
women’s lives.

Chinese Language
The ability to speak Chinese is also a major component in being Chinese.233 The
young adult members of the church such as Nadine and Emily are highly motivated to
ensure that their children receive Chinese language lessons. Along with her husband,
Nadine believes in instilling in her son as much knowledge of Chinese language and
history as possible. She sends her son to a Chinese-medium school, where he is taught to
read, speak, and write in Chinese. As she spoke to me, Nadine recalled and lamented that
her own schooling was under the national school system, where Malay was the medium
of instruction. As part of a new generation of Chinese in postcolonial Malaysia, she had
hoped that mastery in Malay language would gain her more social and economic
233
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mobility.234 However, decades of the government’s preferential treatment of Malays
gradually disillusioned many Chinese Malaysians, including Nadine. She now realizes
that no amount of mastery of Malay or Malaysian history and culture would ever grant
her equal access to Malaysia’s social and economic capital. It is because of this
realization that she now sends her son to a Chinese-medium school. She believes that
Chinese school is superior to national schools where Malay is the language of instruction.
She also believes that a Chinese education would provide her son with the best
opportunity to succeed in an increasingly hostile environment. Emily echoed Nadine’s
sentiments. Like Nadine, Emily also wants to make sure that her two daughters would be
able to speak Chinese. She feels that her children will be more in touch with their roots if
they learn Chinese. She agrees wholeheartedly that the ability to speak Chinese is an
important feature in determining one’s Chineseness.235
Both women believe that it is more beneficial to be with what they call “likeminded” people because they offer safety and familiarity. In these two stories, there is a
prevalent theme of fear: fear of losing one’s sense of pride and culture, of losing one’s
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roots, and more importantly, of losing political and socio-economic clout in a rapidly
changing environment.
Yet, learning Chinese is complicated and perhaps counterintuitive, since this
implies a sacrifice of cultural capital and economic potential. I do not think this is the
case, however. Most church members are multilingual; they are already fluent in English.
Although Malay is Malaysia’s national language, the use of Malay is largely limited to
interactions with Malays (and some Indians) and is rarely used in communication with
other Chinese. Since the Malaysian government implements policies that disadvantage
non-Malays in areas such as entrance to local universities and employment in government
jobs (both of which use Malay as their medium), mastery in Malay language carries few
advantages. For the Chinese, the habitus, socialized in the historical experience of
discrimination and communalism in Malaysia, creates a naturalized view of their place in
the world as well as develops proper strategies to retain and preserve the habitus. This
helps explains the ambiguity of trying to learn Chinese while simultaneously adopting a
western outlook.

Chinese Business Savvy
Perhaps one aspect of Chineseness most discussed by Metro Church members is
the Chinese enterprising spirit. They are convinced that the innate Chinese sense of
business savvy is what sets them apart from other ethnic groups, especially the Malays.
Church members agree that the Chinese have an innate “enterprising spirit,” and that the
ability to work hard has enabled them to survive and succeed in business. Jimmy Ning
claimed that Chinese Malaysians are “very resourceful and entrepreneurial.” He argued
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that Chinese businesses continue to flourish despite Malaysia’s pro-Malay NEP policy.
As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, this aggressive economic policy was
implemented by the pro-Malay BN government to “correct” the economic imbalance
between the Malays and non-Malays. The policy in effect curtailed Chinese economic
access in favor of Malay businesses. Mrs. Loring Gan echoed Jimmy’s views and
believes that the Chinese are also hardworking and enterprising people. She sums up the
Chinese enterprising spirit as, “[whatever] I want to achieve, I achieve it through my own
self, and I don’t depend on any other people.”
The idea that ethnic minorities share a strong collective primordial identity that
translates to business practices has attracted much scholarly attention. Gordon Redding,
in his The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism, traces the economic culture of what he calls “the
Overseas Chinese,” suggesting that while the Overseas Chinese may not be living in
China anymore, their hearts and minds have not left the country. Therefore, Chinese
economic culture is bolstered by a unique ability to co-operate with one another. Redding
argues that Chinese capitalism differs from Western capitalism in that it is based on the
Chinese familial structure where trust, kinship, and paternalism take precedence over
legalism and individual rights.236 Thus, the spirit of Chinese capitalism is a “set of beliefs
and values which lies behind the behavior of Chinese businessmen.”237 This spirit stems
from the Confucian importance of family, its reciprocal relationship and hierarchy of
order. In this analysis, Confucian thought stresses that good relationships are based on
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co-operative behavior among members of the community. Thus, attaining harmony and
balance through good inter-personal relationships is of the utmost importance.238
Redding’s work provides an analysis of Chinese capitalism from a culturalist
perspective.239 Like those who take a culturalist view of Chinese capitalism, my
informants also believe that they possess an innate essence exclusive to Chinese culture
in business and commerce. This too stems from a historically reified view of Chinese
Malaysians as shrewd business people. Since the history of Chinese migration to
Malaysia is associated with hardworking laborers, Metro Church members would believe
these historical practices to be an innate attribute of Chinese ethnic identities. Again, this
may seem counter-intuitive since Chinese Malaysians are stereotyped as greedy and
money-minded people. As I will explain later in the chapter, habitus, while durable, is not
static, and this strategy-generating principle drives the thoughts, perceptions, and actions
of Metro Church members to maneuver around the social field to improve their situation
according to “the feel for the game.”
Why do people band together around these natural givens? Harold Isaacs’ idea of
basic group identity provides an explanation for the persistence of primordial
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attachments. Incorporating a socio-psychological lens in his analysis, Isaacs attributes a
group’s need to belong as “basic group identity.” This basic group identity consists of
“ready-made set of endowments and identifications which every individual shares with
others from the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which he is born at that
given time in that given place.”240 In Idols of the Tribe, Isaacs argues that the fear of
“aloneness” causes “a great clustering into separatenesses that will… improve, assure, or
extend each group’s power or place, or keep it safe or safer from the power, threat, or
hostility of others.”241 If Geertz observes that primordial attachments and the need for
sameness were prevalent in emergent post-colonial states, Isaacs believes that the
increasing fragmentation of “old power systems” and the fragile instability of newly
formed nations into clusters of separate groups have caused much anxiety and confusion
among individuals.242 As a result, people are desperate to regain some semblance of
stability by “retribalizing” themselves. In other words, they cling on to their own ethnic
group because it gives them a measure of physical and emotional security.243 Primordial
bonds become solidified through the early process of socialization. These bonds possess
overwhelming resilience because of a universal need for belonging and self-esteem.244
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Because of the need to connect and belong, Isaacs explains how primordial affinities and
attachments continue to persist. Thus, identity is “an aspect of the emotional and
psychological constitution of individuals; it is, correspondingly, bound up with the
maintenance of personal integrity and security, and may be extremely resistant to social
change.”245 In the face of marginalization and the nature of bounded communities in
Malaysia, Malaysian Chinese hold tight to their primordial characteristics which include
Confucian values, the Chinese language, and business savvy.
While Isaacs analyzes the powerful persistence of primordial affinities through a
socio-psychological lens, Pierre van den Berghe believes that the roots of primordial
attachments go far deeper than psychology by incorporating a socio-biological
framework in the study of ethnicity. He points out that humans are genetically
“programmed” to attach to a particular kin group and form alliances with like-minded
people regardless of safety and security. Van den Berghe argues that all social organisms
are programmed to be “nepotistic,” that is, behaving in an “altruistic manner in
proportion to their real or perceived degree of common ancestry.”246 The propensity to
establish kinship has a biological component not because:
we have a gene for ethnocentrism, or for recognizing kin; rather… that those
societies that institutionalized forms of nepotism and ethnocentrism had a strong
selective advantage over those that did not (assuming that any such ever existed),
because kin selection has been the basic blueprint for animal sociality.247
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People are driven by their “genetic mechanism for animal sociality… to maximize
inclusive fitness.”248 Within the socio-biological framework, it is kinship sentiment, not
culture that forms the basis of ethnic identity. Van den Berghe contends that culture is
merely an approximate explanation for the persistence of primordial ties.249 Most of all, it
is the genes in our bodies that determine individual relationships, group dynamics, and
group associations.250
These two theories help explain how Metro Church functions as a safe haven for
Chinese Malaysians to express their faith and socialize with like-minded people. Not only
do they think alike, they also belong to the same ethnic group. Most of the church
members come from a relatively similar socio-economic background. When I asked them
if they have many friends outside the church, there was an air of anxiety among my
participants. They explained that even though they did have friends outside the confines
of the church, they were insistent that most of their close friends came from church. For
example Maria Han cited the New Testament passage from Paul’s epistle in 2
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Corinthians – “Do not be yoked together with unbelievers” – as the reason not to
associate too closely with “non-believers.” Maria reasoned:
So, let’s just say that if I’m a Christian and if you’re in a relationship with a nonChristian, it will affect your faith because you are being torn in between like
going to church, and you know, your husband is like, “I don’t want you to go to
church.” There is a reason why the Bible said that.
Although Maria is referring to a hypothetical marital relationship, there is no reason to
doubt that she would have the same justification in reference to making friends. This is
especially prevalent with reference to romantic relationships. Many of the church’s
younger members are either in a serious romantic relationship or have married each other.
As a minority and oppressed group, it made logical sense that Metro Church members
would want to associate with their own kind since this constitutes a sound method to
ensure their survival.
Still, these arguments do not explain why some church members have willingly
left the safe confines of church. Mrs. Loring Gan has been attending Metro Church since
the early 1990s with her husband. As an early pioneer of the church, she has witnessed a
fair share of happenings in the church. She lamented that she has not seen a lot growth
within the church:
KIT

: [Do] you think [the church] will thrive? Grow some more, or

stagnant?
LORING : Errr… it won’t grow.
KIT

: It won’t?

LORING : It will grow by children… the babies members are producing.
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KIT

: Yeah? What do you think about the idea of the church growing

within since they’re not bringing in new people in. What do you think about that?
LORING : It’s going to be a… clique. A family church. It’s very
dangerous.
KIT

: Do you like that?

LORING : It’s not for me to say whether I like it or not. So I just leave it.
But it’s a family church, which is not very healthy.
Loring is concerned that the church may have become too isolationist and faults many of
the church members for being too comfortable. She is convinced that this would
ultimately create an insulated and “incestuous” environment.
Why do people continue to band together based on such things as blood, ancestral
heritage, and communal familiarity? Walker Connor recognizes how emotions can be a
powerful force in eliciting bonds of Chineseness. He argues that it is the intense passions
invoked by ethnic bonds that form the building blocks of nationalism.251 In his work,
Connor concentrates on discovering the mechanisms that trigger these emotions. He
suggests that speeches, songs, poems, and symbols act as examples of mechanisms
triggering these tendencies. Ultimately, he concludes that successful responses regarding
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ethnic attachments are invoked “not through appeals to reason but through appeals to
emotions.”252
However, Connor’s theory fails to account for human agency. His argument
assumes that people are easily manipulated by mechanisms and structures that influence
them act in certain ways. At the same time, there is also a danger of assuming that people
are fully cognizant of the choices they are making. Rather, I am pointing out that some
things cannot be explained on the basis of rationality/irrationality. What may seem
irrational in our eyes and by the majority of society can be considered rational through an
internal process that may not be visible to us.253 That is why Bourdieu can give us much
more analytical mileage in examining Metro Church members’ ethnic identities. What I
am suggesting is a move away from a dichotomous structure/agency category and
towards strategy. As Anthony Giddens argues:
structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both enabling and
constraining. This, of course, does not prevent the structured properties of social
systems from stretching away, in time and space, beyond the control of individual
actors.254
In the next section, I show how church members strategically maneuver around the
habitus to maximize material and symbolic profit. As such, they create demarcations and
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identities that begin to move away from the negative stigmatization of the Chinese. This
is a highly complex process that involves negotiating western modernity with their
inherited Chineseness.

Defining Chinese Ethnicity in Malaysia: Creating Ethnic Demarcations
Malays and Non-Malays
Wang Gungwu observes that in general, Chineseness is not a fixed category;255
there is little similarity between the Chinese who migrated across the Southeast Asian
region.256 Place and locality are important determining factors in the overall construction
of Chineseness as Wang sees identity as a flexible category in which the social actor
possesses agential power to determine what is useful for them. In the previous chapter, I
mentioned that Malaysia’s generally accepted terms of identity – Malay, Chinese, Indian
– are entrenched and reified along essentialist constructs. Yet, being Chinese in Malaysia
goes beyond imposed labels since past and present social and political events as well as
the daily living experience plays as much a factor in determining their identities. As a
minority and marginalized community, they have to constantly negotiate with the
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imposed labels in their daily lives. For Metro Church members, the ways they conceive
themselves ethnically is contingent upon their lived experience, social location, and the
types of communities with and in which they interact.
Here, I want to highlight the creation of ethnic boundaries between Malays and
Chinese. The differentiation of Malay identity by the Chinese in Malaysia acts as a way
to maintain certain boundaries within the confines of Chineseness. Fredrik Barth suggests
that the key feature in ethnic identification is the maintenance of ethnic boundaries, and is
not so much about internal cultural attributes. By this he means ethnic identities are a
form of social organization, rather than a bounded enclosure of cultural expression.257
Barth’s work has been pivotal in the development of the constructivist approach which
stresses on the socially constructed nature of ethnic identities. In his introduction to the
volume, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, published in 1969, Barth identifies ethnic groups
as “categories of ascription and identification” that “have the characteristic of organizing
interaction between people.”258 These categories classify “a person in terms of his basic,
most general identity, presumptively determined by his origin and background.”259
Through fieldwork among the Pathans in India, Barth discovered that some
individuals who were born into the Pathan ethnic group were absorbed into the Baluch
257
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tribes as social and economic circumstances changed and it became more advantageous
for them to be identified as part of the Baluch group. Based on his findings, Barth argues
that, even in a highly structured society such as India, there is considerable freedom for
the social actor to define him or herself as a group member of a particular type:
It makes no difference how dissimilar members may be in their overt behavior - if
they say they are A, in contrast to another cognate category B, they are willing to
be treated and let their own behavior be interpreted and judged as A’s and not as
B’s; in other words, they declare their allegiance to the shared culture of A’s.260
Barth emphasizes that “change of identity takes place where the person’s performance is
poor and alternative identities are within reach,” and this change results in modifications
of unit and boundary organization.261
Barth rejects the idea that boundary maintenance is largely an isolated
phenomenon without any interaction with other groups. He argues that it is not about
shared commonalities and culture; rather, ethnic identities are constructed during the
course of interaction and transaction between decision-making individuals:
We can assume no simple one-to-one relationship between ethnic units and
cultural similarities and differences. The features that are taken into account are
not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which the actors themselves
regard as significant… some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and
emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical
differences are played down and denied.262
Shared cultural affinities within an ethnic group are generated through the process of selfcategorization and the categorization of, and by others. It is the production – and
reproduction - of difference in relation to the external world that creates the image of
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internal similarity. Barth’s point is that ethnic groups should be conceived in terms of
social organization and interaction, rather than as an expression of underlying culture.
As Bourdieu reminds us, habitus exists in, through, and because of the practices
of actors and their interaction with each other and the rest of their environment, including
the various structural givens of social and political contexts. Because of country’s
colonial legacy, communalism and bounded ethnic categories permeate Malaysian
society. For this reason, Metro Church members create boundaries that separate between
Chinese and Malay. The physical layout of the city, along with very visible signs of
ethnic demarcation serves as reminders for the Chinese that they are different from the
Malays. For example, food and dietary choices become a distinctive ethnic marker
between Chinese and Malay. In Malaysia, the National Islamic Council is responsible for
determining what foods are considered kosher for Malays to consume; foods in grocery
stores and restaurants are marked with the halal label. Chinese restaurants are not
assigned this label because of the presence of pork in their foods.263 When responding to
the question of Chinese characteristics and identity, Metro Church members often
answered that they “can eat pork.” Not only did they said that they could eat pork, some
church members went as far as saying that the Malays were “missing out.” I often heard
comments on how the Malay people were, by nature, “nice and friendly” people. But they
can be easily manipulated. To this end, they fault Malaysia’s Islamic religious authorities
for being too rigid and legalistic. This implies that the Chinese had more “freedom” and
liberties than their Malay counterparts, a separation between Chinese and Malay. Simply
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put, a relatively regular thing as food consumption takes on a different meaning in
Malaysia as it becomes a social and political symbol that demarcates the social
boundaries between Malay and Chinese.
Like food, religion also becomes an important marker of ethnic boundaries
between Malays and Chinese. Because all Malays are Muslims by birth, the differences
between the two ethnic groups are very visible. Since the 1980s, there has been an
increase in ethnic sensitivities with the rise of Islamic fundamentalist thinking in
Malaysia.264 For example, Malay women are encouraged to wear the hijab outside their
homes. With such visible markers of identity, it is easy for both ethnic groups to
differentiate between a Malay and a Chinese: a Malay person is Malay because they are
Muslim; a Chinese person is Chinese because they are not Muslim.265
Even though there is a small minority of Chinese converts to Islam, Malaysian
laws require the convert to change his/her name into a Muslim name. Moreover,
conversion to Islam entails a total restructuring of one’s identity to conform to Malay
identity. The Chinese interpret this as a denial of their Chinese heritage and culture; as
such, conversion to Islam and inter-ethnic marriages between Chinese and Malay have
been few. My informants consistently express the opinion that they would “lose their
identities” by converting to Islam. “You have to change your name to a Muslim name,”
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said one of them. Metro Church members often expressed their frustrations toward the
majority Malay ethnic group, and especially the current ruling government, who they feel
has manipulated and fired up tensions among various ethnic groups in Malaysia. In such
an environment, creating boundaries serve as protection against the majority Malays.266
Barth’s theory of ethnicity explains the two groups’ coexistence. There are very clear
symbolic boundaries between Malays and Chinese and to claim oneself as a member, one
must meet all terms of qualification for that particular group. Why the deliberate
separation and distinction? As Barth reminds us, the maintenance of boundaries is
important in the establishment of ethnic identities.

The “Modern” Chinese and the “Chinese” Chinese
So far, we have explored how Metro Church members differentiate their Chinese
ethnic identities by constructing demarcations between Chinese and Malay. While Barth
places his emphasis on the maintenance of boundaries between ethnic groups as the key
factor in perpetuating ethnic identity, he also assumes that these boundaries are stable and
unchanging. In this section, I show the ways in which these boundaries are porous and
fluid.267 Metro Church members make choices about their ethnic belonging depending on
the social circumstances that benefit them.
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Abner Cohen contends that ethnic identities developed as a response to functional
organizational requirements. He believes that ethnicity “operates within contemporary
political contexts and is not an archaic survival arrangement carried over into the present
by conservative people.”268 Drawing on his fieldwork with Hausa traders in Nigeria,
Cohen’s work, particularly his Custom and Politics in Urban Africa, focuses on the
process of “retribalization” among the Hausa community in the wake of decolonization in
a region dominated by the Yoruba. Under British colonial rule, the Hausa enjoyed special
privileges as cattle traders. While the Hausa were not particularly self-conscious of their
tribal heritage, changes in the country’s social and political organization forced them to
become increasingly aware that their economic livelihood were contingent on ethnic
cohesiveness. No longer afforded special privileges by the independent Nigerian
government, the Hausa engaged in a process of retribalization by way of conversion to a
particular sect of Islam as a way to maintain their economic status and to demarcate
themselves from the Yoruban majority.
For Cohen, ethnic identities are inherently political and related to competition for
resources. He moves the discussion from one that conceptualizes ethnicity through the
lens of culture to one that focuses on the idea of ethnic identity as a type of informal
political organization.269 Cohen’s analysis is helpful in showing how ethnic identities are

their content and perception. So in this sense, Cohen is not disagreeing with Barth per se, only that the
concept of “ethnicity” should not be viewed as unchanging. As I will show in this section, even within the
group “Chinese,” there are various demarcations taking place. See Ronald Cohen, “Ethnicity: Problem and
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never neutral; they are deployed in the political struggle for power as different
communities pursue their own interests. Ultimately, Cohen believes that groups in
modern society possess the agency to utilize various symbols (such as kinship and
religion) to further their political and economic interests.270
In this case, Metro Church members are trying to disassociate themselves from
reified Chinese categories – greedy, money-minded, selfish, and shrewd. These
constructed boundaries are political maneuverings to navigate a precarious Malaysian
environment. As a political maneuver, Metro Church members create demarcations
between what I call the “Modern” Chinese and the “Chinese” Chinese. As Modern
Chinese, church members define Modern Chinese as the type of Chinese who have
adapted modernity (i.e. a western view) as part of their ethnic identities. In my
interviews, I asked my participants how they defined themselves ethnically. Although
many did not hesitate in declaring “Chinese” as their answer, the answers come with
“qualifiers.” Emily Chang, a recent college graduate and mother of two, lives in the
suburbs of Petaling Jaya, a rapidly growing city in the Kuala Lumpur metropolitan area.
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She has an undergraduate degree in Counseling Psychology from the United States and is
working on her Masters degree in Counseling at a local private college. Emily spends
most of her days looking after her children alone while her husband travels around the
country for work. She is also an active member of Metro Church, where she serves as an
assistant worship leader. When I asked her how she identified herself ethnically, Emily
did not hesitate: she is Chinese. Nevertheless, she is quick to delineate that she is not a
very “traditional Chinese.” When I asked her what she meant by this, Emily explained
that she is a Chinese that did not really follow any Chinese traditions and customs. She
gave an example explaining that other than “spending time with the family,” she did not
participate in various Chinese New Year celebrations even though she acknowledged the
holiday’s importance in defining Chinese identity. As a Modern Chinese, she believes
that she is not required to follow all aspects of her Chinese cultural traditions. The idea of
choice and voluntariness is an important aspect of a Modern Chinese identity because for
church members such as Emily, she does not feel obligated to follow practices she does
not understand or have not assigned any meaning to them. My point is, Emily’s Chinese
identity is not “stuck” with the cultural givens of the Malaysian Chinese community.
Emily’s nuanced definition of Chineseness is also very similar to Jeremy Lee’s
response. A graduate of a local technical institute and young adult father of two, Jeremy
runs his own audiovisual business and helps out with the church’s technologic needs.
Like Emily, Jeremy also identified himself as a Chinese, but he did not provide a
straightforward answer:
I’m quite confident I’m Chinese because I know in Malaysia, everybody knows
what race they are. They’re not so integrated… In a way we’re less Chinese in
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Malaysia. As a Malaysian… I’m less of a so-called Chinese… Because I’m not
educated in the Chinese school. So I’m not very fluent in Mandarin, and I cannot
read and write Chinese language.
Jeremy reasoned that because he was not Chinese educated and did not attend Chinese
school, he is more “western in thinking.” Jeremy and Emily’s examples demonstrate the
ways in which Metro Church members construct boundaries between the Modern
Chinese and the Chinese Chinese. What does a Modern Chinese look like? How are they
different from the Chinese Chinese? But what does modern mean in relation to
Chineseness?
Jeremy’s point on being “western in thinking” is the key to understanding what
constitutes a Modern Chinese. Attributes that define a Modern Chinese person in
Malaysia include open-mindedness, rationality, and objectivity. These are, in a sense,
connected to western ideals. In defining their status as Modern Chinese, my interviewees
often informed me that they are not “stuck behind times.” Words such as “progress,”
“scientific” and “enlightened” are important components in their definition of Modern
Chinese. Further, these words are almost exclusively associated with a western-mindset.
For example, Jeremy stressed that a western-centric education would undoubtedly
provide problem-solving skills and a scientific, objective mind for knowledge. This is
their definition of a Modern Chinese – the type of Chinese people who have embraced
modernity, and by extension, western influence in their ethnic identities. As Modern
Chinese, church members believe that this ethnic construction would ultimately give
them the best chance to succeed in an environment that marginalizes the Chinese
community.
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What is the political advantage of creating such a demarcation? In maintaining the
importance of competition and resource allocation, and building on Barth and Cohen’s
analyses, some scholars have utilized rational choice theory as a way to further explicate
their findings. Originally an approach based on economic models of cost-benefit
calculations on human behavior, rational choice theory quickly made its way to ethnic
studies. The theory argues that the social actor is an intentional individual acting with the
purpose of attaining the ends that are consistent to the individual’s hierarchy of needs.
Michael Hechter constructed a model of group solidarity on the basis of
individual pursuit of public goods. He argues that rational choice analysis is capable of
explaining changes in the social actor’s actions and behaviors. According to Hechter, “it
can be expected that everyone will prefer more wealth, power, and honor to less, because
attaining these goods often makes it easier for individuals to attain other (perhaps more
idiosyncratic) goals.”271 Rational choice theory provides a predictive element in the field
of ethnic relations: “[the] law of large numbers allows predictions for the aggregate to be
rather precise.”272 Hechter argues that ethnic collective action will only arise when
groups are receiving benefits. It is not so much social change for the sake of change, but
more about what one can get out of a given situation.
Similar to Hechter, Michael Banton is also interested in utilizing rational choice
as a testable set of propositions in situations where groups of people make particular sets
of choices as opposed to others. With his background in economics at the London School

271

Michael Hechter, “A Rational Choice Approach to Race and Ethnic Relations,” in Theories of
Race and Ethnic Relations, edited by David Mason, and John Rex (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), 269.
272

Ibid.

138

of Economics, he sought to link rationality as the criterion for analyzing the process
where people identified with each other within their ethnic groups. In Racial and Ethnic
Competition, Banton argues that “competition is the critical process shaping patterns of
racial and ethnic relations.”273 Banton outlines his rational choice framework as follows:
Firstly, individuals use physical and/or cultural differences to generate groups and
categories. As a result, this creates ethnic groups. Secondly, when groups interact,
processes of change affect their boundaries which are determined by the magnitude of
competition with one another.274
Because the Malay majority has continued to reify and negatively stereotype the
Chinese community as money grubbing and unscrupulous people, it becomes necessary
for church members to construct boundaries that do not conform to these negative
stereotypes. Rational choice theory explains how Metro Church members’ definition of
Modern Chinese identity as progressive, rational, and having the best of western ideals,
allows for the maximization of success in the social and economic structure of Malaysia.
Kuala Lumpur is a bustling metropolis with many multi-national corporations. A
Modern Chinese ethnic identity would provide Metro Church members with more access
to employment opportunities since these corporations stress the importance of English as
a medium of communication and knowledge of western ways of thinking. More than just
access to employment opportunities, a Modern Chinese identity gives them more access
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to cultural and social capital, which, according to Bourdieu, could be transformed into
other forms of capital.275
Since English is the most widely spoken language in the world, it is advantageous
for Metro Church members to master the language. Most private and multi-national
corporations in Malaysia require potential employees to have a solid grasp and
competency in English. Emily indicated that as a Modern Chinese, she prefers to speak
English. Although she can speak Chinese, she did so only with her parents. Meanwhile,
Korey Nah grew up in the port city of Klang in the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. He is
fluent in Chinese and a variety of Chinese dialects. In recalling his childhood days, he
remembers speaking Chinese to his grandparents and relatives all the time. When he
turned thirteen, his family relocated to the city of Subang Jaya, where a majority of the
people living there spoke English as their medium of communication. While in high
school, he switched to speaking English as his main language:
You make new friends… and most of the friends in Subang here, they speak
English. They’re more English educated than Chinese educated. There’re still
some, but majority of them are English speaking. And I mix with them. It so
happens they are my classmates and they became real friends.
Life in Subang Jaya provided Korey with a western immersion. Because his friends are
mostly “English educated,” he is exposed to western media and entertainment. He
appreciates the openness and relationship that “western kids” have with their parents and
peers. Korey continues to communicate with his parents in Mandarin, but admits that it is
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quite “weird” since he “definitely speaks English more than… Chinese.” Korey believes
that it was up to the individual to choose how one behaves despite the western influence,
be it through friends or through the media. For Korey, openness and individual choice are
important concepts which he believes to be products of western influence in his life.
Yet, rational choice theory’s belief in maximizing materialistic claims as the basis
for governing human action oversimplifies what constitutes “materialistic claims” by the
culturally situated social individual. In addition, it fails to pay attention to inter-group
power dynamics as well as between intra-groups. Who stands to benefit more, and at
who’s expense? We cannot assume that membership to an ethnic group is based on the
converging of a single, homogeneous interest. In other words, one person’s “interests”
may not be similar to the other; and if the interests do not align, members of the group
will follow a different course of action accordingly. Therefore, rational choice theory
reduces people to one-dimensional beings and does not fully capture the workings of
such complex groups as Chinese Christians in Malaysia.
In the creation of the Modern Chinese identity, the same negative image that
dominant Malays had imposed on the Chinese community in Malaysia is ironically
recapitulated by the Metro Church’s Modern Chinese identity against that those I am
identifying as the Chinese Chinese. Here, it is important to discuss the meaning and
definition of a Chinese Chinese according to Metro Church members. While the label
Modern Chinese signifies openness and rationality, Chinese Chinese signifies closemindedness and irrationality. Jeremy argued that the problem with the Chinese mentality
was their lack of innovation, and what he calls “the old way, or the proven way.” For
example, he said that the Chinese Chinese have a “don’t rock the boat” mentality. By
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this, Jeremy believes that the Chinese Chinese would never think outside the box and
engage in risky, yet innovative ideas.
Church members also informed me that the Chinese Chinese are more
“traditional” in their thinking, and they described this thinking as inherent in those
Chinese that prefer to converse in Chinese language, attend Chinese schools, and adhere
more towards traditional Chinese rituals and celebrations. While my interviewees agreed
that all Chinese are hardworking and enterprising people, the difference between the
Modern Chinese and the Chinese Chinese is that the latter are more “money-minded.” As
focused as they are on commercial activities, Metro Church members claimed that the
Chinese Chinese are so engrossed in making money that they have become unscrupulous,
selfish, and “stuck in their old ways.” Church members described them as stingy,
dishonest, superstitious, and behind the times. This is an important point because it
implies the Chinese Chinese’s closed-mindedness that is the direct opposite of the
progressive-minded Modern Chinese. These descriptions are also remarkably similar to
Malay stereotyping of the Chinese community in Malaysia.
Here, we see church members’ tension in negotiating their Chinese ethnic
identities. On the one hand, they continue to attach to their inherited cultural patterns
such as Chinese values, business saavy, and Chinese language. On the other hand, they
also view these as negative attributes of the Chinese Chinese. Given structure of the
habitus, it is not easy for them to simply jettison these cultural patterns completely. These
cultural patterns are reinforced daily in their lives unconsciously and do not change
quickly. Thus, group behavior also cannot simply be reduced to actions of individual
members since the maintenance of social order is dependent on the “rules of the game.”
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Bourdieu charges that rational choice theory misunderstands how social agents operate.
People do not live in social vacuums. The Chinese in Malaysia are a historical product of
complex cultural mixtures. If maximizing advantages are the main focus of these ethnic
identities, why do Metro Church members continue to hold fast to certain Chinese traits
and values? Three examples below show how rational choice theory does not fully
capture Metro Church member’s ethnic identities.
Hailing from the bustling city of Petaling Jaya, Maria Han is a recent college
graduate from Australia who works as a technology consultant. She was raised to be an
independent woman who is free to make her own choices. Indeed, the idea of
voluntariness is tantamount in what church members see as an aspect of the Modern
Chinese. Although Maria acknowledged that she is independent and westernized, she did
not deny the fact that some Chinese traits remain embedded in her core such as respecting
one’s elders and filial piety. This is an important insight as it point toward an existence of
inherited traits that continue to persist despite her westernized Modern Chinese outlook.
College student Justin Chang also holds his Chinese upbringing in tension with
his fascination with western culture. In recalling the Chinese idea of filial piety, he is
appalled by the fact that western youths do not treat their elders with the proper respect.
For Justin, the idea of calling one’s parents by their first name is simply unheard of. At
the same time, Justin is taken in by the freedom and openness of western culture. He cites
how western parental relations are more egalitarian. I suspect that he desires a type of
relationship that is otherwise unavailable due to a rigid Chinese culture that emphasized
on respect and order over freedom and openness.
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The best example of the negotiated nature of Chineseness comes from Zachary
Chin. Born and raised in a small town in the southern state of Johor, he attended college
in Kuala Lumpur before heading off to England to further his studies. Upon graduating,
he returned home to work as an accountant. Now living in Kuala Lumpur, his entire
family attends Metro Church. In terms of the Chinese people, Zachary argued that:
Basically Chinese are good people. And, we’re being taught a lot about Chinese
philosophy, [and] Chinese culture, which is good, you know? But then… still,
because [they’re] not so strong, there’s still a lot of bad things [happening]. So, I
will generalize and say in short, Chinese culture, there’s a lot of good, but it’s not
strong enough… to contain the evil. That’s why the evil still, you know, [there’s]
corruption and all those injustice and unrighteousness and unfairness still happen.
What Zachary means is while Chinese culture has many valuable and good features, it is
undermined by the weight of its own traditionalism. The implication here is that his
Chinese cultural upbringing was somehow inadequate, even incomplete – “not strong
enough.” Still, Zachary maintained that he is still very much Chinese and claimed that the
Chinese possess “the best of both worlds.” He believes that the West has many things to
offer to the Chinese. He identifies these western features as being open, scientific, and a
willingness to cooperate and share knowledge.
Let me return once again to Bourdieu’s concept of strategy to help explain this
very complex dynamic that Metro Church members are negotiating. Bourdieu
understands strategy as a specific orientation of practices and associates strategy with
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“maximizing of material and symbolic profit.”276 However, we should not equate strategy
as a purposeful and calculated pursuit of benefits such as those proposed by rational
choice theorists. Bourdieu argues that social agents do not calculate according to explicit
rational and economic criteria. Rather, they operate according to an implicit practical
logic and dispositions.277 Individuals do not dictate actions, but rather it is the
institutional arrangements set up by groups that specify the appropriate means by which
goals are to be pursued. Strategy is rooted in an unconscious practical logic that is the
emergent product of habitus and fields. Agents individually or collectively deploy
strategies to improve or defend their positions in relation with other social agents.
To take Zachary’s example once again, he was raised in a Chinese environment
where he watched Chinese movies and learned to appreciate Chinese culture. For
Zachary, the habitus structures him as a member of the Chinese community in Malaysia.
The cultural patterns that have been informed through the habitus continue to manifest
and exert influence on the structures imposed in his life. However, within this habitus,
Zachary has the agency to create strategic moves to navigate the murky waters of the
social field of Chineseness in Malaysia. Strategy, in this sense, emerges from the habitus
to alter the structure of the field.
The three examples above demonstrate the tense relationships in negotiating
Chinese ethnic identities. On the one hand, my informants are constructing a different
type of Chinese ethnic identity. Their identification of “Modern Chinese” is in opposition
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with what they perceive as the more traditional Chinese Chinese, whom they believe are
backward and less progressive (i.e. less westernized). On the other hand, they still believe
that there is much value in identifying as Chinese. The problem with Barth, Cohen,
rational choice theory, and the constructivist approach in general is that they tend to
ignore the inescapable historical and cultural legacy of the Chinese in Malaysia, that is,
the habitus that structures the way they understand themselves in the social field. Further,
these approaches give too much weight to conscious social agents who come to
understand themselves as cultural beings.

Looking Beyond the Primordialist and Constructivist Approach
Ethnic identities are complex and the predominant scholarly approaches are
centered on primordialist and constructivist conceptions of identity. Constructivist
scholars argue that ethnic identities are not “things” in itself, firmly bounded and
unchanging.278 Rather, they are more malleable, fluid, and situational. The social agent
possesses the agency to “pick and choose” and construct their identities in the mediation
of social relations and negotiation of access to resources. No longer viewing identities as
self-bounded entities, the constructivist approach has opened up avenues to the dynamism
of ethnic identities. My interviews with Metro Church members demonstrate how their
views on Chineseness do not simply reflect the cultural givens of social existence. As a
method of maximizing social mobility and economic/social output, a constructivist
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approach to ethnic identity shows a clear and conscious separation between a Modern
Chinese and a Chinese Chinese. By separating themselves from the Chinese Chinese,
they are in fact jettisoning what they felt as unmodernistic aspects of Chinese identity –
aspects that they felt hindered them from acquiring economic and cultural capital.
While the constructivist approach can certainly address the shortcomings of the
primordialist approach, nevertheless, primordial attachments continue to persist.
The primordial approach maintains that identities are fixed with clearly drawn
boundaries. There are intrinsic features at the core of one’s identity. This approach
stresses how ineffable structures dictate the way people identify and group themselves.279
As I indicated earlier, Metro Church members continue to view some characteristics that
make them Chinese as non-negotiable and durable. As much as constructivist-minded
scholars would like to insist that identities are formed as a way to maximize resource
collection, constructivist explanations are unable to explain the durability of primordial
and essentialized categories in ethnic identities. Further, even though the analyses of the
economic and political dimensions of ethnicity are immensely useful, it is reductionist,
and can lead to an excessively deterministic view of identity. These analyses neglect
cultural, psychological, and symbolic meanings behind identity markers.
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I want to highlight how complex human beings can be, with their abilities to
seemingly hold different and contradicting ideas in their minds. This is something both
primordial and constructivist theories of ethnic identities have failed to recognize.280
I am in agreement with the constructivist approach, and more than likely, I would locate
myself on that side of the scholarly debate. Here, I want to briefly refer back to Rogers
Brubaker. While generally a proponent of constructivist approaches to identity, Brubaker
notes that the constructivist school generates a “soft” perspective on identity that has little
to no analytical purchase. In addition, he argues that in an attempt to exorcize any
essentialist (i.e. primordialist) elements from the scholarship on ethnicity, the
constructivist approach has become so porous and multifaceted that it fails to count for
anything at all. By this, he believes that a “soft” constructivist theory of identity fails to
examine why essentialist claims to identities continue to proliferate, therefore losing
much of its analytical power.281 Brubaker suggests that it is best to talk about
identification rather than identities. Through the conception of identification, Brubaker
wants to shift the focus to examine ethnicity as a process and “to specify the agents that
do the identifying.”282 Similar to Brubaker, postcolonial studies is dedicated towards
uncovering these “agents” and power regimes that do the identifying.
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A Postcolonial Contribution to Identity
Contemporary scholarship on identity is beginning to addresses how the
experience of colonialism has affected identity formation among postcolonial nations.283
In particular, how does the traumatic experience of colonialism affect the formation of
identities among the colonized? The questions raised by postcolonial scholars make it
apparent that there is more going on in identity construction than adequately explained
via economic, psychological, social, and rationalistic terms. Rather, the way in which the
colonized are positioned and subjected originates from the exercise of power and cultural
production. As Foucault reminds us, every exercise of knowledge and representation is a
formation of power regimes. In taking up Foucault’s concept of biopower as a method of
controlling and assigning categories in groups, there is a need thus to interrogate these
power regimes that has come to represent and dominate the colonized. Thus, while
retaining its constructivist roots, the postmodern and postcolonial shift in theoretical
approaches to ethnic identity are now leaning more towards deconstructing social
meanings and emphasizing on the social actor rather than a focus on macro-sociological
and material-based theories.284
Knowing now that identity is not one thing or unified, postcolonial scholars
articulate a theory that conceptualizes identity as one that is becoming. This approach
pays attention to the discontinuities and ruptures of identity formation in the
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identification process. Stuart Hall argues that while there are many points of similarities,
there are also many points of differences that constitute identities. Drawing mainly from
the experience of the black diaspora in the Caribbean, Hall contends that there are:
ruptures and discontinuities which constitute, precisely, the Caribbean’s
‘uniqueness.’ Cultural identity, in this second sense, is a matter of ‘becoming’ as
well as of ‘being.’ It belongs to the future as much as to the past. It is not
something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture.
Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But, like everything
which is historical, they undergo constant transformation.285
Hall asserts that cultural identity does not have a fixed origin or a pristine primordial past
to which people could return to. It is the realization that identities are intertwined,
imagined, factual and fictive. Above all, identities are about positioning. Ultimately, Hall
argues for a theorization of identity as “a form of representation which is able to
constitute… new kinds of subjects, and thereby enable us to discover places from which
to speak.”286 Hence, there will always be a political element attached to this endeavor.
Through the contribution of postcolonial studies, we can see how ethnic identities
can function as a political resource deployed by marginalized communities in the struggle
against the structures of oppression. Seen this way, identities are never neutral. To return
to my research context, Metro Church members’ constructions of the Modern Chinese
285
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category function as a deliberate positioning which they believe would offer them the
best potential to rise above and resist Malaysia’s essentialist view of the Chinese. Yet, as
I have already mentioned, in doing so, they create demarcations toward the Malays, but
more importantly with the Chinese Chinese. Even though the Chinese Chinese share the
experience of colonization and marginalization, Metro Church members, who demarcate
themselves as what I call the Modern Chinese, continue to perpetuate the same
mechanisms that essentialize the Chinese Chinese.287 Even as the Modern Chinese are
constructing Chinese identity that resists the dominant essentializing of Chinese identities
in Malaysia, they are reinscribing the very same essential categories imposed on them by
the dominant Malays to the Chinese Chinese.
While I do not wish to downplay the importance of the postcolonial approach to
the study of ethnic identities since the struggle against marginalization in Malaysia
continues, I question how identity formation is increasingly associated with a site of
political struggle. Indeed, postcolonial studies is deeply entrenched within the
domination/marginalization dynamic, or what Lawrence Grossberg calls the “‘colonial
model’ of the oppressor and oppressed and the ‘transgression model’ of oppression and
resistance.”288 Thus, postcolonial approach on identity ignores the heterogeneity of power
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within the marginalized groups themselves. If we take these assertions seriously, then it
appears that scholars of identity who are influenced by postcolonialism may run the risk
of overreaching to “rescue” and assign agency to marginalized peoples. Reality is
complex, and at the heart of this matter is the question of whether there is some sort of
self-conscious agency by marginalized peoples or if they are victims of the mechanisms
that transform human beings into subjects. The answer surely has to lie somewhere in the
middle. This is precisely why Bourdieu is useful in my analysis. His work moves beyond
the theoretical views of primordial structuralism and constructive functionalism.
Bourdieu’s theoretical principles cast a different perspective on ethnic identities as
dynamic and relational.
In the case of the Metro Church, informed by their habitus, members maintain
primordial attachments of their Chinese identities while at the same time adopt a
constructive aspect of their Chineseness. This is not a clear-cut separation but a messy
endeavor, one that is filled with conflict and contradiction. As a historical byproduct of
complex mixing of socio-economic and cultural adaptations, the Chinese in Malaysia
have come to understand their ethnic identities at a pre-conscious level. The cultural
patterns that have been informed through the habitus continue to manifest and exert
influence on the structures that are imposed in their lives. While this might sound
deterministic, Bourdieu believes that circumstances may alter these patterns.
Nevertheless, the most basic understanding of the “rules of the game” do not change
easily or quickly, because they are constantly reinforced in numerous ways in numerous
domains of their lives.
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It is important to note that for Bourdieu, practices and behaviors do not generate
out of a social vacuum. Rather, they are structured in social contexts called fields which
act as social arenas of struggle over the appropriation of capital. For Bourdieu, capital
should not be conceived in along classic Marxist conceptions. Rather, other forms of
capital exist including economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital; habitus is formed
in accordance with particular types of capital. For example, those who have massive
economic capital but less cultural capital are unlikely to invest in such things as art,
music, and higher education. Depending on the situation, Metro Church members may
emphasize or downplay different aspects of their Chinese identity for political, economic,
or cultural gains/survival. Yet, in the struggle for capital, someone is bound to lose out.
This will become more apparent in the following chapter as I explore how Christianity
becomes a powerful form of cultural capital. There are repercussions in privileging
certain markers of Chineseness, especially when those who are doing the privileging are
urban dwelling Chinese with vast amount of capital.

Implications and Conclusion
When it comes to the studies on identity formation, we should not be satisfied
with descriptive enterprises. Rather, we should be asking, in addition to descriptions, how
the process of identification elevates, denies, or negates certain markers of identity. In my
own research context, how does the process of identification include or exclude other
Chinese groups in Malaysia? There is power involved in the process of identification, and
the identities constructed by Metro Church members have direct repercussions in intraethnic relations. Unequal belonging demonstrates how power no longer resides in the
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exclusive property of repressive apparatuses. Rather, power manifests itself even among
marginalized communities.
The literature on identity formation tends to pose a binary opposition between
voluntary identity on the one hand, and involuntary identity on the other hand; either
identity is constructed, or it is ascribed. More importantly, it is the question of how much
freedom and awareness do social actors maintain in the identification process. Do they
possess agency? On the one hand, scholars such as Foucault argue that there is little selfawareness for social actors to maneuver due to their own perceived subjection. In
explaining the idea of the Panopticon, he argues that those who are “subjected to a field
of visibility, and… knows it, assume responsibility for the constraints of power; he
inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he
becomes the principle of his own subjection.”289 On the other hand, scholars attempt to
rescue the individual by highlighting how individual acts of resistance may not
necessarily appear on the surface.290 Beneath the surface of compliance towards authority
is an undercurrent of ideological resistance. For example, the idea of the agential resistive
agent has captured the minds of many postcolonial writers who argue that hybrid
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identities can act as a method of resistance. But this still assumes that the social actor
possesses the necessary agency to do so.
Throughout this chapter, I analyzed the construction of ethnic identities among
the Chinese in Malaysia. As a minority group, they continue to find utility and emotional
connection with their Chinese cultural “givens” as well as acknowledging the fluid
dimensions of their ethnic identities. Weaving together interview narratives and an
examination of various theories of ethnic identity, I argued that the way the Chinese
negotiate and make sense of their identity goes beyond a primordialist/constructivist
paradigm. Ethnicity cannot be reduced to individual choice; but it cannot be reduced to
what Brubaker calls bounded groups either. Like the members of Metro Church, they are
engaged in strategic maneuvering to maximize material and symbolic profit. As such,
they create demarcations and identify themselves as what I call Modern Chinese –
progressive, modern, and western; this is in contrast with the Chinese Chinese –
backward, traditional, and old-fashioned. To reduce human behavior to biological
workings on the one hand and mere pragmaticism on the other hand ignores the human
capacity to operate at very complex level. To address such issues, it is necessary to move
towards a theoretical framework that begins to capture the complexities of identity
formation on a more contextual and processual level. As I have mentioned earlier,
Bourdieu offers a more complex analysis. His conceptions of the field, habitus, and
practice are especially useful to understanding the formation of ethnic identities among
the Chinese in Malaysia.
In concluding this chapter, there is one other territory left unexplored – religion.
Despite being a minority religion in Malaysia, Pentecostalism is one of the fastest
155

growing Christian sects in Malaysia. For Metro Church members, their choice of religion
plays a key role in reconstituting their Chinese identities as well as granting them access
to capital. Bourdieu’s key theoretical concepts will prove just as useful in the
examination of the religious field and illuminate my argument of unequal belonging. The
following chapter explores what they gained from being part of a religious group that is
not highly favored by the local authorities in Malaysia.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CHRISTIANITY, CULTURAL CAPITAL, AND UNEQUAL
ACCESS

When I was eight years old, my father decided to take me to Sunday School at a
nearby church because it would be “good for me to have some religion.” The church was
located on the second floor of a shop lot. There were no tall spires or stained glass
windows to greet or inspire me. Since I only attended Sunday School, I was mostly
oblivious to the rituals of a regular Sunday service – communion, sermon, tithing or
offering. With some instances of singing and Bible stories, Sunday School was mostly a
time for me to play games and socialize with friends.
By the time I became a teenager, I felt that I had grown out of Sunday School, so I
left the church. Meanwhile, my relatives and cousins had other ideas. As staunch
believers in the physical manifestation of the Spirit of God in their lives, they
occasionally invited me and my family to special worship services at their church. This
was one of my earliest exposures to Pentecostal Christianity. I vividly remembered how
uncomfortable and awkward I felt as the only one who did not feel the spirit or speak in
tongues. Interestingly, I converted to Evangelical Christianity while I was attending
college in the United States. I quickly became involved with ministry work on campus.
However, things began to change when I started attending graduate school. Frustrated
with how my fellow Christians were uncritical of the dynamics of race, class, and gender,
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my once secure knowledge of Christianity – sin, Jesus, hell, atonement, Satan, etc. – were
challenged.
On one of my return trips home to Malaysia, I visited my relatives’ church to
satisfy and respect my elders’ request. My experience with that visitation was a mixture
of awe, confusion, and discomfort. I was not sure if it was the conservatism that bothered
me or the fact that they were more westernized than many of the white Christians that I
went to church with in the United States. And so, twelve years after my conversion to
Christianity, I am returning to the site where I first became acquainted with Pentecostal
and Charismatic Christianity.

To be an English-speaking Chinese in Malaysia is to occupy a precarious
position. Politically and ethnically, the Chinese are a minority group; being a Christian
also positions them as a religious minority. Nevertheless, Christianity, especially
Pentecostalism, is one of the fastest growing religions in Malaysia today. What is the
appeal of Christianity? In the previous chapter, I explored how Metro Church members
reinscribe their Chineseness as a strategy to resist the essentializing categories associated
with the Chinese in Malaysia. Thus, Metro Church members demarcate what I call
Modern Chinese and Chinese Chinese. Church members identify themselves as Modern
Chinese and deploy this as a marker for progressive, modern, and western-centric
Chinese identity. However, these strategies, following Bourdieu, are neither wholly
unconscious nor simply the result of rational calculation; it is a dialogical relationship
where habitus and field informs one another. To this end, Chineseness goes beyond a
primordial/constructive dichotomy. Instead, a processual and strategic outlook presents a
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more accurate way in analyzing Chinese ethnic identities. Ultimately, this demonstrates
that hybrid identities are not always resistive or liberative. Rather, the unequal
distribution of cultural capital maintains an intra-ethnic oppression among the Chinese.
Given the minority status of Christianity in Malaysia, what are the benefits of
embracing this religion? In this chapter, I examine how members of Metro Church
negotiate their identities as Chinese and Christian. They form complex relationships
involving religion, culture, and ethnicity. In postcolonial studies, Christianity is a
(neo)colonial enterprise that displaces indigenous cosmologies in a hegemonic manner.291
I mostly agree with this assessment; Christianity can be hegemonic and often functions as
a vehicle for the “colonization of the mind.” However, I would like to move the
discussion in a different direction. I contend that Christianity is not a tool of colonization
or an instrument of liberation but as a vehicle for socializing members into adopting
certain orientations and practices in relation to their surroundings. Christianity is a lens
through which they restructure their Chinese identities. Hybrid identities do not
necessarily indicate resistance or compliance with structures of oppression.
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Using Bourdieu’s concept of capital, I argue that Christianity is a powerful form
of cultural capital.292 Specifically, one’s mastery in English and western ideals endows
church members with this capital. Christianity confers Metro Church with access to
power even though they are marginalized within Malaysian society. I do not mean this
simply as a matter of amassing power in terms of Chinese resistance against the Malays.
Rather, it should be understood as what Heidi Dahles calls “the optimization of access to
resources through… cultural means.”293 In addition, access to cultural capital is
ambiguous because it creates unequal belonging. It is limited because not everybody has
access to it. It is very difficult to come by for the Chinese who are not fluent in English or
familiar with western ways. Seen this way, Metro Church members’ construction of
hybridized identities reinforces unequal belonging.
First, I will discuss Bourdieu’s concept of capital and how it could be applied in
Metro Church’s context. Then, I will contextualize Christianity in Malaysia. This is
important because it sets the stage for the ways in which Metro Church members
construct their hybridized religious identities. Using conversion narratives of my
informants, I show how these narratives are processes and active affairs. With
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conversion, church members are also readapting their Chinese traditions. This active
conversion to Christianity reflects a type of empowerment and self-assertion among
Metro Church members to invest and generate a very powerful form of cultural capital.
Finally, I show how access to this capital is unequal by examining the privileging of
western ideals and English as examples of cultural capital, reifiying instead of resisting
structures of oppression.

Capital and Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice
One of Bourdieu’s significant contributions to social theory is his notion of
capital. Related to the acquisition of capital is the “internalized form of the class
condition and of the conditionings,” habitus, which enables the social actor to know the
world, acquired through active socialization and upbringing, without thinking about it, to
react to different cultural stimuli, and to make judgments on what is considered vulgar or
gaudy rather than dignified or beautiful.294
Cultural capital is applicable to religious participation. This is one area where
Metro Church members can gain social mobility. In a context where the Chinese lack
access to political power, yet are successful in economic realms, cultural capital becomes
the most flexible component for gaining social power. Cultural capital refers to symbolic
goods existing in the mode of linguistic and cultural competence. Bourdieu
conceptualized capital existing in various material and non-material forms.295 According
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to Bourdieu, society is as a multi-dimensional space comprised of intersecting and
conflicting fields. It is within all of these overlapping fields that humans assert
themselves as individuals and/or as members of a group. The individuals in these fields
develop particular sets of dispositions which in turn provide them access to particular
types of capital. The religious field is a competitive structure which determines both the
form and representation of religious dynamics. In “Genesis and Structure of the Religious
Field,” Bourdieu argues that religion serves two social functions: first, to legitimize the
current social order, and second, to orientate social agents with the means to make sense
of their position in the social order.296
For Bourdieu, cultural capital is a “long-lasting disposition of the mind and body”
that implies “a labor of inculcation and assimilation.”297 He describes cultural capital as
existing in three forms:
in the “embodied” state, i.e. in the form of long lasting dispositions of the mind
and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books,
dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace or realization of
theories or critiques of these theories, problematic, etc., and in the
institutionalized state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because,
as will be seen in the case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original
properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee.298
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Cultural capital refers to the forms of knowledge, skills, and education which give the
social actor mobility and access to other forms of capital. Individual dispositions and
competencies give privileged access to such capital in its “objectified” form of cultural
artifacts, and in turn institutionalized in the form of professional qualifications.
Accordingly, institutionalized cultural capital plays the most prominent role in converting
cultural capital into economic capital.
Bourdieu’s concern in relation to cultural capital is with its conversion,
transmission, and accumulation in ways that perpetuate social inequalities. It is the
combination of institutional control over forms of capital, coupled with processes of
conversion and transmission that are crucial to the capacity of dominant classes to
maintain their position, and therefore to social reproduction. This is important because it
shows that linguistic or cultural competence is not the result of natural aptitude. Some
people have a preexisting head start over others based varied processes of socialization
that is acquired through the habitus including privileges from educational and economic
opportunities. Bourdieu’s theory is essential in my analysis of Metro Church members
because it begins to show that the actions of church members cannot simply be explained
in individual terms, that is, as full social agents. Rather, they are based on relationships
and interplay between individuals and larger social structures. Access to cultural capital
among Malaysian Christians is limited because they are constrained and enabled by the
habitus and field. The religious life of Chinese Christians in Malaysia is a field in which
various forms of capital are both invested and generated in interactive processes between
and among adherents of Metro Church.
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Even though Bourdieu focuses his analysis on the protection and reproduction of
status and privilege, I do not wish to cast capital purely in a negative manner. Indeed, he
is concerned with cultural capital as a tool of the elite to exclude those who do not
belong. Bourdieu’s primary concern with religion is in its institutionalized form where
the church and other religious institutions that legitimate capital, promote it, and bestow
power and privilege on authorized users and producers of this capital. In his framework,
it is the religious specialists that form the “exclusive holders of the specific competence
necessary for the production and reproduction of a deliberately organized corpus of
secret (and therefore rare) knowledge,” while the laity are objectively “dispossessed of
religious capital.”299 Thus, authentic religious producers are the official institutional
specialists while the laity can only consume but not supply religious meanings.
However, Bourdieu’s analysis of religion is based on a top-down understanding of
cultural production; priests and church hierarchies control the shape and dissemination of
religious ideas while lay people can only consume these ideas. We may fault Bourdieu’s
negative views of religion on his experience and observation of the French Catholic
church’s monopolizing tendencies. In addition, the French Catholic context is vastly
different from Asian Pentecostalism; power operates differently from these two contexts;
there is less clear-cut separation between Metro Church’s “religious hierarchy” and the
laity. Indeed, Bradford Verter argues that Bourdieu’s “Voltairean vision of religious
exploitation distracts him from looking at more subtle dynamics [of religion].”300
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To see religion in a negative manner is unhelpful in recognizing a potentially
powerful tool that marginalized communities could utilize to affect social change.301 For
Chinese Malaysians, converting to Christianity can potentially help them in the struggle
against marginalization by the dominant Malays. Thus, religious specialists are not only
the disseminators of truth. Rather, non-religious specialists (i.e. the laity) have as much
agency in producing the “goods of salvation” in the religious marketplace.302
Nevertheless, this potential is limited and only accessible to a few. While I agree that the
top-down model of religious domination understate how religious practitioners construct
religious meaning in their day-to-day lives, I insist that power and inequality continues to
manifest themselves in the Malaysian Chinese community even though they are a
collectively marginalized group. More importantly, the Malaysian context shows how
power and the accumulation of capital in all forms and permutations operate in complex
and multi-directional ways.
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Pentecostalism’s Background and Historical Context in Malaysia
It is particularly important to ground this study in the history of Pentecostalism in
its Malaysian context. The Pentecostal church is a product of the English-speaking
ministry with an influx of urban Chinese professionals. The habitus that structures this
denomination produces patterns of behavior and logical actions, i.e. practices that are
connected to a given field. Here, I will briefly explain how Pentecostalism became a
product of an English-speaking ministry. This will then illuminate the opportunities and
social inequalities that are present in Metro Church.
Pentecostalism first made its mark in Malaysia in the early twentieth century.
Specifically, the Assemblies of God (AOG) denomination traces its origins with the
arrival of an American missionary, Carrie P. Anderson, in Kuala Lumpur in 1934. Fluent
in Chinese, Anderson focused her ministry on the Chinese immigrant community and
operated primarily in the cities.303 As the ministry grew steadily, other missionaries began
arriving from the United States to assist her work. Due to British colonial policy of
discouraging inter-ethnic mingling, missionaries carried out their work and set up
churches along ethnic lines. With regards to the Chinese community, AOG churches
formed as separate Chinese-speaking and English-speaking congregations. Although
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ministry among Chinese-speaking communities flourished from the 1930s to the 1960s, it
quickly became surpassed by the English-speaking ministry with the founding of the
Bible Institute of Malaya (later renamed Bible College of Malaysia, BCM) in the
1960s.304
The early graduates of BCM became church pioneers, ministers, and evangelists,
establishing AOG churches around the country. By the 1970s, the AOG began
penetrating student groups around schools and universities in the cities; Chinese youths
made up a significant portion of AOG churches and fuelled the Charismatic
movement.305 The rise of the Charismatic movement was followed by a spurt in growth
of English-speaking AOG congregations around the country, especially in the Klang
Valley.306 In the 1980s, a second wave of charismatic renewal began to influence older
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professionals and businessmen with better economic resources. It is in this context that
Metro Church first came into existence.
For many Malaysian Chinese living in the city, interactions with various cultural,
political, and social influences are the norm, and they shape how the Chinese make sense
of the world, and, in effect, their identities. Traditionally, Malaysian Chinese align
themselves with a variety of Chinese religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, and
Confucianism. However, recent trends have seen a steady rise of Christian converts
among the Chinese, especially to Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity.307 According
to the ASEAN Statistical Yearbook of 2005, it was estimated that the Christian
population in Malaysia more than quadrupled from 220,000 to 2,000,000 between 1970
and 2000.308 Pentecostalism is a relative “newcomer” among other established Christian
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denominations in Malaysia, and the Pentecostal boom in the 1970s created a decidedly
more localized, independent, and charismatic form of Pentecostalism.309
Christianity is growing rapidly among Chinese and Indians because these groups
are among the few that are available for proselytization. Because Islam is Malaysia’s
official religion, proselytizing to the Malay population is illegal and the government
keeps a tight watch on any Christian activity that might be perceived as threatening
Muslim and, by extension, Malay culture and political power.310 Any attempt to
evangelize to Malays is perceived as a potential spark for social unrest that threatens the
Malay community and the primacy of Islam as Malaysia’s official religion. With the rise
of Islamization in the 1970s and 1980s, religious tensions in the country have
increased.311
309
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Examples of religious tensions include the 2009 church firebombings in Kuala
Lumpur as a result of a judicial ruling that the word Allah was not an exclusive Muslim
use alone.312 Previously, Malay-translations of Christian publications and periodicals
were forbidden to use the word Allah to signify the Christian God since the National
Islamic Council reasoned that it was exclusively used around the world to denote the
Muslim God. Protestors of the ruling claimed that opening up the word for Christian use
would only “confuse” the Malay-Muslim population.313 The new ruling would effectively
allow non-Muslims, especially Christians, to use the word in their Malay-translated
Christian publications. In a separate incident a few months later, a group of Muslim
Malays marched to the Selangor state government office with the severed head of a cow
– a sacred animal for Hindus – to protest against the relocation of a Hindu temple to their
predominantly Malay-Muslim neighborhood.314
It is in these precarious scenarios that Metro Church is operating. As part of the
Assemblies of God (AOG) denomination, Metro Church is a charismatic and Pentecostal
church. Just to provide a visual of Metro Church, the church’s welcome brochure states
that sing in tongues, prophesize and anoint people, and “fall when prayed for.” Located in
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the city of Subang Jaya, a well-to-do suburb in the Kuala Lumpur metropolitan area,
Metro Church is placed on the upper stories of a shop lot, amidst endless rows of terrace
houses and bungalows. Unlike churches in the United States, there are no crosses or
steeples that indicate that this is a house of worship. The sign for Metro Church is small
enough that one can easily miss it if one is not paying attention. Metro Church is located
on the third floor, and one has to climb a few flights of stairs to get there, although people
with disabilities and senior citizens can use the elevator. Because Malaysian laws prohibit
construction of churches from the ground, Christians have to purchase pre-existing
buildings and convert them into religious institutions with government approval. Church
groups are also not allowed to alter the basic shape of the building.
Metro Church’s four-point vision statement states:
By the grace of God…
1. We envision a Pastoral Team with God-gifted five fold ministries, supported
by a Leadership Community of 50 leaders.
2. We envision a Church with 300 committed disciples who are joyfully
involved in their God-given ministries, participating in 30 CARE Groups,
under the covering of a Shepherd Leader for every 10 members.
3. We envision a laity-empowered Church providing comprehensive ministries
to meet the needs of every member, refreshing pastors and Christian workers,
providing resources to enlarge their ministries.
4. We envision a Missions-focused Church that is involved in church planting,
networking and financial partnership to spread the Gospel of Jesus Christ in
Malaysia and beyond.
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The vision statement reflects Metro Church’s distributed and horizontal leadership
structure. It is precisely this horizontal leadership structure that we see how unequal
belonging operates in the church. Because Metro Church does not operate on a “topdown” structure, unequal belonging demonstrates a more layered working of privilege
and power that is inherent within the marginalized Chinese community in Malaysia.
Metro Church’s head pastor, Solomon Wu, is a product of the youth/student charismatic
revival in Malaysia in the 1970s. A graduate of Bible College of Malaysia in 1984, Pastor
Wu served as the young adult minister of a local Pentecostal (now defunct) church in
Kuala Lumpur. When a scandal broke out in that church, he resigned from his post.
Along with a few church members who left with him, Pastor Wu started Metro Church as
an independent church in 1993. A year later, Metro Church was officially recognized in
fellowship with the Assemblies of God of Malaysia.
Pastor Wu serves as the senior pastor of the Metro Church. Together with his
pastoral staff, the church operates under the motto, “where God does marvelous things.”
The church has grown steadily since its inception. In 1999, the church raised enough
funds to purchase and relocate to a larger space in a shop lot where it currently stands.
The majority of the congregation resides in the Kuala Lumpur metropolitan area; it is not
surprising to find members traveling as far as Gombak and Ampang townships to attend
Sunday worship. The congregation’s demographics range from college-aged youths, to
new families, to retired senior citizens. In recent years, Metro Church has renovated and
expanded the size of its sanctuary to cater to its growing congregation. With this
expansion, the church now possesses the necessary space to run several ministries and
programs simultaneously. They also established a separate “Chinese Church” and
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“Indonesian Church” for congregants who are not fluent in English in an adjacent unit. I
shall return to address the significance of these churches (in particular the Chinese
Church) later. For now, I turn toward my informants’ sites of negotiation – conversion
and traditional Chinese observations. While these narratives reveal deep spiritual values
for my participants, they also indicate the importance of adopting a western worldview
and reaffirm their privileging and use of English in the process of conversion to
Christianity as they negotiate their Chinese culture.

Chinese and Christian Sites of Negotiation
Conversion Stories and Entrance into Christianity
Conversion is a complex process, one that involves many variable aspects that
influence an individual to switch from one religion to another. In this section, I
demonstrate how conversion to Christianity at Metro Church is a gradual affair. More
importantly, conversion plays an active role in reworking Chineseness and constructing a
religious identity that is different from the “Chinese Chinese.” It is neither repudiation
nor preservation of Chinese cultural traditions, but more about reorienting Chineseness
through a shifting relationship with western worldviews.
I also highlight some of the predominant assumptions of conversion studies.315
Many theories contend that personal crisis and tension forms the basis for religious
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conversion. These theories are also deterministic which suggests that the convert is either
consciously joining a religious group at will or passively “brainwashed” through
manipulative techniques.316
We must begin with William James’ classic text, The Varieties of Religious
Experience because many subsequent scholars operate through his assumptions. James
utilizes a psychological approach and argues that the urge to convert derives from
feelings of incompleteness, depression, and sinfulness.317 James distinguishes between
two types of conversion: volitional conversion, which is gradual, and instantaneous
conversion, which is sudden and dramatic. The clearest indicators of a person’s
conversion, for James, are a sense of inner peace and control, reception of new perceived
truths, an ecstasy of happiness, and sense of newness in life.318 James’ model captures the
trajectory of the convert who has changed and developed to a new person. However, his
approach seems to apply only to people with extreme emotional problems, and he
emphasizes instances of depression, tension, and instability. Therefore, there is a sense of
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paternalism running through James’ model where people with “sick souls” need only
surrender to a higher power to remedy their personal inadequacies.319
James’ model continues to hold sway on future discourse on conversion as it
continues to link conversion with emotional distress. In particular, John Lofland and
Rodney Stark’s model of conversion is based on a “sequential funnel,” that is, a series of
steps toward conversion.320 In “Becoming a World Saver,” the authors interviewed
converts from Reverend Moon’s Unification Church in San Francisco and argue that
people convert to a new religion during times of strain and hardship through a gradual
process that is influenced by social relationships.321 Total conversion, which includes
behavioral and verbal commitments, involves seven “necessary and constellationallysufficient conditions.”322 We also see James’ influence on Lofland and Stark’s theory
since their approach presumes the existence of some kind of personal crisis which then
leads to religious conversion. On the one hand, we must recognize the values and
groundings for these theories. On the other hand, we must remain critical of what these
assumptions mean about the converts.
Lofland and Stark’s theory does lend a framework to Janet Lim’s conversion
narrative. I start with her story because it fits the most traditional idea of conversion looks
like. Because of the extreme nature of her conversion story, she also exemplifies a
dramatic reorientation of one’s Chineseness around a Christian religious worldview.
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Although raised in a traditional Chinese environment, Janet’s early exposure to
Christianity came when she was in high school; she attended an Anglican missionary
school. As an adult, she self-identified as a moralist. Even though her siblings converted
to Catholicism as adults, she did not pay much attention to them because she felt that she
was a good person and did not need to go to church. Meanwhile, her daughter started
attending Metro Church and became good friends with some of the church elders. With
all this exposure on Christianity, Janet claimed that she had the “double insurance” of
knowing Christianity and Chinese religion. However, when her husband fell ill in 2004,
she was at a loss. Although her daughter brought some Metro Church members to pray
for her father, Janet recalled: “I really, really cried to God. I was on my knees, I was
crying… and I said the Lord’s Prayer... I told God. I said, ‘God, if you heal him, I will be
a Christian.’ I didn’t go to the temple… I didn’t go do my joss sticks… I really turned to
God… I was touched.” Her husband did recover from his illness. While recovering in the
hospital, Metro Church members continued visiting Janet and her husband. They offered
them encouragement, gifts, and prayers. Janet was touched by their gesture of Christian
love and started attending Metro Church. At church, she attended Bible study classes and
started learning more about Christianity. Meanwhile, she was also learning about
Catholicism which she felt was “a little off.” After a period of evaluation, she decided
that Metro Church was the place for her.
Certainly, the key point to Janet’s conversion is the miraculous healing of her
husband. This indicates how conversion can be gradual but punctuated by dramatic
events. Janet’s early exposure to Christianity introduced her to a Christian worldview as
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presented by Metro Church. Her post-conversion Christian education reinforced and
allowed her to reinterpret her ethnic identity within that Christian worldview.
While Janet’s story shows the dramatic and crisis component of Lofland and
Stark’s theory, many of my participants have much less dramatic conversion stories and
come from more stable lives. Many come from well-to-do middle class families and did
not go through any traumatic events prior to conversion.
A more applicable model analyzing these less dramatic conversions would be
Henri Gooren’s “conversion career” approach. Henri Gooren’s Religious Conversion and
Disaffiliation critiques older approaches for being too focused on crisis and tension as
conditions for conversion. He also rejects the preconceived Pauline idea of a unique and
once-in-a-lifetime conversion experience. Gooren asks whether religious conversion
would orientate someone into a completely different personality or if there is congruence
with the convert’s experience of early religious upbringing. Gooren develops what he
calls a “conversion career” approach. He rejects the idea of conversion as a straightforward progression where people have to go through stages in their conversion. Rather,
a conversion career is “the member’s passage… through various levels of religious
participation.”323 Gooren’s approach captures a more accurate explanation of Metro
Church members’ conversion narratives.324
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For example, Nadine’s conversion story demonstrates the dynamism of Gooren’s
conversion career model. A self-described curious religious seeker, Nadine converted to
Christianity after a prolonged period of doubt, research, and education. Raised in a nonreligious household, she is a natural inquirer and claims that she had always believed in
the existence of God despite her upbringing. She identifies herself as a universalist prior
to converting to Christianity. She believes that the existence of the different religions in
the world is just God’s ways to connect with different people. She recalled a childhood
memory of her dog going missing. She prayed to God for its safe return. When the dog
did return home, she claimed that this experience was her “first touch point in… belief.”
In college, she found great difficulty in accepting Christianity: “All these cultural things,
you know?” she shrugged. Here, she is referring to her knowledge and respect for
Chinese culture; a culture that she perceives is often at odds with Christianity.
After her graduation from college, Nadine started attending Metro Church at the
urging of her friend. She started buying books and reading up on Christianity to try to
understand the faith. The church elders also encouraged her to attend prayer meetings and
Bible studies. But she declined because she wanted to learn about Christianity by herself.
Her biggest problem was associating God with Jesus: “it took me so long… because [I
thought] Jesus was… a [regular] person.” Eventually, she accepted that Jesus is God
through independent research and reading. She is glad that she gradually came to
understand Christianity and became less inquisitive and less combative thanks to the
family-like atmosphere of the church. Nevertheless, she continues to feel tension in her
faith. She still has trouble accepting the fact that all non-Christians might end up in hell.
In particular, her mother “has not seen the [Christian] light yet,” but Nadine claims that
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she is a good person and insists that she would “end up in a very good place” in the
afterlife. She admits that it is difficult to reconcile the thousands of years of Chinese
history and culture with Christianity. Tension is apparent through Nadine’s story:
converting to Christianity requires giving up elements of her deeply intertwined ethnic
and cultural identities, but with the possibility of gaining cultural capital through a
Christian and a hybridized western worldview.
The habitus of Nadine’s Chinese upbringing does not mesh with a Christian
worldview. Yet, habitus is not rigid since “the social world may be uttered and
constructed in different ways, according to the different principles of vision and
division.”325 For, within the habitus, Nadine could strategically maneuver around her
social field to best transform her circumstances. This strategic maneuvering is about
jockeying for position to acquire cultural capital.326
However, conversion is a highly subjective affair. Conversion narratives are also
dependent on the reliability of the converts’ narratives. They may be lying or
exaggerating their stories, building or simplifying them for narrative intelligibility. I am
aware of the methodological issues surrounding the validity and accuracy of my
informants. James Beckford argues that self-reported accounts of religious conversions
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should not be taken at face value. Rather, they are “artfully accomplished
constructions.”327 Beckford’s research on a Jehovah’s Witness community reveals that
the community’s constructions of their conversion narratives cohere with the Watchtower
movement’s official discourses. He contends that the converts internalize certain views of
the Watchtower Society and that these views become resources for them to draw from in
constructing their personal stories of religious conversion.328 It should be noted that these
narratives are not merely parroting the religious organization’s “official script.” Rather,
the script provides a basic structure to construct their conversion stories.329 While I
acknowledge that biases and inaccuracies do exist in these narratives, I am also not
interested in the accuracy of their stories. Rather, I am trying to analyze recurring patterns
among the conversion narratives because these stories reveal how church members
negotiate their Christian faith with Chinese culture.330
Zachary, who self-identified as a “curious seeker,” has been interested in religion
since high school. Although he visited various churches when he was young, he felt that
he was simply doing this “casually.” At the same time, he also dabbled in Taoist
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practices. This is not surprising since he was also raised in an environment where joss
sticks and ancestor worship were a part of his daily life. He told me, “I was looking for
the truth; I want to find God.” When he was a teenager, a Christian revival rally
(organized by American missionaries) passed by his hometown. After attending this
meeting, he was convicted to embrace Christianity:
My classmates invited me to one of the rally. I remember that the rally is talking
about the “Gospel train.” So I attend one of them. So I put up my hand to receive.
That’s where it started.… There’s a prompting in my heart when the altar call was
made. I put up my hand, there’s prompting in my heart. I hesitated… actually. In
fact I fight it many times. But during that time, I think, I, with a prompting of my
heart, and I, I would say that time… seeing that some truth that challenged me,
you see… in the altar call, they always challenge us. So, I see that there’s some
truth and some prompting in my heart. I want to take the challenge. I want to taste
Jesus… It’s something very new.
I asked Zachary about his thoughts on his previous engagement with Taoism. He pointed
out that what he did was very “cult-like.” What this means is not that Taoism is a cult, but
rather it is the practices in Taoism that struck him as cultic. He explained by pointing to
instances where he would consult mediums to win lottery tickets, and achieve good
health. Despite these past dealings, Zachary insisted that he did not really “put heart into
it.” Ultimately, it was Jesus’s “prompting of the heart” that led to his conversion to
Christianity.
David Snow and Richard Machalek’s idea of biographical reconstruction is also
helpful in explaining Zachary’s story. In “The Sociology of Conversion,” Snow and
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Machalek’s analysis of Nichiren Buddhists’ conversion narratives suggests that
“conversion accounts should not be taken as objective sources of data. Rather, these
accounts act more as processes of biographical reconstructions that are constantly
reinterpreted in the face of new experiences.331 Conversion narratives become the lens to
reconstruct previous life events.
Consider Mrs. Loring Gan’s narrative. Although she had early exposure to
Christianity through her Catholic high school experience, she only converted to
Christianity in her 40s. She claimed that it was a “peaceful process.” Growing up in a
predominantly Buddhist and Taoist environment, she frequently visited the temple with
her mother to participate in rituals and ceremonies, although she claimed that she did not
understand anything that was going on. She recounted an instance where she was puzzled
by a particular woman at the temple:
When I was young, my neighborhood was mostly Buddhist. And I saw this
woman, she took a whole… bunch of joss sticks and just pray and pray, and then
the minute she puts down [the joss sticks], she was scolding and scolding and
scolding [other people]. I said, “is it really religion? Is this a good religion?” I
asked myself, “is it a good religion?” You’re scolding… you’re supposed to
religious; that means your heart must be good, but she’s scolding… okay? That
puts me off.
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According to Loring, Christianity is a “very clean kind of religion.” I asked her for
clarification to her assertion. She said that it was between the individual and God: “you
go to church and you just pray to God.” Loring rejects Taoist and Buddhist traditions for
their ritualism and unsophisticated enforcement of morality. Perhaps this is also the
reason why she was “put off” by Chinese religious traditions. It was not until her sons
became active in church that she and her husband started attending Metro Church. From
this gradual experience, she “grew as a Christian.” She claimed that it became a
“habitual” thing: “there are certain events and that we feel that it really give us some
peace.” Zachary’s views on the cultic nature of Taoism and Loring’s rejection of the
unsophisticated nature of Taoism are colored by a post-conversion reflection and
restructuring of Chinese cultural and religious traditions. However, Loring and Zachary
did not repudiate every aspect of traditional Chinese practices. Rather than a preservation
of traditional Chinese culture, my informants demonstrated how Christianity helped them
adapt and negotiate Chinese traditions.332 They construct a hybridized identity, seeing
their Chinese traditions through a Christian lens.
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Chinese Traditions and Being Christian
Despite their commitment to the Christian faith, many of my informants told me
about the importance of Chinese traditional celebrations such as Chinese New Year and
Qing Ming. At the same time, they were flexible in their understanding of these customs.
For example, mandarin oranges are a common mode of gift-giving among Metro Church
members during Chinese New Year. The word for “mandarin orange” is gam in
Cantonese, which also resembles the word “gold.” This gift symbolizes a wish for
prosperity and wealth for the upcoming year. In addition, the meaning of the common
Chinese New Year greeting of “gung hei fatt choi” has received a good deal of discussion
among church members. Because the greeting means “congratulations and wishes for
prosperity,” some church members were uncomfortable with its connotation because it
refers to “earthly” material wealth. Instead, they preferred the alternative greeting “san
nihn fai lok,” which literally means “happy new year” in Cantonese. Metro Church
members are uncomfortable with the idea of luck because their lives are controlled by
God and not fortune. The ideas of luck and fortune are present throughout Chinese New
Year celebrations.333
The central tenets of Chinese New Year – prosperity and longevity – also become
reconstructed to conform to Christian beliefs. Metro Church’s worship minister justified
this through his interpretation of the biblical text. While the prosperity and longevity
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certainly have commonalities in the Bible, the worship minister reasoned that the major
difference between regular Chinese conceptions of prosperity and longevity and the
Christian perspective is that the Christian concept is rooted in eternity and everlasting
treasures. He implied that Chinese perspectives on prosperity and longevity are worldly
and ephemeral.
Like Chinese New Year, Qing Ming (tomb sweeping day) is just as important for
Metro Church members as it is for non-Christian Chinese. I spoke with those who
travelled out of town to honor their ancestors’ graves. They insisted that Qing Ming is not
as much a festival for the dead as an obligation for the living. They claimed that there is a
difference between worshipping, which is what non-Christian Chinese did, and honoring
one’s ancestors, which is the Christian way. Zachary equated Qing Ming, or
“Remembrance Day” as he called it, with the Christian call to honor one’s elders. As long
as he did not pray with joss sticks on the graves of his ancestors, he was fine with it. He
was quick to point out that he was not celebrating or performing rituals for the
ancestors.334 Zachary preferred to call Qing Ming an act of honoring ancestors so that it
would not be confused with worshipping or venerating ancestors, which is what the
Chinese Chinese practice. Meanwhile, Jimmy Ning observed Qing Ming “to fulfill [his]
responsibility for the living.” Jimmy wanted to respect and fulfill the wishes of his aging
parents by helping them carry food and worship materials to his grandparents’ graves to
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“lessen their burden,” since hiking up to the cemetery to the grave site was strenuous for
his aging parents.
Metro Church members’ attempts to reconcile vastly different religious and
cultural traditions are filled with conflicts and contradictions. More importantly, they are
not dichotomous; even though there is a conscious effort to preserve their inherited
Chinese cultural identity with their new-found religious identity, thought and action do
not perfectly align with each other. Therefore, to explain these observations in terms of a
recapitulation of colonial tendencies might not be accurate. Rather, we should see this as
an example of an emergent expression of local identities and values. While it is true that
Pentecostalism in Malaysia traces its beginnings from external forces like western
missionaries, this cannot simply be understood as an extension of the westernization of
Malaysian Chinese life, nor should we understand this to be a recapitulation of
colonialism.
There are many challenges and difficulties to analyze Pentecostalism because
there are many different types of Pentecostalism, each with different takes on theology,
ritual, and organizing principles. Allan Anderson contends that there are no prescribed
notions in defining Pentecostalism’s characteristics because scholars often overlook
Pentecostalism’s growing complexities and its contribution to the local reinvention of
Christianity.335 Paul Freston calls this reinvention a form of “local subversion,” a
localized appropriation of Christianity that creates hybrid doctrines, practices, and
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identities.336 Far from unsuspecting victims of imperialistic tendencies of Christianity,
Metro Church members reaffirm their commitments as both Christian and Chinese;
conversion to Christianity allows them to add another layer of meaning to their Chinese
ethnicity.337
Conversion narratives and Chinese traditions point to a plurality of thinking and
consciousness among Metro Church members. These pluralities involve constant
negotiation and re-interpretation. Peter Berger refers these as the process of “alternation,”
which he describes as “the possibility to choose between varying and sometimes
contradictory systems of meanings.”338 Seen this way, conversion to Christianity is not a
complete break with past traditions and/or identities. Instead, the “new” Christian identity
provides the individual with interpretive rules to make sense of the world. This new
system of meaning (i.e. conversion to Christianity) that the individual enters into should
not be assumed as covering up the old system of meaning. Rather, it facilitates “an
explanation of the meaning system he has abandoned” as well as combating their
“doubts.”339 Thus, church members negotiate, delineate, and reinscribe Chinese cultural
practices to accommodate their Christian faith.340
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Once again, Bourdieu helps explain this phenomenon. This relation between the
social structure and habitus is important in explaining how church members are
constrained by the shape of the existing field. The cultural patterns that are based on
historically complex socio-economic adaptations by which Metro Church members
understand their lives may not always be conscious in their minds even though these
patterns exert considerable amount of influence in structuring their lives. Habitus
overcomes the objective/subjective dichotomy by considering individual acts as
“intentionless inventions of regulated improvisation” produced by the dynamic
relationship between individuals and structures within a field.341 As Bourdieu asserts,
“[agents] can succeed only to the extent that ... they manage to reactivate dispositions
which previous processes of inculcation have deposited in people’s bodies.”342
The process of socialization endows church members with certain knowledge and
knowhows in the field of cultural production. In this case, Metro Church becomes a field
where cultural capital is invested and generated. Religious conversion and the subsequent
reshaping of Chinese cultural traditions may be regarded as a strategic position-taking.
Conversion to Christianity helps church members maintain or improve their position in
the field of cultural production. The individuals acting in this field develop a particular
set of dispositions in the struggle to gain access to capital. Cultural capital, in the form of
English language and Christian morals, translates into status and prestige.
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Establishing the Economic Status of Metro Church
A majority of Metro Church members come from well-to-do families and are
already economically privileged. Although some work in blue collar jobs such as
construction, they nevertheless belong in the management level, working as supervisors
and managers. Yet, the wealth of Metro Church members is difficult to discern. They
may not dress the part, but they often have wealth tucked away for their children’s
education, a new house, or expensive trips overseas. Flaunting their wealth is not part of
their modus operandi.
One way to determine the congregation’s wealth is by examining the weekly
contributions of the church. While the actual weekly church contributions are
anonymous, monthly and annual contributions are listed on the church bulletin board.
This board gives a report of the church’s financial resources, and the average monthly
and yearly church giving. The numbers are staggeringly high, amounting to tens of
thousands of dollars. This is an indication of the wealth of the congregation, and church
members do not hesitate to give their money for the betterment of the church and
kingdom of God. Pastor Wu often encourages his flock to contribute generously to the
betterment of God’s Kingdom, and the congregation responds in kind.
I also asked my informants if they could describe their wealth and economic
status within Malaysian society. They usually added qualifiers to justify their answers.
For example, Jeremy claimed that he was part of the “working class” before he started his
own business. Now he calls himself “lower middle” class, although “not struggling as
much as before.” Jimmy, on the other hand, described himself as “average” and “nothing
fancy.” Nevertheless, the typical answer that I received was, “I’m comfortable,” which
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indicates that they are economically well off. In many instances, church members talked
about their “absent” children from church who were off attending college in the United
States, Australia or England.
Since church members are economically privileged and possess economic capital,
the church does not play as much a part in helping members acquire economic capital.
Yet, capital does not exist solely in terms of monetary wealth, but in status, cultural
knowledge, and social connections. Thus, Metro Church functions as a site for acquiring
another form of capital – cultural capital.

Christianity as Cultural Capital
Becoming Part of an English-speaking Community
Even though Fenggang Yang argues that Chinese Christians often link
Christianity with the economic success of the West, achieving upward mobility goes
beyond monetary wealth.343 There are other forms of capital manifested through
Christianity. For Metro Church members, more than simply accumulating economic
capital, conversion to Christianity affords them access to cultural capital. Christianity
becomes a site for the acquisition of cultural capital. Its teachings purport to help people
to become morally superior if they live out their Christian values. These values translate
as knowledge of western lifestyles and privilege English as the language of choice.
My informants’ preference in attending the English church is not so much a
matter of choice, but a product of socialization in a middle-class, urban, and western
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upbringing. This is especially true in Malaysia where English remains a foreign language
in rural areas while it is very much an everyday language in larger urban areas. 344 English
is an influential means of communication in foreign trade, in business, and in politics in
non-English speaking countries.345 One’s mastery of English also plays an important role
in conferring social and economic advantages. Rakesh Bhatt argues that English is the
“commercial lingua franca” in international business.346 As a result, formerly colonized
communities consider English “the linguistic capital necessary for the accumulation of
both economic and political powers.”347 For Malaysian Chinese who are fluent in
English, this translates to entrance into English-speaking colleges overseas, employment
in well-paying multi-national corporate jobs, and recognition of status. English is a form
of cultural capital that confers to people a prestige and honor that could be converted into
more economic wealth.
Some scholars stress that the privileging of English as a mode of communication
is a form of linguistic colonialism.348 These are extremely important critiques. For
example, Robert Phillipson defines linguistic imperialism as “the dominance of
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English… asserted and maintained by the establishment of continuous reconstitution of
structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages.”349 However,
Phillipson’s idea of linguistic imperialism, or “anglocentricity,” reduces people as
helpless victims of structural imposition. Philipson’s position also assumes that colonized
peoples are incapable of independent decision-making. While I do not fully agree with
the idea of a fully agential person either, fluency and mastery of English among Chinese
Malaysians is a strategic maneuvering in a Bourdieuan sense. Metro Church members are
not deluded nor are they fully conscious agents of change either. In an environment that
has politically and ethnically marginalized the Chinese community, they master English
because it grants them access to cultural and economic capital.350 As I mentioned earlier
in this chapter, forms of capital are not fully distinct categories, but are often intertwined.
There is a transnational quality in Metro Church’s typical Sunday worship service
that is transferable from one context to another. If an English-speaking visitor from the
United States happened to stumble into the church’s Sunday service, he or she would be
able to follow most of the service without much knowledge of Malaysian Chinese
culture; the church’s medium of communication is English and follows a typical
evangelical pattern: welcome and announcements, prayer, praise and worship,
communion, sermon, and dismissal. Songs are sung in English and are usually selected
from American Christian publications such as the Vineyard. Sermons are also in English
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(with a sprinkling of Cantonese), and “Manglish,” a type of localized English dialect.
Sometimes, Pastor Wu invites other church leaders, or preachers and ministers from other
AOG affiliated churches and ministries to deliver guest sermons. On many occasions, the
church invited guest speakers from Australia, New Zealand and other English-speaking
countries. The sermon contents usually revolve around themes of personal piety, the end
times, faith in God’s provisions, and the power of God’s healing.
It is not just that church services and sermons are conducted in English, the feel of
the church is that of a western, modernized church. The sanctuary is set up like a typical
evangelical church in the United States. Western instruments such as electric guitars,
drum kits, and synthesizers fill up the stage. Worship is also largely computerized. The
sanctuary boasts a state of the art sound box and mixer board; PowerPoint presentations
project song lyrics, biblical verses, and sermon notes onto a large screen behind the
pulpit. The technology present in the sanctuary also indicates a level of wealth and
success.
The majority of church members have college degrees and successful careers.
This is most visible among young families, who strive to provide their children with a
good education. For example, Pastor Wu himself recently graduated with a Doctorate of
Ministry at a divinity school in the United States. My informants, especially the younger
members, have degrees from foreign English-speaking colleges; Emily Chang went to the
United States to study psychology, and had recently completed her Masters degree in
Counseling at a local English-speaking college. Meanwhile, Rosie Hung earned her Hotel
and Management degree from a college in Rhode Island. These academic qualifications
obtained from English-speaking countries mean that Metro Church members are already
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highly fluent in English. In this way, attending an English-speaking church is not so
much about practicing English but being part of an English-speaking Chinese
community. The real advantage here is the status of being around English-speaking
Chinese. More than just an “English club,” Metro Church is a religious community in
which Christian values and morals are propagated. From these teachings, they gain access
to western values which translates into cultural capital.

Propagating Christian/Western Values
In addition to English, church members learn western and Christian values in
church. A majority of Metro Church members subscribe to American evangelical
ministry programs such as Focus on the Family to learn more about Christian family
living. The church’s library also has a modest collection of books acquired through
donations, mostly in English. There are books authored by famous evangelical and
Pentecostal preachers from the West such as James Dobson, Billy Graham, Chuck
Colson, and Rick Warren. These materials are available for Metro Church members to
read and research more on various issues ranging from traditional Christian family values
to personal piety. These traditional Christian values translate as knowledge to navigate
the world as Christians.
Yet, these values also reinforce patriarchal structures where church members
accept as the ideal form of Christian relationship. Why would Chinese women adopt
identities that are predicated on their loss of power and reinforcement of their own
oppression? Feminist scholars assert that women who choose to associate with these
constructions of identity may in fact be empowered even as they appear to be
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disempowered.351 For example, R. Marie Griffith’s study on Pentecostal women seeks to
reexamine how the women reshape the concept of submission to suit their own devices.
In God’s Daughters: Evangelical Women and the Power of Submission, Griffith’s
ethnographic study reveals that submission is subverted into empowerment by way of
harmonizing submission as God’s will.352 She also discovers this to be instances of the
“lampooning of male behavior.”353
Frances Adeney’s Christian Women in Indonesia: A Narrative Study of Gender of
Religion echoes Griffith’s analysis by demonstrating how Indonesian Christian women
gain access to power in a male-dominated society. Adeney utilizes vignettes from her
research participants and argues that the women use everyday practices such as offering
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hospitality, and honoring relationships to develop “resistance theologies that reconstruct
social realities.”354 Adeney’s analysis shows the highly contextualized nature of
resistance and gender equality. As such, there is no “one size fits all” approach to
analyzing empowerment and resistance.355 In my context, the importance of filial piety,
as part of the inherited cultural givens of Chineseness, favors males over females. The
habitus of Metro Church members blends easily with the conservative Christian message
of men being heads of households. Because of Chinese filial piety’s resemblance with
Christian patriarchy, it is difficult for the women to challenge and manuever around these
structures. While I am certain that women members of Metro Church are not victims of
patriarchal structures, I am also not sure if they are actively challenging these structures.
In addition, the church’s weekly sermons reinforce traditional Christian values in
accordance to western biblical interpretations. One sermon by a guest preacher – a selfdeclared Chinese Malaysian “evangelist” – alluded to the Prayer of Jabez as a way of
increasing one’s wealth and health. The evangelist also assured the congregation about
the “power of giving.” This giving by means of increase in wealth is not for personal gain
but for the betterment of God’s kingdom. The sermon implied a trickle down blessing
where the fortunate (the blessed) are to help out – in a sense, to be a blessing – to less
fortunate people. This particular sermon reinforced values of humility and generosity –
values that many church members did not associate with the Chinese Chinese. As I
explained in the previous chapter, my informants identified the Chinese Chinese as
greedy and selfish people. As non-Christians, they lack the moral compass to live ethical
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lives. Thus, the Christian values inculcated through sermons are taken as superior to nonChristian Chinese values. In the face of an amoral drive for individual wealth, these
teachings enhance Metro Church members with Christian justification and moral
regulations for their economic wealth and behavior.356
Some sermons even respond to particular western holidays/observances. During
the weekend of Mother’s Day, Pastor Wu’s wife delivered a sermon addressing the
importance of motherhood. She spoke about the importance of mothers raising children
to be obedient to God. At one point during the sermon, she alluded to Amy Chua’s
concept of the “Tiger Mother,” a concept that she rejected because “as a Chinese trait,”
Asian parenting techniques were too stringent.357 It is not that she was rejecting the
traditional Chinese way of motherhood, but she stated that it needed a Christian balance
to it. The Christian way she advocated had to do with balance and honor. This sermon
teaches Metro Church members how Christianity can perfect their Chinese ways of
living.
The church becomes a site of cultural competency not just through its sermons,
but through a myriad of ministry programs such as cell groups (called CARE groups),
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and School of Christian Growth (SCG) classes. SCGs are Bible/book study classes
designed to teach members about Christianity and the Christian life. Depending on one’s
level of “spiritual maturity,” lessons range from strengthening the faith of young
believers, to lessons in apologetics, as well as the end times. Attendance is voluntary but
members are highly encouraged to attend. During my fieldwork, I regularly sat in on one
of the classes to gain exposure to the course content and the exchanges between the
students. This particular class was designed specifically for “intermediate believers.”
They were studying a guided workbook called “Walking with Christ.” In these classes,
members follow a lesson curriculum set up by the church leadership. Members are taught
to submit to God’s will and live with a “servant’s heart” as an ongoing transformation of
one’s Christian life. SCG classes build a theological base that CARE groups translate into
daily practices.
Basically a cell group, CARE (Caring, Accepting, Reaching, Encouraging) groups
are smaller and more intimate than SCG classes. The church leadership believes that
small groups are an important aspect in nurturing the Christian’s spiritual growth by
caring for each other in practical ways. These groups meet every Friday night in the
CARE group leader’s home to fellowship with one another, share testimonies, answer
prayer requests, and conduct Bible lessons. Group members are provided with a study
workbook based on a particular book in the Bible. In CARE groups, a small group of
congregants meet to affirm and support each other in their faith. Janet Lim finds CARE
groups to be important because she has the opportunity to interact with other Christians
and “help each other [and] advise each other to grow as a Christian.” Prayer requests and
testimonial sharing time reveal what members’ concerns are and what they value. On one
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occasion, an older gentleman shared his success in purchasing several properties. He
attributed this as a sign of God’s blessings and the outcome of his faith. Book lessons
from the CARE group only serve to reinforce these values.
At the time I was conducting my observations, CARE group participants were
studying the book of Proverbs with focus on becoming a wise and prudent Christian.
These studies were personal and practical as group members learn how these biblical
principles could be applied to their daily lives. One lesson discussed how to differentiate
between “a prudent and simple person.” Whereas the prudent person is able to detect any
deceit or dishonesty, the simple person is foolish and is susceptible to manipulation and
temptation. Group members would then use this knowledge to apply it to their daily lives.
Another older gentleman in the group shared how God helped him become wiser in his
business decision making process and did not become a victim of unscrupulous business
practices. All this translates into cultural capital – tacit knowledge required to succeed in
everyday life such as conducting and making wise business decisions.
Finally, Metro Church teaches its congregants the value of temperance and
moderation. Church leaders are not forbidden from consuming alcohol. Although regular
church attendees are allowed to consume alcohol in moderation, they are dissuaded from
doing so; many church members also choose not to drink alcohol by their own volition.
Throughout the duration of my fieldwork, I also did not see anyone smoke tobacco at
church or at any non-church related gatherings. On many occasions, my participants told
me that they stopped smoking and drinking after they converted to Christianity.
Moreover, they often point towards the non-Christian Chinese as practicing these vices.
The implication here is that smoking and drinking, as identity markers, are considered to
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be activities of culturally “lower” people. Korey Nah recalls his experience after his
conversion to Christianity. He felt “uncomfortable” when his non-Christian relatives
started playing mahjong and drinking whiskey during Chinese New Year celebrations.
Like Korey, church members reasoned that these actions may cause other Christians to
“stumble” in their faith. Church members interpret these vices as indicative of flawed
morality dishonoring of one’s body as “the temple of the Lord.”
The examples above show how conversion to Christianity and the construction of
hybridized Chinese Christian identity provides Metro Church members with access to
mastery of English and a westernized worldview. Members gain access to this cultural
capital which provides them with the means to navigate an environment that marginalizes
them for their ethnicity and religion.

Unequal and Limited Capital
In the previous section, I showed how conversion to Christianity facilitates access
to cultural capital. While this empowers Metro Church members with forms of western
ideals and mastery of English, we should not see this empowerment as a type of Chinese
resistance against dominant-Malays in Malaysia. Given my analysis of the process of
conversion and participation in Christianity, it is tempting to assume that cultural capital
is freely available for all. As I have mentioned earlier, accumulation of capital among
church members is more about what Dahles argues as creating openings to maximize
one’s access to capital. While Dahles affirms how conversion to Christianity offers
Malaysian Chinese, in particular the Chinese business elites, access to various types of
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capital,358 I also argue that access to capital is not freely available for all. It is limited and
unequal, because only English-speaking and westernized Chinese are able to access this
cultural capital. One’s mastery of English or appreciation for western ideals is not
contingent on skill or intellect. Rather, church members have a preexisting head start over
others by virtue of the habitus that provides them access to power and privilege despite
their status as a minority group in Malaysia. Christianity enhances access to these
resources. Habitus enables the social actor to “know” the world without thinking about it,
react to different cultural stimuli properly, and make judgments on what is considered
vulgar, distinguished, acceptable, or unacceptable.
For Bourdieu, economics alone will not help explain the reproduction of social
inequality. Rather, he is interested in developing “a general science of the economy of
practices that does not artificially limit itself to those practices that are socially
recognized as economic… to grasp capital, that ‘energy of social physics,’ in all of its
different forms, and to uncover the laws that regulate their conversion from one into
another.”359 In particular, Bourdieu explores the ways in which the trappings of middle
class and urban culture are deployed as “raw materials” in the dynamics of class
relations. Cultural capital plays a central role in societal power relations as it produces a
non-economic form of domination. In this section, I show how the unequal distribution of
cultural capital perpetuates an intra-ethnic oppression among the Chinese. In particular,
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limited access to cultural capital creates unequal belonging between Modern Chinese and
Chinese Chinese.360
Power exercised through cultural capital should not be misconstrued as setting a
political agenda. Bourdieu believes cultural capital imposes its power through exclusion
and symbolic imposition. It is the power of legitimating how specific cultural norms and
practices are deemed superior and how they are institutionalized to regulate behavior and
access to resources.361 As much as cultural capital can bestow advantages upon the
individual, it could also be used to exclude others, perpetuate conformity, and as such,
recapitulate essentialist categories. The flexibility and fluidity of cultural capital is that it
functions both ways, that is, it can be used in positive as well as negative ways.
In Metro Church, the cultural capital of Christianity is limited. The existence of
two sister churches, the “Chinese Church” and the “Indonesian Church,” offers a hint to
the limited and ambiguous characteristics of this cultural capital.362 The Chinese Church
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Even though the Chinese and Indonesian churches exist under the same banner of Metro
Church, the two congregations are separated from the English-speaking church. I was told that Metro
Church started the Indonesian Church as an extension of their ministry to evangelize church members’
servants and maids from Indonesia. In addition, the Chinese and Indonesian churches, especially the
Chinese Church is most unequal within the context of Metro Church. Even though they have converted to
Christianity, they lack knowledge of modernity and mastery of English. I regret that I was unable to visit
both sister churches during my fieldwork. I am certain that future field research on these two congregations
would further prove my argument that unequal belonging is a more useful category of analysis compared to
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is Metro Church’s ministry extension to cater to friends and families of the regular
English church attendees who are not fluent in English. On the surface, these churches do
not appear dissimilar from each other except by their mode of communication. The
Chinese Church has its own staff and worship band. This particular congregation is not
integrated with the English-speaking congregation. Instead, the English and Chinese
churches only come together during special services such as baptisms. While it is not
uncommon to find churches communicating in English and Chinese together in a single
setting in Malaysia, Metro Church chooses to remain separate. Thomas Gan insisted that
Metro Church needed to conduct its worship services according to its own “segment.”
What he means by this is the two groups should not integrate as a unified congregation.
Thomas argued that “our mind will run away…we cannot focus.” He explained that the
congregations should not mix because the constant back and forth translation between
English and Chinese would only distract the overall flow and impact of the worship
service.
However, there are rare instances when these two churches come together. Metro
Church conducts special baptism services at the culmination of the new member classes.
Because Metro Church is a relatively small building, the church conducts its baptisms in
a different and larger church with a pool. I attended one of these services during my
fieldwork. In that particular service, there were at least two dozen new members. It was
also a combined service where the English and Chinese Churches were in attendance
simultaneously. Staff members from the Chinese and English Churches led the service.

hybridity. Indeed, hybridity could not account for the complex workings power and privilege that is
enmeshed within marginalized groups.
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Although it was a bilingual service where English and Mandarin were spoken, they were
not translated for the congregants.363
At this particular service, most of the baptism candidates came from the Chinese
Church. One by one, the candidates walked up to the pool to be received and baptized by
the pastors of their respective congregations. After the service, I asked the worship leader
of the Chinese Church why she did not pray in Chinese. My question appeared to have
caught her by surprise. She said that she did not know how to answer that question and in
hindsight, she should have said the prayer in Chinese. Even though the majority of the
baptism candidates were from the Chinese Church, this exchange suggests an unequal
belonging between the Chinese and English congregations. Although the churches exist
under the banner of Metro Church, there is an unconscious privileging of English as the
preferred medium of communication even though she is a member of the Chinese
Church. The fact that it was a leader from the Chinese Church that said this proves that
non-English speaking, or at least non-English fluent church members do not occupy
equal playing field compared to English-speaking modernized Chinese Christians.
I also asked my participants what they thought about the Chinese Church. For the
most part, the responses were lukewarm. The responses displayed ignorance to the
Chinese Church’s activities. Many expressed that they did not know much about the
363
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church or its congregants. Mostly, they claimed unfamiliarity with Mandarin as a reason
for their ignorance. Others such as Tiffany Feng said that that she could “express
[herself] better in English rather than Cantonese or Mandarin.” Finally, another member
argued that she “never felt comfortable” in the Chinese Church: “It’s like I couldn’t
express myself through songs...The songs don’t appeal to me.” She claimed that
something is lost when English Christian songs are translated into Chinese; they lack a
certain quality that elicits one’s connection to God.
While one cannot fault many church members for not attending the Chinese
Church due to their inability to speak Chinese, others, such as Janet, are fluent in
Chinese. Yet, she chooses not to attend the Chinese Church because she claimed that the
English service is better because of her “retention” rate. This implied that an Englishspeaking church service is more conducive in the overall understanding of Christianity.
Janet prefers to attend the English service because she feels that she could learn more
about Christianity in English, even though I suspect that the Chinese Church is just as
adequate in teaching its congregation about Christianity. Meanwhile, Justin Chang did
not “really think too much about it.” He cited, as did other church members, the music as
the impetus for attending the English service. “I don’t listen to Chinese songs. I find it
very ‘emo.’” Even though he understands Mandarin, he did not understand the verses of
the songs: “I’m being brought up in an English environment where I speak English.”
These responses indicate that the English-speaking Chinese members of Metro Church
prefer not to attend the Chinese Church. As Modern Chinese, Metro Church members
live in urban areas, are inculcated with modernity, and are fluent in English. Thus, the
habitus unconsciously socializes them to attend the English Church.
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The acquisition of cultural capital through Christianity goes hand in hand with a
devaluation of other cultural competences and resources that church members find
lacking. Their westernized outlook becomes the norm in evaluating other Chinese groups,
especially the Chinese Chinese. For Metro Church members, their identification as
Modern Chinese, now reflected through their Christian faith, informs them that the
Chinese Chinese are somehow morally and culturally lacking. Thus, this cultural capital
is unequal because the Chinese Chinese are prevented from accessing it.
If Metro Church members view themselves as open, progressive, and modern, they view
the Chinese Chinese as their opposites. For example, Jimmy Ning said that the Chinese
Chinese are mostly “sly, con-men.” He claimed that there are many Chinese who are
cutting corners and “just want to find an easy way out.” Jimmy’s statement is informed
by his acquired cultural capital as an honest and productive Christian. Jeremy Lee faulted
the Chinese Chinese who are educated in the “traditional Chinese ways.” He argued that
these traditional ways consist of educational skills that do not promote progressive
thinking. Instead, these skills involve mundane and rote memorization of facts. As such,
Jeremy reasoned that the Chinese Chinese are not as progressive as the West. Zachary
echoes Jeremy’s sentiment and equated Chinese culture as “selfish” by virtue of their
upbringing:
You see… if you know the culture of the Chinese, they’re very selfish. The
knowledge they have, they keep it to themselves. Okay? Whereas the West, you
look at the West… whatever knowledge and discovery they have, they will
discuss. They share. That’s why they progress much faster. So, that’s why we
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know so much about the western world, because of their openness and sharing of
knowledge.
Zachary’s use of the word “progress” reflects a view of the Chinese Chinese as lagging
behind the West. Moreover, he is recapitulating the ruling BN-government’s trope of the
the untrustworthy and shrewd money-grubbing Chinese. These statements are particularly
disturbing and revealing at the same time. Although Metro Church members are
ethnically Chinese, they create distinctions between them and other non-Christian and
non-westernized Chinese Malaysians. Coupled with the limited access to cultural capital
there is unequal belonging in Metro Church members’ hybridized identities.
While the examples above appear to focus on the negative aspects of traditional
Chinese education and business practices, other critiques are centered on traditional
Chinese Chinese traits and values. For example, Jimmy has strong reservations toward
Chinese Chinese families favoring boys over girls. He called these practices “outdated”
and “old-fashioned” and wondered why Chinese families are still obsessed over the role
of men as heirs to the family. Finally, Mrs. Loring Gan calls the Chinese Chinese
“superstitious” people who are governed by numbers and the forces of nature. They are
also cold, calculating, and “noisy” people. Here, the word “noisy” is associated with
one’s lack of personal and cultural etiquette. Without the morally superior life that
Christianity bestows on Loring, she finds that Chinese Chinese behaviors and
mannerisms lack polish.
Unequal cultural capital is operating at an unconscious level. It is not that church
members are actively oppressing the Chinese Chinese. It is also not my intention to pit
these two Chinese groups against each other. Nor am I conceptualizing these two groups
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as dichotomously separated. Rather, Metro Church members have internalized their ways
of living as the norm. To this end, church members are committing what Bourdieu calls
“symbolic violence” – the unnoticed and partly unconscious domination that everyday
social habits maintain over the conscious subject – against non-Christian Chinese.364
Thus, acquisition of cultural capital that is supposed to empower the Chinese minority in
Malaysia ends up reinforcing the negative and essentializing stereotypes associated with
Chinese Malaysians toward the Chinese Chinese. Thus, Metro Church members are
engaged in unequal belonging.

Conclusion
Among the various types of Christianity present today, Pentecostalism and
Charismatic Christianity are enjoying a surge in growth especially in the Global South.
Some Pentecostal churches have become rich and prospered from wealthier
congregations. In Malaysia, the emergence of Pentecostal Christianity and its ministry
among the Chinese is divided along language and dialect lines, resulting in the emergence
of Chinese-speaking churches and English-speaking churches. It is the English-speaking
congregation that presents an enticing and attractive option that is modern and western.
Conversion to Christianity is usually associated with a recapitulation of the
colonial mindset. However, I conceptualize Christianity not as a tool of colonization or
364
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an instrument of liberation, but a vehicle for socializing members into adopting certain
orientations and practices in relation to their surroundings. In terms of conversion, the
traditional view holds personal crisis and hardship as the impetus for conversion –
sudden, dramatic, and once in a lifetime. However, through conversion narratives from
Metro Church members, I show that conversion is a process that involves extended
periods of interaction, research, and evaluation.
Moreover, I demonstrate how the habitus has structured my informants to
consider Christianity as an option because many have once interacted with the religion in
their lifetime. These conversion accounts act more as processes of biographical
reconstructions that are constantly reinterpreted in the face of new experiences.
Conversion experiences are a lens through which to view previous life events. My
informants demonstrate an adaptation and negotiation of their Chinese traditions. They
create a hybridized identity, seeing their Chinese traditions through a Christian lens.
Metro Church members are not unsuspecting victims of the imperialistic tendencies of
Christianity. On the contrary, they have come to terms with their identity as Christian and
Chinese. Being Christian allows them to add another layer of meaning to their Chinese
ethnicity.
With this understanding in mind, turning to Bourdieu’s theory of capital becomes
an important and essential component of my analysis. He shows how capital can manifest
itself in different forms other than in economic and monetary terms. Since the majority of
Metro Church members are already well-off financially, conversion to Christianity grants
them access to other forms of capital. Despite their marginalized status in Malaysia, I
show how Metro Church members’ conversion to Christianity serves to maximize their
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potential to acquire cultural capital. This cultural capital entails mastery of English and
understanding of western modes of thinking. Both are utilized to empower and navigate
their lives in an environment that marginalizes them for their ethnicity and religion.
Nevertheless, if inequality is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, then it is also vital
to analyze how cultural capital may not function strictly as empowerment for the
marginalized. Although my informants converted to Christianity as a form of strategy to
optimize access cultural capital in the form of westernized thinking and mastery in
English, I also demonstrated that access to this capital is limited and unequal. It is limited
and unequal because non-English speaking and less-westernized, culturally “lower”
Chinese Malaysians are unable to access this capital. This creates an instance of unequal
belonging.
My findings begin to show how the discourse on hybridity as adopted by many
postcolonial scholars needs to be re-evaluated. We need to construct a more useful
analytical concept to better understand lives of marginalized people on the ground. My
concept of unequal belonging nuances hybridity. With this concept, we can begin to
explore the intricate process of constructing hybrid identities on the ground. More
importantly, unequal belonging interrogates hybridity’s potential as a tool for social
change. The following chapter will explore these ideas as I begin to explore the
significance of my findings in postcolonial studies and hybridity.
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CHAPTER FIVE: UNEQUAL BELONGING AND THE HYBRID SPIRIT

After half a year of fieldwork, I returned to the United States to complete my
project. The community I was leaving behind had become more to me than simply
research participants. The pastor offered his prayers for my safe return and success, and
at a going away party held in my honor, the most often expressed sentiment of the
community was a strangely comforting, “God bless you.” At that moment it did not
matter that our views of God were different, or that I was not Pentecostal and definitely
did I speak in tongues, I was one of them. They exclaimed such things as “I’m so glad
that I could help you with your project,” or You’re going to do great, Kit,”although many
of them did not understand my research perspective.
Back in the United States, my friends asked me to comment on my experience in
the field. I told them that they were the nicest people I had ever met and that part of me
regtted the fact that I might have to subject my participants’ lives, identities, and
theological outlooks to intense and critical academic scrutiny. While some understood my
dilemma, others were puzzled why I felt this way, as if I had somehow “gone native.” It is
because of this dilemma that I have continuously struggled to strike a balance between
honoring my participants’ experience – no matter how bizarre I find their rituals and
lives – and being a responsible and critical scholar of religion. On the one hand, Metro
Church members see me as a godly person whose work will inspire other Christians to
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study more about religion. On the other hand, my colleagues and friends from graduate
school expect me not to pull any punches -- to critique and expose the mechanisms and
power dynamics behind the cries of “Hallelujah” and “Amen.” But do I have to choose
between one and the other?

In the previous chapters, I explore the historical and social context of the
Malaysian Chinese community. I demonstrate how contemporary Malaysia continues to
be affected by the British “divide and conquer” policy that reifies and essentializes the
nation’s various ethnic groups. My interviews and fieldwork demonstrate that Metro
Church members’ identities are in constant flux; they construct and negotiate their
identities as simultaneously Chinese and Christian. As devout Christians, the Malaysian
Chinese community holds fast to their religious convictions, and often times their
conversion to Christianity creates a reorientation of their minority status within Malaysia.
More than just a marker of identity, Christianity is a site where some Chinese Malaysians
are able to gain access to cultural capital. Conversion to Christianity serves as a way of
maximizing their social position in Malaysia. However, access to this capital is limited
and unequal since only those who have mastered English and are well-versed in western
cues and ideals are able to access this capital.
This project’s main task is to interrogate the assertion in postcolonial scholarship
that hybrid identities function as a form of resistance for marginalized communities.
Throughout this dissertation, I have demonstrated that identities are not unitary or stable.
The dozens of interviews and observations on which this project is based, coupled with
the literature on ethnicity, religion, and postcolonialism, demonstrate that identities are
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constructed, malleable, and negotiated. Nevertheless, these identity constructions are
constrained by the cultural givens of habitus.
In this final chapter, I incorporate my findings from the previous chapters and
bring them into conversation with the larger discussion of hybridity. This chapter argues
that Metro Church members are engaged in what I have called “unequal belonging.” That
is, they privilege one marker of their identity over another: “unequal” in the sense that not
all members of the larger community, Chinese Malaysians, are the same; some members
of the community have more cultural capital and a “higher” status than others. Thus,
westernized-English-speaking Chinese Christians (what I call Modern Chinese) have
higher status, socially and culturally, than non-English-speaking, or at least nonChristian, Chinese (what I have called the Chinese Chinese). In concert with some of
Bourdieu’s theoretical principles, unequal belonging highlights the ways that hybridity,
although a useful and helpful term, fails to capture the nuanced workings of privilege and
power that are inherent within marginalized groups. First, I explain how Bourdieu’s
theoretical conceptions help show unequal belonging in the lives of Metro Church
members. This is especially relevant when addressing the issue of religious syncretism.
Next, I explore how the scholarship on syncretism, especially missiological studies and
early anthropological studies, has tended to emphasize a kind of corruption and erosion of
culture and religion. Later, I analyze how the scholarship on hybridity is too monolithic
to capture Metro Church’s complex and intersecting identities and loyalties. Thus,
unequal belonging can help nuance hybridity by paying attention to the workings of
power and privilege that exist among marginalized communities. This provides a more
complex and multi-directional view of hybridity, such that it is understood to be
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simultaneously resistive and oppressive. Metro Church members generally reject the idea
that they are hybrid; however, their Chinese-westernized-Christian identities are
necessarily a dynamic product of the blending – not always conscious – of a variety of
cultural, religious, and ethnic elements.

Unequal Belonging
A close analysis of the everyday lived experience of people on the ground shows
that certain types of identity markers are privileged over others at specific times and in
specific contexts. In the case of Metro Church members, they cling to facets of their
Christian identity while constantly reshaping their Chinese ethnic and cultural identities
to accommodate their Christian faith. So, while hybridity is always fraught with
negotiation, this unequal belonging indicates that it is not always a mode of resistance.
This is a flaw that many scholars fail to take account. For example, Namsoon
Kang argues that the category “Asian” is too homogeneous a category to warrant any
effective analysis of such diverse groups of people in Asia. In her article, “Who/What is
Asian?” she also states that there needs to be cross-cultural and cross-national analyses of
specific Asian countries “in order to explain their own internal features and socioeconomic conditions.”365 Kang utilizes Said’s concept of Orientalism and Spivak’s
critique of representation to challenge Euro-Western feminists’ “Othering” of Asian
women. She also critiques the self-Orientalizing tendencies of Asian theologies. To this
end, Kang turns toward Bhabha’s concept of hybridity to counter essentialized
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constructions of identity present in Euro-Western feminists and Asian theologians. By
resituating monolithic categories such as ethnicity, class, and race in “in-between
spaces,” she argues that hybridity “helps Asians overcome the exoticism of cultural
identity.”366
Like Kang, I also find hybridity to be a useful category in describing the fluid
boundaries and multiplicities of identities. However, Kang uses hybridity too
unproblematically. While Kang is correct in conceptualizing a hybrid Asian identity that
pays attention to the trappings of essentialism, hybridity suffers from misuse in the
assumption that it necessarily functions as a site of resistance against oppressive
structures. I want to go one step further and explore whether this hybrid Asian identity
can serve as an instance of oppression. Postcolonial discourse’s conceptual error is
assuming a “one size fits all” framework for hybridity from which its values and
strategies of resistance can be deduced. Hybrid identities can be further nuanced when we
begin to interrogate the term not just in its utility to challenge essentialist claims to
identity, but by considering how hybridity may mask the workings of power and
privilege. Metro Church members have complex identities intersecting and competing
loyalties, strategies, and agencies. Bourdieu provides a better way to analyze the
hybridity as it relates to unequal belonging because he provides a more nuanced account
of how the social order masks its arbitrariness and perpetuates itself by convincing
society to accept current existing hierarchies. These hierarchies become powerfully
evident in the privileging of English and western and modernist ideals in my data.
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Nuancing Hybridity with Bourdieu
Much of Bourdieu’s sociological theory addresses the subjectivist and objectivist
conceptions of social life: intentional calculations of social actors as well as the
underlining social structures that govern people’s behaviors. More importantly, his
theories are dedicated to the critique of inherited categories and accepted ways of
thinking; he focuses on the subtle forms of control wielded by groups such as politicians,
educators, intellectuals, and technocrats under the guise of rationality and culture. This is
the basis of symbolic violence – the subtle imposition of systems of meaning that
legitimize and solidify structures of inequality.367 Bourdieu shows that power is mediated
through interior behavioral dispositions of the social actor and through the exterior
features of the social structure. This moves beyond functionalist (individual action) and
structuralist (exterior constraining forces) positions to explain the relationship between
individuals and society, and the power structures that are produced from this relationship.
Habitus plays an important role in Bourdieu’s attempt to reconcile the objectivistsubjectivist dichotomy. Briefly, habitus is the system of dispositions which internally
structures and shapes individuals through inculcation into their social milieu. It becomes
the structuring structure that determines how individuals act in the world either with a
degree of comfort or discomfort. These “givens” of society are:
laid down in each agent by his earliest upbringing, which is the precondition not
only for the co-ordination of practices but also for practices since the corrections
and adjustments the agents themselves consciously carry out presuppose their
mastery of the common code.368

367

Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 139.

368

Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 81.

216

Of course, these givens are not visibly stated or explained, but are nonetheless “sensible”
and “reasonable.”369 It is these givens (the middle class, westernized, and modernistic
status) of Metro Church members that I suggest, forms the basis for their privileging of
Christian identity. They do not question these givens because church members perceive
them as “natural.”
Habitus “contains the solution to the paradoxes of objective meaning without
subjective intention. It is the source of these strings of ‘moves’ which are objectively
organized as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic intention.”370
Here, we see why Christianity becomes such an important marker in the construction of
identities among Metro Church members. Habitus exists as a structure that constrains
them to maintain a “pure” Christian belief. Moreover, Christianity becomes the lens
through which to view and reconstitute Metro Church members’ Chinese ethnic
identities. As I mentioned in Chapter Four, they see this as a “best of both worlds”
because Christianity perfects their Chinese identities.
Bourdieu also believes that the social world is divided into distinctive arenas of
practice which he calls fields. As a relational term, fields are networks of social relations
and positions where agents (individuals, groups or institutions) are located. These
locations are determined by the interaction between the rules of the field, habitus, and
capital. Once established, fields operate within their own internal logic. They possess
their own unique set of rules, knowledge, and forms of capital. As such, individuals and
groups are engaged in a struggle to maximize their positions in the social order. To fully
369
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understand the concept of field, it is important to pay attention to the “positions” in the
field and its relations to one another.371 Bourdieu argues that individuals occupy certain
positions in various fields. They are defined by their relational position within the field’s
distribution of capital. In this scheme, fields are “networks of relations between
individuals and institutions competitively engaged in the dynamics of cultural production,
pursuit, consumption, and/or accumulation… invariably in one’s interest…Thus each of
us – by second nature because we have internalized this entire system – develops
strategies to either maintain or improve our positions in this relational network of power
that is the social world.”372 Fields are thus complex arenas that consist of producers,
consumers, distributors, legitimators, and regulatory bodies. David Swartz notes that
“field analysis calls attention to the social conditions of struggle that shape cultural
production. Even supposed neutral cultural practices are, according to Bourdieu,
embedded in systems of social as well as intellectual distinctions.”373
Metro Church and its members belong to a religious field. This religious field is
structured by a struggle between variously positioned agents and institutions over cultural
capital. As Bourdieu states in his essay, “Genesis and the Structure of the Religious
Field,” religion possesses two functions with political ramifications: first, it legitimates
various social order; second, it provides people with the justification to make sense of
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their positions in the social order.374 It is this second function that is an important aspect
in our understanding of hybridity and Metro Church’s rejection of religious syncretism.
As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, ethnic identities among Malaysian Chinese
do not necessarily conform along the primordialist/constructivist dichotomies. Rather,
they manifest both tendencies. For Metro Church members, Chineseness is a contested
and negotiated term. It is simultaneously a product of self ascription and ascription by
outside forces. Externally, the pro-Malay government has stigmatized the Chinese as
greedy, money-minded foreigners who cannot be trusted. This is the state-imposed
identity that the Chinese members of Metro Church have to contend with on a daily basis.
Internally, however, they reinscribe their own markers of Chineseness as an alternative to
these state-imposed identities. These self-ascriptions of ethnic identity can be
transgressive in nature, since they are actively engaged in reconstructing an identity that
defies the stereotypes associated with being a Chinese. I have already demonstrated how
this is especially the case with the demarcation between what I call the Modern Chinese
and Chinese Chinese. These Modern Chinese do not ascribe to categories traditionally
associated with being Chinese. They are the “not quite” of the Chinese.375 Their very
presence disrupts bounded notions of culture, religion, and ethnicity. Yet, these identities
may perpetuate oppression among other marginalized groups.
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destabilizes structures of authority and essentialisms by turning the gaze back upon the eye of power.
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In Chapter Four, I explained how Christianity provides Metro Church members
access to various forms of capital. In particular, the cultural capital acquired by Metro
Church members can be transformed into other forms of capital. Depending on the place
and dispositions of church members, the Chinese religious and cultural traditions may or
may not be positively received by members. In doing so, members are able move up in
their social positions and acquire the recognition and capacity to define what is legitimate
and valuable. Even though Christianity provides them with the means to resist negativity
associated with being Chinese in Malaysia, it also affords them cultural capital that is not
available to all. While the Chinese Christians gain extra capital, the Chinese Chinese are
denied these opportunities. As I will show in the next section, while Metro Church
members claim to be simultaneously Christian and Chinese, they privilege their Christian
commitments over other markers of identity. Hybridity thus is too simplistic to analyze
the potentially disguised deep-seated inequalities within marginalized groups. This is
especially evident when addressing the issue of syncretism.

Syncretism: The Dirty “S” Word
Syncretism is a contentious term that is usually associated with notions of
contamination and impurity. The term goes beyond the purview of religion, as it is also
associated with culture. In addition, syncretism has been burdened with many different
attributes, beginning with a negative view, to a more neutral stance, and finally a positive
reclamation of the term.376 In this section, I analyze some of the scholarship on
376

The scholarship on syncretism is vast and complex. The term itself is also problematic and
often serves the Christian missionary labeling of corruption and impurity. Some scholars have accused
syncretism as a term to belittle religions of less developed areas or peoples. At the same time, syncretism
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syncretism while interspersing it with my analysis of Metro Church members’ views on
religious and cultural mixing.
In Chapter Four, I analyzed how Metro Church members reconstitute Chinese
cultural celebrations and observations such as Chinese New Year and Qing Ming to
create a new understanding that is meaningful to church members. Conversion to
Christianity allows church members to add another layer of meaning to their Chinese
ethnicity. Even though Metro Church members are constantly negotiating their cultural
and ethnic identities, they are insistent in maintaining strict boundaries around their
religious beliefs and practices. They believe that syncretism and religious mixing will
corrupt their spiritual faculties, causing them to “backslide” in their Christian faith. I
should also point out that I am not interested in exploring the topic of syncretism along
theological arguments, such as examining the “authenticity” of Christian identities or
deciding who is “more Christian” than the other. Rather, I want to examine how Metro
Church members’ rigid outlook of Christianity contributes to unequal belonging.

denotes an amalgamation and hybridization of various distinctive cultural components. One of the most
complex parts of studying syncretism is the problem of definition. Syncretism is criticized as being either
too broad or too reductionistic to warrant any analytical purchase. It becomes a pejorative term when we
bring in issues of power, colonization, and domination. Additionally, syncretism is used interchangeably
alongside related concepts as hybridization and creolization in attempts to move away from the colonial
implications of the term. Religious scholars, anthropologists and cultural historians alike have tried to
develop syncretism as a more neutral term. Still, others are more concerned with the uses of syncretism
rather than trying to develop a useful definition to the term. For more information on the definitions and
problematic of syncretism, see Michael Pye, “Syncretism and Ambiguity,” in Numen 18 (1971): 83-93;
Andre Droogers, “Syncretism: The Problem of Definition, the Definition of the Problem,” in Dialogue and
Syncretism: An Interdisciplinary Approach, edited by Jerald Gort, et.al. (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans,
1989), 7-25; Stephan Palmié, “Against Syncretism: ‘Africanizing and ‘Cubanizing’ Discourses in North
American Orisa Worship,” in Counterworks: Managing the Diversity of Knowledge, edited by Richard
Fardon (New York: Routledge, 1995), 69-100; Charles Stewart, “Syncretism and its Synonyms: Reflections
on Cultural Mixture,” in Diacritics 29, no.3 (1999): 40-62; Karen L. King, “The Politics of Syncretism and
the Problem of Defining Gnosticism,” in Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historique 27, no.3 (2001): 461479; and Siv-Ellen Kraft, “To Mix of Not to Mix: Syncretism/Anti-Syncretism in the History of
Theosophy,” in Numen 49 (2002): 142-177.
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When I asked church members their views on Catholicism, many of them
expressed doubt that Catholics were real Christians, since they believe Catholicism runs
counter to their perceived orthodoxy of Christianity. For Mrs. Loring Gan, stepping into a
Catholic church was a “weird and scary” affair. When she attended a Catholic high
school in Kuala Lumpur, she was required to attend chapel every Friday. She said that
she hated the experience; the chapel frightened her because of “the weird foreign
statues.” She also described that she had to attend confession whenever she did
something wrong. Loring told me that she also found the nuns to be very intimidating and
cruel. Loring’s fear of statues points toward the Protestant aversion to idol worship. Like
Loring, Metro Church members’ biggest criticism about Catholicism is on the idolatrous
nature of Catholic worship of the Virgin Mary. The existence of saints and other rituals,
my informants claimed, were also in direct violation of Christian beliefs. They hold that
saints and the Virgin Mary supplant Jesus’ exclusive authority to save sinners, and that
praying to them violates the sovereignty of Jesus.
Orsi makes the claim in Between Heaven and Earth that Catholicism’s perceived
foreignness comes as a result of Protestant views on syncretism and orthodoxy. He argues
that scholars of religion are heavily Protestant-centric where beliefs and doctrines are
privileged over vulgar “material” religions such as Catholicism. He also argues that “the
modern world has assiduously and systematically disciplined the senses not to experience
sacred presence; the imaginations of the moderns are trained towards sacred absence.”377
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Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth,12. Orsi joins other thinkers such as Talal Asad in arguing
that categories such as “meaning-making” and “belief” cannot be accurately employed to understand
religion. See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and
Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). In moving away from religion as beliefs, Orsi
states that religions should be conceived as “lived.” See also Nancy Ammerman, ed., Everyday Religion:
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Instead, Orsi stresses the relational aspect of religion where tangibility is important in
negotiating various Catholic saints and religious figures. This experiential quality is
something that modernity and many Protestant religious scholars and practitioners have
found to be bizarre, shunning these sentiments in favor of thought and reason.378
Church members’ claims on the inherent syncretistic nature of Catholicism also
support the negative view of syncretism because they see syncretism as a corruption that
compromises Christianity’s unique message.379 In particular, missiologists and
theologians lament the blending of local religious practices with Christianity. For
example, Bengt Sundkler, a German Lutheran missionary who worked among the Bantu
people in South Africa during the 1930s, did not appreciate the blending of local Bantu
practices within the indigenous churches. He charged that the local Bantu Church had
become “the bridge over which Africans are brought back to heathenism.”380 Sundkler’s
claim corresponds with the discourse in Christian mission studies in which missionaries

Observing Modern Religious Lives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Robert Orsi, “The “So-Called
History” of the Study of Religion,” in Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 20 (2008): 134-138; and
Meredith McGuire, Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008). See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and
Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
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Robert Orsi, “When 2+2=5,” The American Scholar, Spring 2007,
http://theamericanscholar.org/when-2-2-5/#.UU4ymDd4-jY (accessed March 18, 2013).
The Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd edition defines syncretism as “a replacement or a
dilution of essential elements of the gospel.” Furthermore, syncretism is “traditionally… wrong,” and
“must be stopped or reversed.” The dictionary however, acknowledges the differences in expressions of
Christianity in various cultural and ethnic contexts. So, in resolving problems involving syncretism, the
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A.S. Moreau, “Syncretism,” in The Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd edition, edited by Walter A.
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379

380

Bengt Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 297.

223

were trying to make sense of the rise of localized independent churches in non-Western
lands.381 Here, the language associated with syncretism is one of erosion and corruption.
In what follows, I analyze four narratives of syncretism as a dilution of
Christianity. The examples below demonstrate how syncretism is associated by Metro
Church members with the unacceptable borrowing and mixing of non-Christian elements
into Christianity. Rosie Hung, who is in her late 20s recalls her childhood struggles with
being a Christian. She converted to Christianity in high school and her family converted
not too long after her conversion. But her father continued visiting Chinese temples while
attending church every Sunday. He also told her to accompany him to pray to the Chinese
gods. This created a lot of stress for Rosie and her family. Unable to reconcile to the idea
of having two competing and different religious systems, Rosie finally gave her father an
ultimatum to “make a decision and stop going to temples.” She told him to either
continue to pray to the Chinese deities or to put his faith wholeheartedly in Jesus. After a
painstakingly slow process, her father eventually decided to stop visiting temples and
chose only to attend church, much to Rosie’s delight. Recently, Rosie’s father gained the
ability to speak in tongues after receiving the baptism of the Holy Spirit. She and her
family interpreted this as an outward sign of God’s presence and blessing in his life.382
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For other examples, see J.D.Y. Peel, “Syncretism and Religious Change,” in Comparative
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In Pentecostal scholarship, the term “glossolalia” is commonly used to denote a particular kind
of linguistic ability born out of a religious experience in which Christians have been “gifted” with.
Glossolalia is also known as “free vocalization” – a connected sequence of speech sounds that do not
belong to the original language as well as unknown to the speaker. Some Pentecostals equate tongue
speaking as speaking the language of heaven, or God’s spirit. Whether or not these are actual
manifestations of God’s spirit as claimed by those who possess the ability to speak in tongues, is up for
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The important point to take into account here is Rosie’s ultimatum to her father.
The practice of straddling two competing religious systems was ultimately unacceptable
and she stressed that Chinese religious traditions are incompatible with Christianity.
Rosie cannot mix these two different religions together. Syncretistic beliefs and what she
and other church members refer to as appropriating other religious traditions that run
contrary to Christianity are instances of backsliding from the Christian faith. For church
members, backsliding implies a regression of one’s Christian faith back to a preconversion state where God ceases to be the central focus of one’s life.
Similar to Rosie, college student Justin Chang also believes that a true Christian
cannot subscribe to two differing religious views. He claims that Christians who blend
Christianity with Chinese religious practices are confused. He believes that if one reads
the Bible carefully, syncretistic blending of religions should not even be entertained: “If
they have gone to Bible Study, they should know that they shouldn’t do it.” He also adds
that those Christians who continue to engage in syncretistic practices need to re-evaluate

debate. The meaning and significance of speaking in tongues have caused a stir in psychological, linguistic,
sociological, anthropological, philological, and cultural studies. In addition, non-glossolalist Christians,
usually mainline and some sectors of evangelical Christians are suspicious of Pentecostal Christians’
pneumatic claims. Nevertheless, with the ever increasing number of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christians
in the Global South, this phenomenon cannot be easily dismissed as pathological behavior. See for
example, William J. Samarin, Tongues of Men and Angels: The Religious Language of Pentecostalism
(New York: Macmillan, 1972); Felicitas Goodman, Speaking in Tongues: A Cross-Cultural Study of
Glossolalia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); Nils G. Holm, “Pentecostalism: Conversion and
Charismata,” in International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 1, no.3 (1991): 135-151; Mark J.
Cartledge, “Interpreting Charismatic Experience: Hypnosis, Altered States of Consciousness and the Holy
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Apostolic Faith Mission, Zimbabwe,” in Studies in World Christianity 17, no.1 (2011): 12-29; and W. Paul
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their beliefs and re-read the Bible so that they can repent and obey God’s
commandments.
For Metro Church members, syncretism also involves practicing exercise
techniques that they perceive to be “spiritual” in nature such as yoga and Qi Gong. I
asked Tiffany Feng about her views regarding Christians who participate in yoga. As a
health instructor herself, she consciously avoids yoga in her own fitness regime. She and
many Metro Church members understand yoga as a devious method employed by
ungodly forces to corrupt the Christian believer from God. Tiffany claims that although
there is much debate about yoga being “just an exercise,” she has heard stories that in
reality, yoga is the practice of worshipping other gods and objects, namely the sun. So,
she simply chooses to stay away from yoga. Finally, I asked Janet Lim about her views
on traditional Chinese martial arts and exercise such as Tai Chi and Qi Gong. Janet, who
grew up in a “traditional” Chinese family, finds nothing wrong with the practice of Tai
Chi since it is “just an exercise” that promotes healthy breathing techniques and body
movements. However, she rejects the practice of Qi Gong. She claims that it was a form
of martial arts that cultivates the qi, or life energy. She also claims that Qi Gong promotes
access to higher realms of awareness and consciousness, which raises all sorts of red
flags for her. For Janet, practicing Qi Gong is akin to tapping into forces that may not
come from God. Indeed, only God is in control of her awareness and life.
Rosie, Justin, Tiffany, and Janet’s narratives do not appear to leave much room
for flexibility and adaptation. They set boundaries on their Christian identity and exclude
syncretistic practices that they deem as forbidden by the teachings of the Bible. This
echoes Murray Rubinstein’s study on Taiwanese Pentecostals. In “Holy Spirit Taiwan:
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Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity in the Republic of China,” she observes that
Taiwanese Pentecostals are careful to use the Bible “as the basis for all statements and
arguments they make about the way the supernatural and the natural realms are
constituted [and] as the moral basis for all acts and behaviors of individuals in
society.”383 Indeed, Metro Church members are quick to condemn syncretistic acts as
moments of inauthenticity and as signs of backsliding in one’s faith commitments.
While church members reconstitute their traditional Chinese cultural practices
through the lens of their Christian faith, they are generally unreflective of their Christian
beliefs; Christianity is accepted as is. The burden lies in conforming Chinese cultural
practices to religious identities.384 While traditional Chinese practices undergo intense
scrutiny in their Christian commitments, this does not seem to apply to Christian beliefs.
Why? Also, why is there a strong opposition against a syncretistic religious identity?
Here, I find it important to bring Bourdieu back into the discussion. Metro Church
members are constrained to the habitus in which they unconsciously internalize their
ways of living as natural. Moreover, Metro Church members occupy positions in various
fields. In this scheme, fields are networks of relations between individuals and
institutions competitively engaged in the accumulation of capital. In this case, church
members occupy a religious field. As I have already explored in Chapter Four, Metro
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The privileging of Christian beliefs and traditions are evident even though Christianity itself is
a thoroughly hybridized religion. See Eric Maroney, Religious Syncretism (London: SCM Press, 2006).
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Church members converted to Christianity because it would, in part, provide them access
to cultural capital.
To reiterate, for Bourdieu, habitus is largely unconscious and “contains the
solution to the paradoxes of objective meaning without subjective intention. It is the
source of these strings of ‘moves’ that are objectively organized as strategies without
being the product of a genuine strategic intention.”385 Therefore, the accumulation of
capital is a strategy within the religious field. Bourdieu is particularly concerned with
how powerful positions within a field can perpetrate symbolic violence on less powerful
agents. Cultural mechanisms such as education and cultural knowhow may impose
dominant perspectives on the rest of the population in order to legitimate power. Since
the overarching theme of Bourdieu’s work is exposing the sources and reproduction of
social inequality, his concept of the religious field is especially helpful in studying the
relationship between religion, class, and power.
Habitus plays an important role in explaining why Christianity is privileged over
Chinese traditions. The social field they belong to predisposes them to articulate a
Christian identity at the expense Chinese culture. Through this unconscious privileging of
Christianity, Metro Church members are engaged in unequal belonging. For example,
spiritual warfare is a central issue for Metro Church members. More than once during my
fieldwork, I heard sermons reinforcing this idea. In particular, these sermons speak of
non-Christian sacred spaces as places where the evil forces dwell. For example, Vesak is
an important celebration for Buddhists in the country. Church members often receive
invitations from their Buddhist friends to participate in these celebrations in temples.
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Pastor Wu discourages church members from attending these celebrations and justifies
this by arguing that the Christian God is a “jealous God.” More importantly, he says,
visiting Chinese temples and attending Chinese religious festivals may lead to spiritual
attacks by demonic forces.
While Metro Church members may be at a positional disadvantage compared to
the majority Malay population of Malaysia, they hold distinctive advantage in terms of
education and knowledge of western worldviews; conversion to Christianity is one of the
ways to increase this advantage. Thus, church members construct Chinese identities that
resist and move away from the imposed stereotypical Chinese images by the majority
Malays. Nonetheless, they construct these identities at the expense of non-Christian and
non-English speaking Chinese (i.e. the Chinese Chinese). To this end, church members
cause symbolic violence – the unnoticed and partly unconscious domination that
everyday social habits maintain over the conscious subject – on non-Christian Chinese.
The acquisition of cultural capital that is supposed to empower the Chinese minority in
Malaysia also reinforces the negative and essentializing stereotypes associated with
Chinese Malaysians toward the Chinese Chinese. When we utilize unequal belonging to
analyze the current discourse of hybridity, we begin to see how hybridity may not always
be a tool of resistance. There are different types of Chinese groups within the rubric of
Chinese Malaysians, and some groups hold “higher” status than others. In this case, it is
the westernized-Christian Chinese of Metro Church that have more access to cultural
capital than others. Hybridity becomes too unyielding as a concept to nuance the highly
complex social context of the Malaysian Chinese community.
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From a Negative Syncretism to a Positive Hybridity
In the previous section, I analyzed Metro Church members’ privileging and
maintenance of Christian identity over their Chinese ethnic identity as an instance of
unequal belonging. Despite suffering a double minority status as Chinese and Christians
in Malaysia, a Christian identity affords the Chinese members of Metro Church access to
cultural capital. In particular, Christianity endows them with modern western knowledge
and mastery of English.386 I demonstrated that Metro Church members’ views of
syncretism are entrenched along a religious framework that denotes a corruption of faith.
However, syncretism, as an analytical category, goes beyond the confines religion;
various scholars have utilized this category in their respective fields of study. While
theologians and missionaries associate syncretism with corruption of Christian beliefs,
interestingly, early anthropologists also share these same views. Although
anthropologists do not have a stake in any particular religious commitments and
affiliations, they also perceive syncretism as a dilution and corruption of purity. The
difference is that anthropologists view syncretism as a loss of authentic and pure cultures.
Similar to theologians and missiologists, early twentieth century anthropologists
such as Franz Boas viewed culture as distinct, isolated, and self-contained. Boas argues
that it is only when different groups of people come into contact with one another
through hunting, trade, and migration, that cultural mixing and appropriation would
occur. Boas, an influential figure in anthropology, developed the concept of diffusionism
to challenge the biological determination and racist assumptions found in early
386
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anthropological writings that categorzied the progression of various world cultures in a
hierarchical relationship to European civilization.387 Instead, he focused on the
distribution of traits among different cultures. For Boas, culture is distinct and possesses
its own inner dynamism that is shaped by its own particular historical, social, and
psychological context.388 Thus, Boas privileges cultural differences over similarities.
By the 1940s, American anthropologists developed a more positive attitude
toward syncretism. For instance, Melville Herskovits’ The Myth of the Negro Past,
published in 1941, debunks the idea that African Americans did not possess any cultural
past. A student of Boas, Herskovits conceptualized a tree-like model of cultural
diffusionism; he identifying the African American’s original source from West Africa.389
Herskovits traces the histories and cultures of African Americans and argues for the
continuation of the black peoples of West Africa and those in the United States.
Herskovits’ model of syncretism reflects the post-World War II social movement
to consolidate and create a single national identity out of the various (i.e. different)
groups of peoples living in the Americas.390 More importantly, his version of syncretism
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is one of survival and continuation of cultural meanings and identities. Rather than an
instance of corruption, Herskovits sees syncretism as a valuable concept to evaluate how
diverse cultures can become integrated and assimilated into dominant society. The
problem with Herskovits’ model is that acculturation is conceived in terms of
progression, such that “if a person is placed in a new cultural setting he or she will
acculturate progressively, proceeding along a continuum towards some ultimate
completion.”391 Despite Herskovits’ positive affirmation of syncretism as a process of
cultural integration, his idea of syncretism is based on a teleological outlook. He remains
entrenched in the modern European idea of culture as a set of rigid, predictable patterns.
Thus, syncretism is seen as a liminal stage and an unfinished expression of culture that
ultimately leads to cultural assimilation.392
Despite Metro Church’s negative attitudes on syncretism, no religion remains
immune to mixing and boundary-crossings. Certainly, many Christians do not deny that

is much more developed in the American continent. Thus, the affirmative stance on syncretism contributed
towards the development of the “melting pot” ideology in the United States in the 1940s. Indeed, the New
World and African contexts presented very different political situations that made for different
anthropological fieldwork experience. British anthropologists concentrated most of their research in the
African continent, where many regions were still under the yoke of European colonial powers. Meanwhile,
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some level of mixing and appropriation is and has been present in Christianity.393 Hendrik
Kraemer argues in The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World that syncretism,
while “a necessary and normal trait in the religions that live on the primitive
apprehension of existence,” is illegitimate.394 Kraemer, an Indologist turned missionary
in Dutch Indonesia in the 1930s, argues that “Biblical realism” is a form of ideal
Christianity in direct contrast to syncretism.395 Therefore, syncretism is incompatible with
Christianity. He believes that missionaries establishing local indigenous churches as “a
systematic attempt to combine, blend and reconcile inharmonious, even conflicting,
religious elements in a new so-called synthesis.”396 Kraemer tries to reconcile syncretism
with the missionary imperative and observes that syncretism is an inevitable effect of
inculturation. Kraemer’s fear of syncretism is based on syncretism’s ability to alter
Christianity’s core beliefs and identities. As such, great care must be taken to distinguish
between the negative category of syncretism and the neutral “absorption” of nonChristian elements into Christianity.397
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It is important to point out that Metro Church members’ concerns about
syncretism are less about cultural mixing than about religious loyalties and competing
sources of spiritual power. Although there appears to be a clear demarcation between
“real” and “backslid” Christians, they point out that they are less concerned with
“cultural” mixing that does not violate the teachings of the Bible.398 One topic that is
repeatedly discussed is how to behave at a traditional Chinese funeral. The answers are
varied. Many church members speak of substituting joss sticks with flowers in Chinese
funeral rites. Others continue to hold joss sticks, but maintain that this is permissible as
long as there is no intentionality behind it. For example, Mrs. Loring Gan did not see why
there was such a “big fuss” with holding joss sticks since they were merely objects. For
her, the act of offering joss sticks to the deceased “means nothing.” Accordingly, the
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ultimate goal of holding and using joss sticks during Chinese funerals is to “pay respect
to the dead and not to make a scene.”
Justin Chang does not share Loring’s views. He recalls an experience at a
traditional Chinese funeral where his family refrained from performing acts that they
construed as non-Christian. These acts involved using joss sticks to offer prayers for the
deceased, bowing before the coffin, and burning “hell money.” Justin reasons that the
Bible is specific in forbidding such practices. Unlike Loring’s explanation, Justin
believes that the practice of accommodating Chinese religious practices can be a slippery
slope and engaging in such practices might ultimately erode their Christian faith. The
examples above point out Metro Church members’ tensions in reconciling their Chinese
and Christian identities even though church members have an exclusivist view of
Christianity,
Some scholars have made attempts to nuance this difficult category by arguing for
a compartmentalization of identity markers. Nicole Constable’s fieldwork among Hakka
Christians in Hong Kong examines how they make sense of their Chinese, Christian, and
Hakka identities. In Christian Souls and Chinese Spirits: A Hakka Community in Hong
Kong, she argues that the Hakka community in Hong Kong has developed a sophisticated
mechanism to create distinctions between the essentials of Christianity, and the
secularization of Chinese religious practices.399 In doing so, Constable concludes that
Hakka Christians are able to respect both their Chinese past and Christian present.400
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Certainly, Constable’s research provides some explanation for the tensions in
reconciling Metro Church members’ Chinese and Christian identities. However, I do not
think that these compartmentalizations exist in a harmonious fashion or as a conscious
process. While I am not disputing Constable’s findings, they do not capture the specific
contextuality of Malaysian Chinese Christians. Constable does not address why Christian
beliefs are held intact and free of scrutiny while Chinese culture and tradition are
subjected to an extensive process of rationalization and secularization. Finally, she does
not explain why one “compartment” is more important than another.
Edwin Zehner’s study on evangelical Christians in Thailand also attempts to offer
an explanation about reconciling Christian and cultural beliefs. In “Orthodox
Hybridities,” Zehner examines how different sorts of hybridities are deployed among
converted Thai Christians. In effect, this enables a conversion to Christianity that is
grounded in personal experience and at the same time appears as orthodox, which is
important in evangelical Christianity.401 These “orthodox hybridities” help reconcile Thai
Christians’ localized setting with the transcultural character of evangelical Christianity.402
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Zehner notes that his purpose is not to merely point out that “processes of self-hybridity
happen,”403 but to find out the mechanisms that are at work. He argues:
One of the reasons that converts can be creative while legitimately assuming
themselves to be orthodox is because the effect of the evangelicals’ antisyncretistic gaze is to focus awareness on certain areas of concern while
perceiving other kinds of cultural mixing as always their own. In other words, at
the same time that it contests some hybridities, evangelical anti-syncretism also
produces a psychological denial of the hybridity occurring in other areas of
thought and behavior.404
Zehner attempts to nuance the concept of hybridity explaining how certain people hold in
tension their orthodox and essentialized identities while allowing the hybridizing process
to occur in their day-to-day lives.405 This is a negotiative strategy to reconcile between
traditions that appear to be incommensurable. Like Constable, Zehner’s argument fails to
capture the workings of Metro Church members. The notion of picking and mixing
cultural elements does not consider the social locations and positionalities of the social
actor. While it is important to recognize the role of agency, it is also equally important to
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explore how agency is exercised within a system of social constrains, linked to the actor’s
positionalities within specific social contexts.406
Even though there is a privileging of Christianity over Chinese cultural traditions
among Metro Church members, the struggle to negotiate their Chineseness and Christian
faith is constrained by the field of play in a Bourdieuan sense. As I argued in Chapter
Three, the socialized setting of Chinese Malaysians during the British colonial period
creates the habitus that predisposes them to behave in certain unconscious ways. In
essence, they are constrained by their historically inherited cultural givens. Accordingly,
these givens involve respect for traditional Chinese culture and language, Chinese
business savvy, and Confucian ideals. As a minority group, they continue to find utility
and emotional connection with these Chinese cultural givens. In addition, they fit well
with certain elements of western Christian beliefs and practices.The habitus helps to
structure Metro Church members as members of the Chinese community in Malaysia.
The cultural patterns informed through the habitus continue to manifest and exert
influence on the structures imposed in their lives.
At the same time, within this habitus allows for the agency of church members to
create strategic moves to navigate the social field of Chineseness in Malaysia. Strategy,
in this sense, emerges from the habitus to alter the structure of the field. Becoming
Christian, then, involves a strategic move to gain social capital in an environment that
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marginalizes Chinese Malaysians. Nevertheless, strategy is rooted in a practical logic that
is the emergent product of habitus and the social fields in which habitus is
contextualized. It is the institutional arrangements set up by groups that specify the
appropriate means by which goals are to be pursued. Thus, agents individually or
collectively deploy strategies to improve or defend their positions in relation to other
social agents. Although one can argue that Metro Church members privilege a Christian
identity as a strategy to improve their situation in Malaysia, this unequal belonging of
privileging Christian identity disempowers other non-Christian Chinese. As I
demonstrated in Chapter Four, access to capital is limited because only westernizedChinese, what I have called Modern Chinese, have access to this capital.
Carsten Colpe critiques the parallel outlook of syncretism within both
anthropology and religious studies. He suggests that syncretism needs to move beyond
the purview of missionaries and theologians and without its theological and religious
baggage. In his description of syncretism in Mircea Eliade’s Encyclopedia of Religion, he
states that anthropologists and social scientists should explore the function of syncretism
by providing a “socio-psychological clarification of readiness for the balancing,
subordination and unification of truth.”407 In doing so, Colpe suggests that scholars
develop their own interpretive lens rather than relying on historically perceived meanings
of syncretism.
Contemporary anthropologists have since rejected the early model of cultural
contact and syncretism. Instead, they maintain that cultures have always been syncretistic
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at any given point of time.408 Ulf Hannerz suggests that hybridization is now the rule, not
the exception. According to Hannerz, complex and asymmetrical flows have reshaped
cultures which, given existing forms and meanings of culture are not likely to result in
global homogenization. He maintains that “emerging hybridized webs of meaning” are
neither spurious nor inauthentic cultures.409 Syncretism is a natural and neutral process.
Postcolonial and postmodern scholars such as Edward Said and James Clifford have also
debunked the earlier approaches to syncretism. Clifford argues that syncretism is not a
type of “transition” stage that would disappear as soon as the process of assimilation and
acculturation is finished.410 All cultural traditions, including religious traditions, are
based on some kind of interaction either internally or externally. As Said states, “all
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cultures are involved in one another; none is simple and pure, all are hybrid,
heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated and unmonolithic.”411
While recognizing the syncretistic nature of cultures and religions may be an
inescapable fact, pointing this out often amounts to expressions of power, exclusion, and
control. Recent developments in the study of syncretism focus on the use of syncretism as
a means of exclusion. In particular, essentialized identities become associated with power
and domination. When identities become fixed, it is easy for regimes of power to create
boundaries and decide who to include or exclude. Rosalind Shaw and Charles Stewart
contend that the enterprise of identifying and describing syncretistic practices is not
particularly helpful or useful.412 They argue instead that an examination of the processes
and discourses surrounding syncretism would yield a more fruitful scholarly endeavor.
They propose a reconceptualization of the study of syncretism as an uncovering process
rather than simply a descriptive project. In other words, scholars should be more
concerned with the question of “why is there such an antagonistic attitude towards
syncretism?” rather than “what is syncretism?” Shaw and Stewart argue that antisyncretistic attitudes are frequently associated with the maintenance of purity and
religious boundaries.413 Thus, persons whose power and privilege are legitimized by the
maintenance of boundaries under the guise of religious authenticity are more likely to
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feel threatened by syncretism because it challenges the fictive nature of religious
boundaries.
Similarly, Otto Maduro argues in “On the Theoretical Politics of Defining
‘Religion,’” that religions are:
little more than scholarly concurrence with and re-legitimations of politics and
theological attempts by ruling elites to disqualify, marginalize, and eventually
stamp out any claims or attempts to modify, disrupt, or subvert the prevailing
power arrangements, ‘religious’ or otherwise.414
Nevertheless, Maduro suggests that we should not abandon the category “religion”
altogether. Rather, he proposes religion as “lived within the modality of multiple
simultaneous religious allegiances.”415 Syncretism, for Maduro, is one of the possible
outcomes of religious practitioners belonging to these alliances.416 Maduro and Shaw and
Stewart’s examples demonstrate how syncretism is no longer viewed negatively. Rather,
syncretism has the potential to be a method of resistance against dominant discourses of
essentialism because it exposes the fictitious nature of religious boundaries.
For example, Linda Thomas’ study of the African Independent Church in South
Africa contends that early European missionary efforts to stamp out any vestiges of
African indigenous culture and religion maintained by converted Africans is predicated
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on cultural superiority on the part of the missionaries.417 Therefore, Africans were not
considered to be equal to whites and indigenous religious practices were regarded as
unimportant and demonic.418 Despite these efforts, she argues that the church’s religious
cosmology is derived from a synthesis of precolonial African religion and Protestant
Christianity. In particular, black church members developed healing rituals to reorient
and reinvent their social reality as a mode of resistance against the country’s Apartheid
policy. Although it was not a macro (i.e. official and large-scale) resistance against
Apartheid, Thomas insists that this syncretistic reappropriation of “microorder” (i.e.
mundane, everyday actions) symbols received from Christian missionaries enabled poor
black South Africans to “disempower Apartheid structures, to assist marginalized persons
to assert their own self-determined religious identity, and to create order in a chaotic
macroworld.”419
So far, I have examined syncretism’s complex history from its early association
with notions of contamination and impurity to its positive reclamation as a mode of
resistance against power regimes that advocate exclusionist notions of purity. If we
accept Said’s assertion that all cultures are hybrid, then our analysis must move toward
syncretism’s utility in an increasingly globalized world. As Stewart states, “
in a world that valorizes purity and authenticity, it is crucial to attend to the ways
in which syncretism is negotiated… Furthermore, denials of syncretism, whether
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by academic analysts or the people under study, are every bit as interesting where
the compositeness of religious traditions is recognized and accepted.420
In the next section, I shall explore postcolonialism, in particular, Bhabha’s contribution to
the notion of hybridity as a site of resistance. Yet, as I will also demonstrate, hybridity
fails to pay attention to the complex workings of power and privilege that are
unconsciously embedded in the Chinese members of Metro Church. In particular,
unequal belonging demonstrates that not every Chinese Malaysian stands to benefit from
the deployment of hybridity.

Unequal Belonging and its Implications on Postcolonial Discourse
Postcolonial scholars have written extensively on how cultures and identities are
composites that are continuously in flux. Yet, they are utterly imbued with unequal
power. Thus, within these composites and cultural mixings lies the potential for
resistance and dominance. Resistance can manifest itself in many forms, and one of the
ways to examine this is through the lens of performance.421 Syncretism as a form of
performance and play views the social actor as an active agent engaged in individual and
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collective tinkering of traditions to suit contextual needs.422 The work of Bhabha is most
famous for articulating and demonstrating how hybridity, when deployed by
marginalized communities, possesses transgressive and resistive qualities within the
interstices of social structure that often leave little to no room for such possibilities.
Bhabha believes that the agential creativity of the social actor in constructing
hybrid identities can not only bypass binary constructions of identity, but also create a
potential for resistance.423 Bhabha’s draws his ideas from the works of Lacan, Derrida,
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and especially Foucault. In particular, he is influenced by Foucault’s idea of power as
more than a coercive or repressive force that wills people to do things against their
wishes; power can be a productive and resistive force.424 Bhabha’s argument on
hybridity’s creative possibilities for resistance within deeply embedded power structures
is informed by Foucault’s insistence that there is always a possibility of reversal and
subversion within power structures. What is compelling about Bhabha’s argument is the
idea that the marginalized can act subversively in spite of the oppressor’s dominance. The
negotiated aspect of the encounter, even in the face of unfavorable odds, is what allows
for agency among the marginalized. As Bhabha notes, “forms of popular rebellion and
mobilization are often most subversive and transgressive when they are created through...
cultural practices.”425 For Bhabha, the condition of hybridity has become an occasion for
marginalized groups to “mess around” and resist essentializing and hegemonic discourses
of purity. Bhabha’s assertion of hybridity as a creative source of agency and resistance
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against oppression has not only opened up fruitful discussions on the instability of
dominant structures, but also on strategies of resistance in least expected spaces.426
Since all cultures and religions possess composite origins and individuals and
communities continually reconstitute them, Bhabha argues that the very presence of the
Native (Other) creates a disruptive space against colonial discourse. For example, Bhabha
describes a nineteenth century account of a native Indian Christian’s missionary efforts to
convert a local village in Delhi. As a mode of resistance, he points out the villagers’
performative agency by refusing communion administered by a vegetarian, insisting
instead that a meat-eater should serve them communion.427 Bhabha sees this as an
instance of “spectacular resistance.” Yet, as I discovered in my fieldwork, Metro Church
members’ commitment to the Christian faith is unflinching. They take their faith
seriously and they make every effort to follow their Christian commitments as closely as
possible. There is no reason for me to doubt the authenticity of my informants’ religious
convictions. While I do not dismiss the fact that their convictions may be construed as
“performance,” this may not be a sufficient explanation. We need to further explore the
social field and context of Metro Church members, how this field structures and
privileges certain behaviors, and how they optimize access to capital.
As I indicated in Chapter One, not everyone agrees with Bhabha’s positive
assertion of hybridity as a site of resistance. Apart from the critiques of excessive
emphases on textual deconstruction, abstract theorizing and disengagement with the real
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world, I stress that hybridity cannot account for the situated and complex narratives of the
Chinese members of Metro Church. I want to pay more attention to the intricate network
of power relations that exist within marginalized groups. For the Chinese members of
Metro Church, they are constantly negotiating their Chineseness and “Christian-ness.”
Thus, there are many intersecting and competing fields in which Metro Church members
belong. In the struggle to gain access to capital, church members privilege their Christian
identity, consciously and unconsciously, over their Chinese ethnic identity.
It might appear that Bourdieu is restricting agency within the confines of habitus.
This is not the case; Bourdieu believes that habitus, as “systems of transposable
dispositions,” is not a static and unchanging structure that governs social behavior. He is
not, after all, a structuralist. Therefore, instances of resistance do manifest themselves.
Yet, while Bourdieu allows space for resistance, the agential capacity of the social actor
is directed towards adjustments to the field, and the leverage is largely determined by the
shape of the existing field. As Bourdieu states, “[agents] can succeed only to the extent
that… they manage to reactivate dispositions which previous processes of inculcation
have deposited in people’s bodies.”428 In other words, to radically alter the field is
tantamount to “social death.” So, resistance may be present in hybridity, but it is done
within the confines of habitus. This presents a more accurate picture of the Chinese
members of Metro Church position, rather than the nebulous “free for all” form of
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resistance that Bhabha advocates. Nevertheless, the unconscious privileging of their
Christian identity, this unequal belonging, is what creates symbolic violence toward the
non-Christian Chinese. Hybridity becomes a blanketing statement that does not fully
examine the complex, inter-twining, and unconscious jockeying for positions within the
field of cultural production. Indeed, the westernized-English-speaking Chinese Christians
are socially and culturally higher than non-English-speaking, and non-Christian. Metro
Church members perceive non-Christians Chinese as backward and superstitious people.
Thus, it is not always the case that syncretism and hybridity lead to subversion or towards
a more respectful, open, and tolerant community.
Unequal belonging reminds us that we must continue to be vigilant against
romanticized notions of resistance and agency. As such, I propose a more “balanced”
approach by paying credence to both simultaneous empowerment and oppression among
marginalized communities. Julie Ingersoll is careful to point out the univocality of such
studies of empowerment. She argues that univocality “not only marginalizes alternative
views, but… also masks important aspects of religious phenomena. It has had the
paradoxical effect of silencing the feminist women within these traditions.”429 Unequal
belonging demonstrates how we need to pay attention to the different modalities of
actions that marginalized groups such as Chinese members of Metro Church could enact.
In Robert Orsi’s Thank You, St. Jude: Women’s Devotion to the Patron Saint of
Hopeless Causes, he argues that Catholic devotional culture has served to hurt women as
conspirators against themselves. For the women who devoted themselves to St. Jude, the
429

Julie Ingersoll, “Against Univocality: Re-reading Ethnographies of Conservative Women,” in
Personal Knowledge and Beyond: Reshaping the Ethnography or Religion, edited by James V. Spickard, J.
Shawn Landres, and Meredith B. McGuire (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 164.

249

saint empowered the women to take action for themselves and “moved from being the
victim of circumstances to the narrator of them.”430 Nevertheless, Orsi also contends that
this leaves gender roles unchallenged. He sums up women’s status in a patriarchal world
in a poignant statement: “Devotionalism was made for and against women.”431 It is
precisely Orsi’s unwillingness to objectify women either as pawns/victims of the male
Catholic hierarchy or as fully agential individuals utilizing the cult of St. Jude to liberate
themselves that I draw my influence; it is this tension that I want to highlight. The
univocality of Bhabha and other postcolonial scholars’ claims of empowerment and
resistance within hybrid identities can serve to mask power and privilege of the
marginalized Chinese in Malaysia.
Indeed, syncretism and hybridity do not necessarily lead to subversion or towards
a more open, respectful, and tolerant community. For example, while Peter van der Veer
agrees that syncretism is a “useless term” as a descriptive project, he cautions against the
romanticism associated with syncretism as a solution to sectarianism, nationalism,
ethnocentrism, and religious intolerance.432 He wonders if syncretism truly offers a global
possibility for the merging of religious difference, or if syncretism functions as a code
word for the incorporation and assimilation of “minority” cultures into the culture of the
dominant group. Van der Veer examines Hindu-Muslim syncretism in India by citing the
example of Hindu reverence of a Sufi tomb. He argues that concepts such as “tolerance”
and “harmony” do not figure at all with Hindu and Muslim worshippers. Rather, they are
430
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more concerned with issues of orthodoxy and “right belief.”433 It remains to be seen if
minority Muslims are comfortable with Hindus incorporating their religious traditions
into the majority whole. From van der Veer’s example, it is not clear if syncretism would
necessarily lead to respect and communal harmony. 434
Birgitta Frello argues that scholars should be more concerned with analyzing
rather than describing “transgression concepts,” such as hybridity, in order to “open up
new fields and new possibilities for critique.”435 It is one thing to make descriptive claims
about hybrid identities, but it is another thing to examine its utility and effectiveness in
resisting structures of oppression. As Ella Shohat reminds us in “Notes on the
Postcolonial,” hybridity must be examined in a non-universalizing manner. It has to be
contextualized; scholars must question “who is mobilizing what in the articulation of the
past, deploying what identities, identifications, and representations, and in the name of
what political visions and goals.”436 In short, hybridity fails to capture the complexity of
identity formation on a contextual level. For Anne McClintock, the question of displacing
authority through hybridity:
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entails interrogating more than the ambivalences of form; it also entails
interrogating the messy imprecisions of history, the embattled negotiations and
strategies of the disempowered, the militarization of masculinity, the elision of
women from political and economic power, the decisive foreclosures of ethnic
violence and so on. Ambivalence may well be a critical aspect of subversion, but
it is not a sufficient agent of colonial failure.437
While I commend the possibilities of opening up new spaces for creating agency and
resistance among marginalized communities, my analysis reveals that Metro Church
members are engaged in unequal belonging, rejecting certain identity markers while
privileging others.438 Thus, we can further nuance hybridity by incorporating Bourdieu’s
approach towards power and resistance. Bourdieu provides better theoretical grounding
for my analysis of the unequal belonging among Chinese Pentecostals in Malaysia, an
analysis that adds to and compliments Bhabha’s theory of hybridity.
Bourdieu’s theoretical prinicples are not an untroubled declaration of how the
presence of hybrid identities alone would necessarily elicit a situation of resistance and
liberation. Indeed, Bourdieu reminds us to be more attentive to the lived conditions of
people on the ground. Because there are instances of unequal belonging in the identities
of Metro Church members, we need to be careful with our wholesale adoption of
hybridity as the answer to oppression and enforced identities. In relation to postcolonial
studies, there needs to be greater care in examining how marginalized communities can
437
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potentially recapitulate oppressive structures on other marginalized groups and within
their own communities.

Conclusion
Despite contemporary efforts to analyze and complexify the nature of hybrid
identities, postcolonial scholars tend to assume the existence of an antagonistic
relationship between the powerful and the marginalized. In addition, postcolonialism’s
muddiness and obtuse prose is often divorced from the local political and social terrain.
The history of colonialism in Malaysia plays a pivotal role in the reification of ethnic and
religious identities. As I have demonstrated in Chapter Two, the British colonial
administration in the late 1800s and early 1900s constructed and reified the ethnic and
religious categories in Malaysia. The Chinese who migrated to the country became
associated with images of greedy foreign invaders. This image continues to manifest
itself in contemporary Malaysia along rigid ethnic and religious boundaries. Based on
this observation, the Chinese Christian community in Malaysia is doubly oppressed. For
the members of Metro Church, they construct fluid and hybrid ethnic and religious
identities as a strategy to resist these essentialized categories. Their very presence
disrupts bounded notions of culture, religion, and ethnicity.
While hybridity, as a useful analytical concept, begins to describe the construction
of Chinese identities in Malaysia, it fails to pay attention to the web of inter-connectivity
and unequal belonging not just between the powerful and the marginalized, but also
within the marginalized community. Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, and capital are
helpful tools to analyze Chinese Pentecostals as they negotiate their identities as Chinese,
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Christian, and Malaysian. Because Metro Church’s congregants are disproportionately
from the urban, middle to upper class sector (i.e. westernized) of the Malaysian Chinese
population, these identities may not necessarily act as sites of resistance. To this end, this
chapter argued that unequal belonging highlights that hybridity, although a useful and
helpful term, fails to capture the layered and horizontal workings of privilege and power
that are inherent within marginalized groups.
This chapter also demonstrated that Metro Church members are engaged in
unequal belonging, privileging one marker of their identity over another. It is unequal
because not all Chinese Malaysians are the same: some have “higher” status than others.
By constructing an identity that privileges a western-oriented Christianity, this move
constitutes an important strategy in the struggle against Chinese peoples’ precarious
position in Malaysia. Yet, it also creates a situation of unequal belonging in which urban
Chinese Christians hold power and influence over the non-Christian Chinese who have
limited access to capital.
Hybridity, as an analytical concept, points out sites of intense contestation and
tension, while illustrating that the struggle over its meaning and utility has wide-ranging
cultural, economic, and political implications. It is this tension that I have tried to
demonstrate in this dissertation. It is this tension that is at play in the construction of
identities within the Chinese members of Metro Church in Malaysia. Ultimately, this
project proves that we must continue to probe and nuance hybridity’s power to
undermine structures of authority and dominance.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

If identity is everywhere, it is nowhere. If it is fluid, how can we understand the
ways in which self-understandings may harden, congeal, and crystallize? If it is
constructed, how can we understand the sometimes coercive force of external
identifications? If it is multiple, how do we understand the terrible singularity that
is often striven for – and sometimes realized – by politicians seeking to transform
mere categories into unitary and exclusive groups? How can we understand the
power and pathos of identity politics?
— Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups.439

Brubaker’s insights on the issues surrounding identitiy formation deserve to be
taken seriously. In my own research context, I observed and analyzed the highly complex
formation of identities among Metro Church members. As I interacted with my research
participants in this specific context, I noticed how they live their lives in tension with
multiple aspects of their identity such as their religious commitments, ethnic
demarcations, and place in Malaysian society. Church members are constantly
negotiating different and competing loyalties and allegiances. These intersecting loyalties
led me develop my concept of unequal belonging which questions how hybridity may or
may not function as a site of resistance.
Postcolonial scholars, especially Bhabha, posit that cultural borrowing and
interpenetration are part of the very nature of cultures. As such, identities – be they
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national, ethnic, or religious – are fraught with instabilities in the face of the globalized
world. Static and fixed grounding in identities is not neutral but possesses the power to
exclude other groups that do not “fit in.” For Bhabha, hybridity’s displacement and
mixture gives rise to a “Third Space” from which one can detect, critique and reject
colonialism’s failed project of promoting purity and polarity.440 Hybridity is a strategy for
disrupting exclusionary and oppressive notions of a pure identity among
marginalized/minority communities. I challenged this notion by introducing the idea of
unequal belonging where hybridity may not always be a site of resistance.
In Malaysia, the ruling government’s ongoing policies that essentialize race and
religion to contain conflicts between the dominant Malays and the Chinese and Indian
minorities have created rigid ethnic and religious demarcation. Hybridity should be
celebrated and deployed against structures of oppression. Yet, I have argued that
hybridity, while an exceptionally useful category, also fails to address issues of unequal
power relations. To this end, I utilized Bourdieu’s sociological lens to nuance hybridity
as a theoretical framework.
The specter of colonialism continues to haunt contemporary Malaysians. I
examined how the colonial vision of “race” manifested in the institutional structures of
Malaysian colonial society. I utilized Bourdieu as a framework to assess the effects of the
legacy of British colonialism on Chinese and Malay relations in Malaysia today. These
ethnic groups, having internalized these colonial schemes formed a habitus which
structured the social practices/policies that continue to construct the Chinese minority
along essentialized categories are more than just unscrupulous traders and opportunistic
440
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foreigners, I showed how early Chinese immigrants played an important role in the
assisting the Malay rulers in managing the trading affairs of the port-state. The Chinese
also created hybrid communities by inter-mingling and marrying local women.
Of course, there were ethnic tensions that pre-date British arrival in Malaysia.
However, the arrival of the British exacerbated the country’s ethnic tensions and
drastically altered the socio-economic and ethnic landscape of the country. Although
Malaysia’s plural and multi-cultural society was largely a byproduct of British colonial
policy, this policy also reified strict ethnic boundaries that have contributed to the
marginalization of non-Malays in Malaysia to this day. Bolstered by nineteenth century
theories of racial superiority, these policies became the discursive framework in which
the colonization of Malaysia took place. The British discouraged the Malays from
participating in economic and social activities of colonial Malaysia, because they were
deemed to be too docile and “lazy” to engage in the colonial economy. The colonial
government also implemented the “divide and rule” policy which prevented other ethnic
groups from integrating and forming real communities. Thus, the Chinese became
“othered” and stereotyped as invaders and ungrateful money grubbers; the Malays
resented how the Chinese were siphoning the country’s resources that they believed were
rightfully theirs.
The habitus of the colonial experience is not explicitly stated, but self-evident
within the “givens” of the social milieu. These “givens” continue to manifest themselves
in post-independent Malaysia. The trope of the greedy and ungrateful foreign Chinese
continues to resurface whenever there are any rumblings of protest and critiques against
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the ruling pro-Malay BN government. Most importantly, racial and ethnic boundaries are
strictly reinforced.
I stressed that the Chinese community is a heterogeneous group by exploring the
idea of Chineseness through fieldwork at Metro Church, a Chinese-majority Pentecostal
Church in Kuala Lumpur. Identity formation is a complex process that simultaneously
incorporates individual agency, group dynamics, and societal impositions. Further,
identity formation is a lifelong endeavor that includes the discovery, recovery and
appropriation of old, forgotten and new identities. This case study shows the Chinese in
Malaysia have different ways of conceptualizing their own Chineseness. Being urban
dwellers, most members of Metro Church qualified their view of what it meant to be
Chinese. Through my interviews, two categories began to emerge: the “Chinese” Chinese
and the “Modern” Chinese.
Malaysian Chinese ethnic identities are simultaneously constructed and flexible.
They also display attachments to static concepts. Chinese ethnic identities are constantly
shifting and fraught with tensions in maintaining both primordial and constructive
elements of their identities. Imagining identity as a process would mitigate between
“structure versus agency” dichotomies. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus offers a more
complex analysis of the context which compliments postcolonial scholarship on identity.
Metro Church members, informed by the habitus, are able to maintain primordial
attachments of their Chinese identities, while at the same time maintaining a
constructivist aspect of their Chineseness. As a historical byproduct of complex mixing
of socio-economic and cultural adaptations, primordial cultural patterns continue to
manifest and exert influence on the structures imposed in their lives. While this might
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sound deterministic, Bourdieu believes that circumstances may alter these patterns and
social agents can strategically maneuver within the habitus to maximize their potential to
“get ahead” in the game. As a result, they constructed what I call a Modern Chinese
identity. My analysis of the interviews reveals an example of unequal belonging where
the Modern Chinese disparages the Chinese Chinese group as “lacking – the Chinese
Chinese stand in opposition with Modern Chinese identity. Nevertheless, the most basic
understandings of the “rules of the game” do not change easily because they are
reinforced through the institutional structures and social practices of their lives.
This project also challenged conventional views of the role of Christianity in a
postcolonial context. To be a Chinese and Christian in Malaysia is to experience multiple
minority statuses. Politically and ethnically, the Chinese are a minority group in the
country, while being Christian also makes them a religious minority. Among postcolonial
studies, scholars interpret Christianity as colonial enterprise that continues to displace
indigenous cosmologies in a hegemonic manner. While I agree with that Christianity can
be hegemonic and could function as a vehicle for the “colonization of the mind” among
converts, I argued that conceptualizing Christianity as a tool of colonization or as an
instrument for liberation is inadequate. I stressed how Christianity serves as a vehicle for
socializing members into adopting certain orientations and practices in relation to their
surroundings. For the members of Metro Church, being a Chinese and Christian form
complex relationships involving religion, culture, and ethnicity.
Among Chinese Christians in Malaysia, the church becomes a site for the
production of, accumulation of, and access to cultural capital. Specifically, conversion to
Christianity re-orientates their Chinese identities and empowering them with access to
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cultural capital which helps counter the reified form of Chinese identity in Malaysia.
Through Christianity, they gain status through knowledge in English language and
western ideals. Yet, I do not mean this to be simply a matter of amassing power in terms
of the optimization of access to resources. This cultural capital functions ambiguously – it
is limited and unequal. Not everybody in the Chinese community could access this
capital, especially those Chinese who are not fluent in English or westernized.
The conventional focus on hybridity as a site of resistance and liberation, made
famous by Bhabha, and popularized among postcolonial scholars, cultural theorists, and
theologians misses the point in examining how and why certain hybridities are privileged
and ordered. Hybrid identities constructed by the Pentecostal Chinese community in
Malaysia are simultaneously oppressed and oppressing. They are engaging in what I call
“unequal belonging,” that is, the privileging of certain markers of identity over another.
This is most evident with church members’ views on syncretism – the practice of
blending and mixing different religious and cultural attributes.
Postcolonial studies have a penchant for diagnosing the ways in which oppression
and marginalization occur either directly or indirectly. In so doing, the discipline has
dedicated itself to developing theories dedicated to uncovering spaces where resistance
could take place. However, through Bourdieu’s categories of habitus, field, and capital, I
hope that I have shown how dominance could covertly (or overtly) mask itself through
fluid and dynamic constructions of hybrid identities. We need to locate some of the more
subtle workings of power and hegemony entrenched even among marginalized
communities. By closely examining the practitioners of these identities on the ground, I
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hope that this dissertation had achieved the task of exposing the limits of the discourse of
hybridity.

Further Research Recommendation: Searching for the “So What?”
When I first began this project, I sought to learn how members of a Chinesemajority Pentecostal Church in Malaysia understood their identities as simultaneously
Chinese and Christian. Moreover, I wanted to explore how these identity constructions
have the potential to resist the institutions of power in Malaysia that has systematically
tried to marginalize them. Although this dissertation uses a specific theory to argue for
unequal belonging within hybrid identities, the analysis provided in this project also
points to new avenues of inquiry and raises further questions.
The focus on a specific community and their everyday lived reality provided me
with insights which could complement postcolonial discourse and religious studies. In
particular, Metro Church members’ narratives offer illuminating perspectives on the
researcher’s position vis-à-vis his/her research participants. In addition, my research
points toward the question and importance of “divine presence.” Because my research
participants continually invoked God and God’s active role in structuring their identities,
we ought to take these narratives seriously instead of dismissing them as something that
is beyond the purview of the researcher.

Becoming the Critic and Caretaker
My home city, Kuala Lumpur, is undergoing massive transformation; new
structures are erected with each passing day; roads change and new elevated highways
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appear seemingly out of thin air. Historic and state of the art buildings stand side-by-side
in the heart of Kuala Lumpur, creating an atmosphere that is simultaneously chaotic and
congested. The city represents the old, the new, and those in between in full display. For
Malaysians, this is nothing new. The city is congested, chaotic, and messy. The hustle
and bustle of life and the smorgasbord of new and old are the things of daily occurrence.
The last description, “messy,” is especially poignant for me as I conclude this dissertation
project. Old and new are not easily demarcated in Kuala Lumpur. They are thrust into the
situation as old and new seamlessly bleed into one another. As a researcher conducting
fieldwork in his own backyard, I am retelling this story because it perfectly captures the
highly complex and debated issue of “insider” versus “outsider.”
When we address the insider/outsider question, we have to ask, what is our task as
religious scholars? On one side of the debate, we have scholars such as Russell
McCutcheon who argue that the religious scholar’s chief concern is to expose the
discursive battlefield taking place within the academic study of religion. Indeed, religious
scholars are to be critics – analyzing and developing theories that are sound – rather than
painstakingly detailing and describing the inner workings of a religious community,
characterized as the caretaker.441 Hence, the scholar, who is the outsider, provides the
most unbiased look at religion.
While this dissertation falls under the “critic” side of the debate, I fall in between
insider and outsider. As much as I believe in the importance of uncovering power
structures in the construction of religious identities, I cannot ignore the so-called
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mysteries, essences, and private experiences of religion and the people on the ground that
experience them. If all we do as scholars is to analyze the workings of power, how then
do we begin to reconcile the stories we have gathered from our research participants
whose experience with their gods and rituals are as real and immanent? In my own
research context, how do I account for Charismatic Chinese Christians speaking in
tongues, or retelling miraculous stories where God appeared to them and healed their
ailments, or delivered them from a potential tragedy?

The Question of “Divine Presence”
Along the same vein, Pentecostal/Charismatic Christianity is a religion that
focuses on the indwelling of the Spirit, spontaneous miracles and healings which fall
outside the range of the natural world. Yet, members of Metro Church take this as a very
natural thing. God plays a significant role in the lives of Metro Church. I saw this every
weekend at church while I was conducting fieldwork. People spoke in tongues, they were
slain in the Spirit, and they asked God to heal their sickness. They also asked God to help
them in the everyday activities that many would consider mundane, or even silly. It is not
uncommon to hear, for instance, stories where church members ask God to clear the
snarling traffic jam in Kuala Lumpur so that they could be at work in time. Although I
acknowledge that this project did not pay much attention to the workings of the divine in
church members’ lives, when God becomes vividly and tangibly present in their
narratives, the divine necessarily needs to be taken seriously in the way church members
construct their identities.
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However, metaphysical beings are beyond the purview of scientific and critical
inquiry. How then, do we begin to provide justifications and explanations incorporate this
very important feature in their lives in the discourse of identity? How do we take this
tangible reality of Metro Church members’ lives our analysis of identity formation? What
categories or interpretative lenses are available for us to analyze this phenomenon beyond
tried and true modern analytical tools? While I think social, political, and economic
explanations of peoples’ religious lives still have a lot of value, can we go beyond these
analyses? Better still, can we put “God” into these discourses?
Divine beings, spiritual ecstasies, and stories of miracles are central to the
religious lives of Metro Church members. Within the context of Catholic Marian
devotional practices Robert Orsi argues in his essay, “Abundant History,” that divine
presence need not be swept under the rug of modernity, as if this is something archaic or
delusional. Orsi further argues that these “abundant events” “requires a history of its own,
and experiences and practices of presence suggest the lineaments of that history.”442
I believe Orsi’s model of “abundant history” could provide new models in
analyzing identity construction that incorporates stories of the divine into the lives of the
people in my research context. I see Orsi’s abundant events as an “opening” of analysis.
Through this opening, researchers can begin to ask hard questions such as, how do we
account for the God and/or Spirit that many of my informants tell me is present in their
lives, walking with them, and influencing the way they think about their identities? If
identities are relational, are they in relationship with divine beings?
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Orsi could provide the study of the Pentecostal experience with a different
analytical lens. When Orsi mentions God irrupting into time, I see this as the introduction
of an unstable element into our stable analytical tools. The nature of ethnographic
fieldwork is that the researcher is bound by the whims and impulses of his/her research
participants. We can never be sure where the research would lead us to find. It is for this
reason that I find ethnographic research to be stimulating, even “dangerous” to a certain
extent. It is dangerous because it forces me, the researcher, to go places that I do not want
to go. It is the organic nature of ethnographic research that challenges the scholars to be
open to different and uncomfortable study results. When people talk about God entering
their lives, we have to consider that people’s lives and identities are not just about
oppression, liberation, survival, or resistance. Most of all, it allows our research to be
honest while honoring our informant’s narratives.
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